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Through examining how hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan imagine their cultural 
identities via ancestor memorialisation practices, this thesis aims to locate a 
theoretical framework that could concretise the abstract notion of cultural identity. I 
argue that a material-based cultural landscape provides an analytically more helpful 
framework than a shapeless and abstract notion of cultural identities based on 
intangible “values”. The aims of this study are twofold: first, to interrogate the 
narrative of the Chinese Diaspora; and second, to articulate a cultural space, grounded 
in practice, as a more stable platform to understand the abstract notion of cultural 
identity.  
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In On Not Speaking Chinese, cultural theorist Ien Ang recounted her embarrassment 
at a conference in a Chinese-speaking country where she, “a person with 
stereotypically Chinese physical characteristics”, could not speak Chinese. She also 
recounted her experience of her first trip to China in 1989 during which she was 
regarded as one of the “others” – a Westerner. Though Ang looked Chinese, she could 
not relate to her Chinese guide. Born into a peranakan1 Chinese family in 
postcolonial Indonesia, Ang grew up as an Indonesian citizen although the family 
“remained ethnically Chinese”. Instead of speaking Chinese – which could mean 
either Mandarin or one of the numerous Chinese dialects – Ang spoke bahasa 
Indonesia. The family migrated to the Netherlands following increased ethnic 
tensions in Indonesia in 1966 in which the Chinese minority was targeted. That move 
did not remove the “inescapability of my notional Chineseness”; no amount of 
explanation could convince people she was Dutch even though she spent her 
formative teenage years living and studying in the Netherlands.2 Ang’s situation 
reflected a disconnect between one’s cultural identifications and identity, which were 
not coterminous. 
Author and editor Lynn Pan, who also lived most of her life outside China, felt 
no such disconnect. Born in Shanghai, China, her family – including herself – left the 
city following the communist revolution in 1949; they were “exiled like millions of 
other Chinese”.3 She spent much of her childhood in Malaya before eventually 
settling in England. Unlike Ang, whose family was localised, whether in Indonesia or 
                                                
1 Local-born with Chinese and Malay (and sometimes Indian) parentage. 
2 Ien Ang, On not speaking Chinese: living between Asia and the West (London: Routledge, 2001). 
3 Lynn Pan, Tracing it home: journeys around a Chinese family (Singapore: Cultured Lotus, 2004), p 2.  
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the Netherlands, Pan’s family continued to live in the world they knew even after they 
left it: 
When my parents left Shanghai, they carried it with them to East 
Malaysia. They re-created the Shanghai of the heydays in this jungle…I 
lived in a completely insulated Chinese-Shanghainese world until I 
became an adult. My mother kept a Shanghainese kitchen in Sabah; I 
never discovered Nonya cuisine until I was a grown-up; I never ate at 
hawker stalls. We spoke Shanghainese. My parents had a clique of 
friends and they were all from Shanghai; they didn't mix with the local 
Chinese.4   
 
Pan’s pursuit of her ethnic and historical roots is evident in her works, most of 
which centre on the subject of China, Chinese identity and Chinese culture.5 She 
identifies with the Chinese culture and history, even if she articulates it in a non-
Chinese language – English.  
Ang and Pan are two examples of “Chinese” people with similar ethnic roots, 
but vastly different outlooks. They illustrate, in Pan’s words, the “varieties of 
Chinese”.6 At the heart of this discourse, China remains the core reference for all 
things Chinese, including the meaning of “Chinese-ness”. Fundamentally, the use of 
terms such as “overseas Chinese”, “Chinese overseas”, “mainland China” and even 
“Greater China” in these narratives all point to the centrality of China – both the 
geographic and cultural entity. This discourse seemingly fossilises the communities in 
an amorphous fuzzy idea of “being Chinese”. 
                                                
4 Vikram Khanna, Reviving a lost heritage: an interview with author Lynn Pan , 1995, 
http://www.sherryart.com/newstory/lynnpan.html (accessed September 7, 2012). 
5 Pan’s works include In search of old Shanghai (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Co., 1982); Old 
Shanghai: gangsters in paradise (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Trade, 1984); China's sorrow: 
journeys around the Yellow River (London: Century Pub, 1985); The new Chinese revolution (London: 
H. Hamilton, 1987); Sons of the yellow emperor: a history of the Chinese diaspora (New York: 
Kodansha Globe, 1994); and Tracing it home: journeys around a Chinese family (Singapore: Cultured 
Lotus, 2004). Pan was also the editor of The encyclopedia of Overseas Chinese (Singapore: Editions 
Didier Millet, 2006).  
6 Pan, The encyclopedia, p 15.  
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This thesis seeks to understand the phenomenon of how descendants of the 
“Chinese Diaspora”, born and bred in their “host countries” imagine their cultural 
identities. I argue for the need to delink ethnic and cultural identities, and that the hua 
ren communities outside China have moved beyond the “Chinese Diaspora” narrative 
in terms of identity. I contend that one’s cultural identity should be viewed as a 
multidirectional entity that is constantly changing and shaped by one’s local context. 
 
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
Cultural theorist Stuart Hall argued that instead of perceiving identity as an essence or 
an accomplished fact, 
we should think, instead, of identity as a ‘production’, which is never 
complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, 
representation.7 
 
Hall argued that this approach will undo the intellectual shackles of cultural identities 
to the idea of origins, of authenticity, which necessarily indicates that a cultural 
identity is a given, an unchanging end product. It is this very intellectual shackle that 
scholars such as Ien Ang and Rey Chow argued against in their critical studies of 
“Chinese-ness”. It is in this spirit that this dissertation seeks to challenge the 
framework of understanding the cultural identity of hua ren outside China. 
This dissertation addresses the issue of “being Chinese” within the framework 
of a practice-based definition of culture. I contend that this approach provides a more 
grounded and non-essentialist framework in which to understand and analyse 
                                                
7 Stuart Hall, “Cultural identity and diaspora,” in Identity: community, culture, difference, ed. Jonathan 
Rutherford, 222-237 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1990), at p 222. 
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contemporary hua ren cultural identities. Specifically, this study examines “being 
Chinese” through the cultural practice of memorialisation. 
This thesis makes a case for the need to separate ethnic and cultural identities. 
Ethnicity and culture are two complex issues, widely used and fraught with 
vagueness. Scholars have yet to reach a consensus on the definitions of ethnicity and 
culture. It is not the intention of this thesis to launch into a debate of what ethnicity 
and culture are or are not. For the purpose of this thesis, I adopt broad definitions of 
ethnicity and culture. In this thesis, I follow Max Weber’s definition of ethnicity or 
ethnic groups which he defined as 
human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent 
because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because 
of memories of colonisation and migration.8 
 
Culture in this thesis refers to  
  
that complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, 
customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired (as a member of 
that group).9 
 
Ethnic identity thus consists of a group’s subjective symbolic or emblematic 
use of any aspect of culture, usually to differentiate themselves from other groups. 
Culture, on the other hand, is a way of living which can be acquired and is 
independent of one’s ethnic origins. Ethnicity is often imposed from outside or 
embraced from within by the group members.10 
                                                
8 Max Weber, Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 
1968), p 389. 
9 Sociological theory: a book of readings, ed. Lewis A. Coser and Bernard Rosenberg (New York: 
MacMillan, 1976), p 18.  
10 George de Vos, “Ethnic pluralism: conflict and accommodation,” in Ethnic identity: cultural 
continuities and change, ed. George de Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, 5-41 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), at pp 16-17. 
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The issue of “being Chinese” – ethnically and culturally – is of great 
importance especially among the “foreign Chinese”11 outside China as Pan 
conceptualised and as Ang personified. The concern of the “foreign Chinese” with the 
issue of “being Chinese” is possibly because of a perceived “lack” – of being 
separated from the motherland, the source of culture and identity – which motivates a 
need for connection. Many of these latter generations of “Overseas Chinese” have 
little or no contact with China or their cultural heritage except by way of their elderly 
family members and traditional customs that are maintained, for example, celebrating 
Chinese New Year or observing Qing Ming. Despite their relative social distance 
from China, they are still often seen as part of the Chinese Diaspora – the wave of 
mass emigration from mainland China from the 19th century through to 1949. 
Removed from China, physically, emotionally and at times, culturally, how do these 
“Overseas Chinese” imagine their cultural identities and identifications?  
This study examines this question, using the case studies of Singapore and 
Taiwan. The aims of this study are twofold: first, to interrogate the narrative of the 
Chinese Diaspora; and second, to articulate a cultural space, grounded in practice, as a 
more stable platform to understand the abstract notion of cultural identity. This 
approach follows Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of the logic of practice which emphasised 
the importance of social performances and actions. Unlike rational choice theory 
which proposed that individuals operate based on continuous calculations according 
to explicit rational and economic criteria, Bourdieu argued that social agents operate 
according to an implicit practical sense and bodily dispositions. Inherent in the logic 
                                                
11 Pan, The encyclopedia, p 15. 
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of practice is that practices – rites, rituals, and social performances – “have no other 
raison d’être than that they exist or are socially recognised as worthy of existing”.12 
The majority of the literature on “Chinese” identities and “Chineseness” has, 
so far, treated social practices as one of the features of what makes one “Chinese”.13 
Many scholars have analysed the how and why of the practices, trying to interpret 
what the variations in forms and substance, and the underlying cultural values and 
beliefs – which may at times seem contradictory – mean. In so doing, it raises the 
problem of reification of the practices as objects, which have to have a meaning, a 
rationale, or a coherence to be understood. Clarity is assumed. The existing literature 
and narratives attempt to make sense of social practices and values, on the assumption 
that there is sense to be made.  
This study will show that such a rationalised approach to cultural practices, as 
Bourdieu argued, strips the practices  
of everything that defines them distinctively as practices, that is, the 
uncertainty and “fuzziness” resulting from the fact that they have as their 
principle not a set of conscious, constant rules, but practical schemes, 
opaque to their possessors, varying according to the logic of the 
situation, the almost invariably partial viewpoint which it imposes.14 
 
I argue that in attempting to understand the contemporary cultural identities of hua 
ren, one needs a new framework that does not undermine the logic of practice. I 
contend that cultural identity has to be viewed as a multidirectional concept, which is 
shaped by the temporal and geographic contexts of the individual. As cultural identity 
                                                
12 Pierre Bourdieu, The logic of practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p 18. 
13 The body of literature is vast. The following are just some of the key titles. See for example Pan, The 
encyclopaedia; Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu, ed., Changing identities of the Southeast Asian 
Chinese since World War II, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1988); Aihwa Ong, Nonini 
and Donald M., ed., Ungrounded empires: the cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism; 
Brandy Lien Worrall, ed., Finding memories, tracing routes: Chinese Canadian family stories, 
(Vancouver: Chinese Canadian Historical Society of British Columbia, 2007); Wei Djao, Being 
Chinese: voices from the diaspora (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2003).  
14 Bourdieu, The logic of practice, p 12.  
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is a process of becoming, it is not a fixed given, but is shaped by multiple forces, 
including politics, education, class and even gender. In light of this, I argue that the 
ethnic identifications of the hua ren in contemporary Singapore and Taiwan may 
constitute what American sociologist Herbert Gans termed “symbolic ethnicity”.15 In 
Gan’s conceptualisation, symbolic ethnicity is a feature of 3rd and 4th generation 
Americans who “perform” their ethnic identity – such as participating in festivals or 
rituals – rather than be anchored in a pre-conceived role of “being” that ethnicity. 
This, I contend, is the case of Singapore and Taiwan hua ren. While they may have 
taken on cultural elements that are not “ethnically Chinese”, they nevertheless still 
see themselves as “Chinese” because it is just who their forefathers are.  
 In this thesis, I use the term hua ren in place of “Chinese” to refer to ethnic 
Chinese born outside China. The frameworks currently employed in the 
understanding of hua ren cultural identities are generally unsatisfactory because of 
the embedded assumptions. First, the overly broad use of the term “Chinese”; second, 
the use of the amorphous “Chinese-ness” in characterising all “Chinese” people; and 
third, the imprecise usage of the term “Chinese Diaspora” without delimiting the 
boundaries of who the term refers to. “Being Chinese”, it seems, is used 
simultaneously to refer to an ethnic, cultural and political identity. This inflated 
notion of “Chineseness” is, to a large extent, colonising. Cultural dis-affinities – such 
as not using chopsticks and the inability to speak Mandarin – notwithstanding, one is 
“Chinese” by virtue of one’s birth to “Chinese” parents. The “unalterable essence of 
Chineseness” may include norms that, according to historian Wang Gungwu, 
“Chinese consider binding on them as Chinese (even when they are unable to attain 
                                                
15 Herbert J. Gans, “Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1979): 1-20 at p 9. 
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them)”.16 Many of these “standards” are unachievable in the contemporary post-
modern, post-colonial world of globalisation, and after decades – if not centuries – of 
localisation. These essentialist and somewhat chauvinistic views of the “Chinese” 
identity fundamentally tie all “Chinese” back to a historical and cultural entity.  It 
denies them agency in their cultural identifications. For these reasons, I argue that this 
is an outdated and unsatisfactory frame with which to understand contemporary 
“Chinese” identities. 
Most studies on the “Chinese Diaspora” fall into two categories. The first 
takes a historical approach, tracing the history of Chinese migration and the resulting 
development of “overseas Chinese” communities and their social features. The 
second category of studies adopts a sociological approach in examining the issues of 
cultures and identities. They focus on ideas such as the assimilation, acculturation or 
isolation and discrimination of “Chinese” communities from the “host” countries, as 
well as their search for roots and cultural identities. While each approach contributes 
to the understanding of a social phenomenon that marked the 20th century, the 
concept of “Chinese Diaspora” has been used too broadly. There is no delimiting 
when the diaspora ended and when an independent local identity began.  
I argue for the need to unpack the definitions and concepts of “Chinese” and 
the “Chinese Diaspora”. Thus, in this study I use the term “Chinese” only to refer to 
nationals of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). When referring to ethnic 
“Chinese” citizens of Singapore and Taiwan (and any other countries with an ethnic 
Chinese population for that matter), I use the term hua ren (华人) to avoid conflation 
and confusion. I also argue that even though hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan can 
                                                
16 Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p 213.  
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trace their history and heritage to the “Chinese Diaspora”, they should no longer be 




This study examines the issue of the cultural identifications of hua ren in Singapore 
and Taiwan. These sites were chosen because they are territories with a hua ren 
majority, and are politically separate from the PRC. Many studies on hua ren cultural 
identities centre on sites in which hua ren are a minority, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Europe and the United States. I want to move away from the minority studies angle 
and look at how hua ren negotiate and imagine their identity in a location and 
environment in which they are not the minority, struggling to make themselves 
visible. The few studies on hua ren majority territories tend to view the hua ren 
population as cultural extensions of China because of the ethnic connection.17 Some 
studies have also tried to argue for the development of a distinctive local culture, most 
notably in the case of Hong Kong and Taiwan.18  
The choice of the two sites also allows for comparison and contrast. Singapore 
is a former British colony dominated by hua ren – demographically, politically (post-
1965), economically and socially. At the same time that the government and society 
operates on Western models of politics and economy, it promotes the retention of 
                                                
17 See treatment of Singapore case, for example, in Pan’s Encyclopedia and Sons of the Yellow 
Emperor. See also James Watson and Rubie Watson, Village Life in Hong Kong: politics, gender, and 
ritual in the New Territories (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2004), among others. 
18 See for instance Jonathan Grant, “Cultural formation in postwar Hong Kong,” in Hong Kong 
reintegrating with China: political, cultural and social dimensions, ed. Pui Tak Lee, 159-180 (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001). in Cultural, ethnic and political nationalism in 
contemporary Taiwan, ed. John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); 
Michael Ingham, Hong Kong: a cultural and literary history (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2007); Melissa J Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese?: the impact of culture, power, and migration on 
changing identities (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), among others.  
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“Chinese” culture. Yet it is conscious of reminding Singapore hua ren that their 
political loyalty lies with the island state. In this case, Singapore’s approach considers 
cultural identification as that – cultural. 
Although Taiwan also has a hua ren majority, its political status is more 
ambiguous. While a section of Taiwan society lobbies for independence from PRC, 
there are also groups who believe that Taiwan should rightfully re-unite with the 
PRC, given its history. Taiwan’s historical baggage vis-à-vis China is much heavier 
and more complicated than that of Singapore’s, whose relationship is more pragmatic 
and economic in nature. There are strong contesting tensions over its cultural 
identification, notably between “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” cultures. Implicit in this 
dichotomy is that “Taiwanese” culture is not “Chinese” culture. Though Taiwan has 
often sought to distance itself culturally from China and “Chinese” identity, 
ironically, in some sense, Taiwan is often regarded as the last vestige of “traditional 
Chinese” culture, which has been ruptured on the PRC. 
 This study explores the cultural identities of the hua ren in Singapore and 
Taiwan through the practice of memorialisation of ancestors. I have chosen 
memorialisation of ancestors – of which ancestor worship is a key practice – as a set 
of practices that transcend linguistic and regional differences. Ancestor worship, in 
particular, has also been perceived as a distinctively “Chinese” practice which has a 
long history and continues to be practiced, with variation, today. Analytically, the 
focus on practices also gives shape and visibility to the otherwise nebulous concept of 
cultural identity. Observation and study of the practices, the interactions of the 
practitioners and the acts, and the attitudes of the practitioners towards the acts 
provides a picture of how hua ren locate, define and express themselves culturally.  
  Jaime Koh 
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MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
This dissertation is primarily motivated by a failure of the current literature to address 
the issue of variable cultural imaginations of hua ren. Existing literature tends to 
pervade a homogenous hua ren identity through the constant use of the abstract and 
amorphous terms “Chinese” and “Chinese-ness”. The research is also motivated by 
my personal experiences while studying aboard. My interest in the issue of cultural 
imagination was piqued by my acquaintances’ constant insistence that I “ought to 
know” everything about China because I am ethnic “Chinese”. Born in Singapore, I 
grew up with hua ren culture – my family practices ancestor worship, celebrates 
“Chinese” festivals and generally subscribes to “Chinese” values such as filial piety, 
respect for the elderly, subscription to social hierarchy and importance of the family. 
My identity card states my “race” as “Chinese” because my parents are “Chinese” 
with “Chinese” surnames. Although my studies and work brought me into contact 
with non hua ren in Singapore, my racial, ethnic and cultural identity as a Singapore 
hua ren was rarely questioned, precisely because the interaction was conducted in a 
Singapore hua ren dominated environment.  
That changed when I went to live in Sydney, Australia for three years, 
between 2005 and 2008. During that time, I studied and worked with an international 
group of students and academics. Whenever the issue of “Chinese” ethnicity, culture 
and history (usually of China) cropped up, the questions and comments were 
inevitably directed towards me. I was expected to be able to answer their questions of 
all things China and “Chinese” because of my ethnic background. My attempts to 
explain to them the differences between the “Chinese” as cultural, ethnic and national 
identity were not always successful. These experiences heightened the consciousness 
of my cultural and ethnic identity vis-à-vis the non-Chinese.  
  Jaime Koh 
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Several other developments also prompted me to reflect on the issues of 
culture and ethnicity. On my return to Singapore, I noted an increase in the presence 
of Chinese Mainlanders – PRC citizens – here. Although also seen as “Chinese”, daily 
interactions with them, and the responses of fellow Singaporea hua ren to the 
Mainlander presence highlighted the cultural distinctions between the two groups. 
Around the same time, there were political and cultural movements in Hong Kong 
and Taiwan to differentiate and distance these hua ren communities from “Chinese” 
identity. Since early 2000, Hong Kong citizens have at various intervals protested 
against the central government in Beijing’s attempts to incorporate them further into 
the PRC political orbit. In 2004, I was in Hong Kong as a reporter to cover the 
protests against changes to the legislative council elections. The sense that Hong 
Kongers were culturally distinct from the Mainlanders came across strongly, even in 
the day-to-day interactions with the people on the street. In Taiwan, the localisation 
movement was strengthened with the election and re-election of Chen Shui-bian, a 
pro-independence “native Taiwanese” as president. The push for a “Taiwanese” 
identity, which started in the 1970s was growing stronger.  
These encounters highlighted the reality of variable hua ren identities, which 
are closely intertwined with politics, history and family, which were not reflected in 
the literature. Nationality and citizenship aside, how can we explain the cultural gulf 
between the various groups which are deemed to be members of the same ethnic 
group? How can we appreciate the distinctions and differences without discrediting 
the processes of localisation? Cultural memories, as manifested in traditional and 
customary practices relating to language, education, religious and spiritual beliefs, 
folk festivals and historical events, is a potential approach in which to answer this 
question. Thus, I decided to explore these differing identities to understand what ties 
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hua ren (or a community) together, and what distinctions and differences may arise as 
a result of the respective local environments. 
 
 
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
This dissertation adopts an interdisciplinary approach. Most of the data used are from 
English and Mandarin published sources on “Chinese” practices, social conditions 
and community studies of both Singapore and Taiwan. This existing literature is 
augmented with contemporary data gathered through interviews, surveys and 
participant observation at the two sites. 
 The material forms of culture – scriptures, literature, dance, myths, songs, 
records, maps, films etc – are some of the most tangible representations and 
embodiments of the particular history and values of the culture. The performances of 
the culture – rites, rituals and habits – are also visible representations and 
embodiments of the culture, although it is methodologically more complex to analyse 
than the material forms. One of the key challenges in using practices as the object of 
analysis is the question of whether the individual performer or the culture itself is to 
be considered as a variable in accounting for differences. Practices are not static and 
unchanging. In fact, as will be argued throughout the dissertation, cultural practices 
adapt and change with not just the individuals performing them, but also as a result of 
the changing social milieu in which the practices are performed.  
 Writing about the construction of an “East Asian popular culture” as an object 
of analysis, sociologist Chua Beng Huat argued that the analytic interest should not be 
on the cultural products – films, television dramas, celebrities, music – “although they 
constitute the empirical material of the analysis”. Instead,  
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the larger analytic interest should be oriented towards the structures and 
modalities through which the products partake in the social and economic 
material relations within the different locations where the products are 
produced, circulated and consumed.19   
 
Similarly, I argue that in using cultural practices as the object of analysis, the analytic 
focus should be on the material environment in which the practices take place.  
To this end, I adopt an interdisciplinary approach that utilises methodologies 
from history, sociology and anthropology. This enables a clearer construction of the 
process of cultural change or continuity as the analytical focus is not quantitative as it 
is qualitative. The historical approach, as reflected in the literature review, allows a 
contextual understanding of the origins of the practices and the ideas behind the 
practices. Sociological and anthropological methods such as surveys, interviews and 
participant observation allow for the gathering of contemporary data which provides a 
basis of comparison against the historical information. The interdisciplinary approach 
also allows for a clearer picture of the network of relations and the interactions 
between the individuals in their respective roles, as well as of ideas of the various 
generations.   
 
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation seeks to understand the phenomenon of hua ren cultural identities 
within the contexts of the family, community and nation. I argue for a rethink of how 
hua ren identity and identifications are considered. I contend that there is a need to 
                                                
19 Chua Beng Huat, “Concpetualizing an East Asian popular culture,” in The inter-Asia cultural studies 
reader, ed. Kuan-hsing Chen and Beng Huat Chua, 115-139 (London, Routledge, 2007), at p 120. 
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move beyond the “Chinese Diaspora” narrative when it comes to studies of hua ren 
communities.  
Chapter 1 questions the effectiveness of the English term “Chinese” in hua ren 
studies and proposes the use of a more neutral and nuanced term, hua ren when 
referring to ethnic Chinese who are not China nationals. Here, I lay out the theoretical 
frameworks used in current studies relating to hua ren identities and argue for a 
paradigm shift in framing hua ren cultural identities. I argue for the need to articulate 
a hua ren cultural space that is neither culturally essentialist nor triumphalist. I 
propose the concept of the Sinoscape as an alternative platform to understand the 
abstract notion of cultural identity. The proposed Sinoscape is based on cultural 
practices, and in this dissertation, I focus on activities relating to the memorialisation 
of ancestors. 
In Chapter 2, I explore the importance of family and kinship within the 
Sinoscape. I trace the development of these ideas and its significance as articulated 
through the practices of memorialisation of ancestors, and examine how these 
practices and values are idealised in the greater narrative of “being Chinese”.  
Chapter 3 spells out the methodological approaches used in this dissertation, 
including the limitations. In Chapters 4 and 5, I examine how these memorialisation 
practices and values operate in the contemporary everyday life of hua ren in 
Singapore and Taiwan. This discussion is based on information obtained through 
interviews, surveys and participant observation. 
Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the contemporary situations in Singapore and 
Taiwan. It makes the case for a paradigm shift, discussed in Chapter 1, and 
emphasises the necessity of moving beyond the universal/particular paradigm. I argue 
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that there is a need to rethink the cultural identities of hua ren outside the contexts of 
the “Chinese diaspora” and of differences and similarities. I contend that the 
Sinoscape is a symbolic one that reflects the symbolic nature of hua ren cultural 
identities, which are not identities that are essentialised to just a few features. In 
rethinking the cultural position of hua ren, the historical and social processes of “how 
we got here” and “where we are at” should be considered, rather than letting “where 
we came from” overshadow the present. This, I argue, is possible if we consider 








CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
In the past two decades, the notion of “Chineseness” has been extensively discussed, 
analysed and investigated through various perspectives, including theoretical, 
anthropological, historical, sociological, literary and cultural paradigms.20 The 
discussion has spilled from the academia to popular forums such as huaren.org, an 
independent and non-partisan website set up in the late 1990s. It was set up in 
response to the anti-Chinese movement in Indonesia, with the objective of being “a 
forum for huaren around the world to discuss issues which concern them and address 
those concerns where appropriate”.21 In Singapore, for example, the discursive space 
for issues of “Chinese” identity has also been enlarged with the setting up of 
institutions such as the Chinese Heritage Centre (in 1995) and the Confucius Institute 
(in 2005), both based in Nanyang Technological University. Such high levels and 
public expressiosn of interest in “Chinese” issues are in stark contrast to the period 
between 1950s and early 1990s, where states and groups sought to distance 
themselves from mainland China and communism. Today, mainland China is still 
ruled by communism, but has lost the menacing edge. In place of ideological conflict 
is a booming economy that is one of the world’s largest. The rise of China as an 
economic power partly explains the resurgence of interest in all things “Chinese”.  
                                                
20 Some of the key works often cited include Ien Ang, On not speaking Chinese: living between Asia 
and the West (London: Routledge, 2001); Allen Chun, “Fuck Chineseness: on the ambiguities of 
ethnicity as culture as identity,” boundary 2 23, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 111-138; Aihwa and Donald M 
Nonini Ong, ed., Ungrounded empires: the cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism, (New 
York: Routledge, 1997); Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural China: the periphery as the center,” in The living 
tree: the changing meaning of being Chinese today, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) and 
Vivienne Wee, “What does "Chinese" mean? An exploratory essay,” Department of Sociology, 
National University of Singapore (1988). This list is not exhuastive.  
21 Ien Ang, On not speaking Chinese: living between Asia and the West (London: Routledge, 2001), p 
57. See also WHF Mission Statement , http://www.huaren.org/home/mission-and-objectives (accessed 
December 10, 2012). 
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Yet, the existing academic frameworks in which “Chinese” identities are being 
analysed cannot be fully applied to the “Chinese” who are not nationals of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Despite the acknowledgement of the different 
developments of “Chinese” communities outside China, there is still a fundamental 
amorphousness in the terms “Chinese” and “Chinese-ness”. This is most notably due 
to the limitations of the English terminology. The English term “Chinese” used to 
describe people with “Chinese” ethnicity and cultural heritage is an inflated term that 
simultaneously denotes ethnic, cultural and national identities. Furthermore, the 
continued usage of the term “Chinese Diaspora” without delimiting the historical 
boundaries is unhelpful in analysing contemporary “Chinese” societies.  
This dissertation makes the argument for a theoretical rethink of the current 
paradigms used in analysing “Overseas Chinese” communities. I contend that there is 
a need to delink ethnic and cultural identities, which are not necessarily contiguous. 
The delinking of the two related but different concepts will assist in generating a more 
helpful framework in which to study cultural identities. In the case of “Overseas 
Chinese” communities, this approach is significant because the conflation of ethnic, 
cultural and national identities have muddied the waters, so to speak. This point will 
be elaborated later.  
In place of the Chinese Diaspora framework, which has been dominant in the 
studies of “Overseas Chinese” communities, I propose a practice-based cultural space 
I term Sinoscape in which the cultural imaginations of “being Chinese” are 
constructed, negotiated and transmitted. A first step in defining the Sinoscape is to 
unpack the definitions of “Chinese” and “being Chinese”. This chapter outlines the 
major conceptual frameworks that have been used to study the “Chinese” 
communities outside China and argues that they have reduced relevance in today’s 
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context. There is a need to interrogate the taken-for-granted concepts and assumptions 
especially in an age where cultural distinctness is increasingly tied to nationalism. I 
argue for the need to use the term “Chinese” critically, instead of using it as an all-
embracing term for people of “Chinese” cultural and ethnic heritage. To avoid 
confusion, I use the term “Chinese” to refer to PRC nationals and hua ren when 
referring to ethnic Chinese born overseas (or “Overseas Chinese) of other 
nationalities. Following that, I analyse possible frameworks in which to study hua ren 
communities. I conclude this chapter by proposing a practice-based conceptual 
framework through which hua ren communities can be analysed.  
 
 
ETHNICITY AND CULTURE 
 
Ethnicity remains an elusive concept despite the massive body of literature dedicated 
to the subject. It is regarded as a classification of people and group relationships22 
with a distinctive set of claims. These include a claim to kinship, fictive or otherwise, 
based on a myth of common ancestry; a claim to a common history or shared 
memories of a common past; and a claim to a common set of cultural symbols, which 
can include religion, customs and language.23 Other feature of an ethnic group may be 
a link to a common homeland, not necessarily in the physical occupation of the 
territory, but rather be a symbolic attachment, as in the case of diasporas.24 German 
sociologist Max Weber offered a succinct definition of ethnic groups as 
                                                
22 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and nationalism: anthropological perspectives (London: Pluto 
Press, 1993), p 4.  
23 Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartman, Ethnicity and race: making identities in a changing world 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Pine Forge Press, 1998), p 19; Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
24 Hutchinson and Smith (ed), Ethnicity.  
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human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent 
because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because 
of memories of colonisation and migration.25 
 
A key feature of Weber’s definition of ethnicity is the belief of a common origin or 
shared ancestry, factual or otherwise. This belief is “important for the propagation of 
group formation…whether or not an objective blood relationship exists”.26 During the 
course of the 20th century, Weber’s definition has been enlarged to include shared 
culture – such as language, culture, customs and even race – as markers, of group 
identity. This understanding highlights two components of ethnicity – race or physical 
attributes, and cultural attributes.  
Ethnicity can only make sense as a differentiating category against the 
“others”: 
To claim an ethnic identity (or to attempt to assign one to someone else) 
is to distinguish ourselves from others; it is to draw a boundary between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ on the basis of the claims we make about ourselves and 
them, that ‘we’ share something that ‘they’ do not. An ethnic group 
cannot exist in isolation. It has meaning only in a context that involves 
others…27  
 
In short, ethnicity can be described as a “subjective symbolic or emblematic use of 
any aspect of culture, in order to differentiate…from other groups”.28 The emphasis 
on boundaries – marked by cultural beliefs and practices – enhances the group 
identity. It is the cultural similarities among the likes and cultural differences from 
others that cement the particular identity. The “authenticity” of any ethnic group is 
often determined by a list of cultural characteristics. The group’s ethnic identity is 
                                                
25 Max Weber, Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology (New York: Bedminster 
Press, 1968), p 389. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Cornell and Hartman, Ethnicity and race, p 20. 
28 George de Vos, “Ethnic pluralism: conflict and accommodation,” in Ethnic identity: cultural 
continuities and change, ed. George de Vos and Lola Romanucci-Ross, 5-41 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982) at p 16. 
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maintained through the continued performce of the cultural practices and belief in the 
cultural values. Any departures from these actions “are typically defined as a loss or 
abandonment of one’s own culture and a betrayal of one’s own people or group”.29 In 
the case of the “Chinese”, inability to speak Mandarin, dialects or religious 
conversion, as well as inter-group marriages are often construed as forms of cultural 
erosion. 
The overemphasis on ethnic authenticity has led to the equation of ethnicity 
with culture. This leads to the question: what is culture? From its original meaning of 
cultivation, honour and worship, the term “culture” has since evolved to a term that 
refers to several things: a general progress of spiritual and aesthetic development; a 
particular way of life of a group or period; and the material beings of intellectual and 
artistic development, including music, literature, art, theatre and film etc.30 Whether 
“culture is tacit, lived, and physically felt rather than realised and verbalised”,31 it 
cannot be divorced from the society in which it is developed.32 In this thesis, culture 
refers to “the total of the inherited ideas, beliefs, values, and knowledge, which 
constitute the shared bases of social action” and reinforced by members of the 
particular group.33 Hence one’s cultural identity encompasses ideas, beliefs, values 
and knowledge. 
While culture is implicated in ethnic identity and relations, the equation of 
ethnicity and culture downplays the social and material environment in which an 
individual lives. It also underplays the significance of the creation and use of cultural 
                                                
29 Maykel Verkuyten, The social psychology of ethnic identity (Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press, 
2005), p 77.  
30 Raymond Williams, Keywords: a vocabulary of culture and society (London: Fontana, 1976), pp 76 
– 82. 
31 Verkuyten, The social psychology of ethnic identity, p 77. 
32 See Raymond Williams, Culture and society, 1780-1950 (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1961). 
33 Culture. Dictionary.com. Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. 
HarperCollins Publishers. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/culture (accessed: November 18, 
2012). 
  Jaime Koh 
 
 31 
meanings, undermining cultural production in place of a culturally deterministic way 
of viewing society. Instead of viewing identity as “becoming”, a process that “takes 
place within a particular rhetorical context by mobilising and interpreting cultural 
discourses”,34 the ethnicity-as-culture approach views identity as “being”. In “being” 
an identity, one is essentialised by a pre-determined framework, an essentialised and 
given identity.  
This thesis argues that the cultural component of an identity is not necessarily 
congruent with one’s ethnic identity, and that it is not a fixed given. Ethnicity is often 
manipulated by politics. As David Wu wrote in his study on the ethnic minority Bai 
group in China:  
Within China, official policies alone can label acculturated Chinese 
as non-Chinese. In the situation overseas, owing to the politics and 
conventional thinking about race and culture, many Chinese who 
have acculturated to the indigenous population are still labelled 
Chinese…35 
 
Political manipulation of ethnicity and ethnic labels takes place everywhere, 
including in Singapore and Taiwan, as later chapters show. Hence, it is critical to 
distinguish between one’s ethnic identity and cultural identity. This thesis follows the 
arguments of contemporary ethnic studies and identity studies which posit that 
identity is not as a static given, but highlights the multiple nature of identities, and the 
process of construction of identities. 
 
                                                
34 Verkuyten, The social psychology of ethnic identity, p 81. 
35 David Yen-ho Wu, “The construction of Chinese and non-Chinese identities,” in The living tree: the 
changing meaning of being Chinese today, ed. Wei-ming Tu, 159-180 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1994), p 166. 
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BEING CHINESE  
Before I go on to outline the practice-based framework of the Sinoscape, I want to 
address the conceptual problems of using the term “Chinese” and the “Chinese 
Diaspora” framework in the understanding of contemporary cultural identities among 
hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan. In this section, I argue for the use of the term hua 
ren instead of “Chinese” when referring to ethnic Chinese communities outside of the 
PRC.  
In this study I found it problematic to use the term “Chinese” because it is an 
English term that is overly inflated. It is both a noun and an adjective that denotes 
many things, including the language, script, cuisines, people and practices associated 
with China – itself an expansive idea that can refer to the historical China, the cultural 
China and the political China (PRC), a situation rarely clarified. The broadness of the 
term makes it too imprecise and elastic to be analytically useful. Used without 
discretion, the resulting analysis can be potentially ambiguous.  
Most critical of all is the term’s conflation of nationality, ethnic and cultural 
identities, with little, if any, distinction between the three concepts. “Chinese” as 
nationality is perhaps the clearest idea to understand – it refers to citizens of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) – zhong guo ren (中国人). At the same time, the 
term is also used to denote an ethnic identity, the “Chinese race” or “Han” (汉). When 
used to refer to PRC citizens, the term’s reference to nationality and ethnic identity 
overlaps, since Han is the largest of the 56 officially recognised ethnic groups in PRC, 
comprising 91.51% of the total population.36 As an ethnic label, “Han” is often used 
                                                
36 National Bureau of Statistis of China, 2010年第六次全国人口普查主要数据公报 (Communiqué of 
the National Bureau of Statistics of People's Republic of China on Major Figures of the 2010 
Population Census[1] (No. 1)), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/newsandcomingevents/t20110428_402722244.htm (accessed June 6, 
2012). 
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interchangeably with “Chinese”, especially in contexts where differentiation with 
other non-Han ethnic groups are required, such as in the case of the officially 
recognised minority groups in the PRC.  
Being an ethnic “Chinese” is, to a certain extent, manifested in a person’s 
physical traits such as appearance (black hair, yellow skin), speech (dialects or 
Mandarin) and ownership of a “Chinese” family name, which in turn links one to the 
common origins shared by other ethnic “Chinese” of a different family name. Being 
“Chinese” culturally is harder to pin down. For some, “being Chinese” is a primordial 
essence that transcends temporal and spatial limitations as highlighted by the 
following two quotations from Lynn Pan’s seminal transnational history of the 
Chinese Diaspora, Sons of the Yellow Emperor:  
The shop-girl that you see in the doorway, the one spooning rice into her 
mouth – she may never eat with chopsticks, she may have difficulty 
forcing her thoughts into Mandarin, but she is pure Chinese, with not a 




To talk to Singaporeans is to realise that what qualifies one as Chinese in 
Singapore is not so much language, or religion, or any of the other 
markers of ethnicity, but some primordial core or unalterable essence of 
Chineseness which one has by virtue of one’s Chinese genes – so that, as 
Clammer puts it, “one cannot become a Chinese unless one is born as 
such and nor strictly speaking can one cease to be a Chinese either, 




The first extract describes a Thai-Chinese girl in Thailand while the second 
excerpt refers to a “Chinese” Singaporean. Although the circumstances in which the 
two individuals lived and worked in would have been different, they can be 
considered members of a “Chinese” cultural group because they were born as 
                                                
37 Pan, Sons of the yellow emperor, p 299. Emphasis added. 
38 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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“Chinese”, regardless of other external cultural influences, as the second quotation 
implies. In this narrative, “Chinese” are “Chinese” because there is an essence and a 
“desired or expected cultural pattern” which historian Wang Gungwu regards as those 
that “Chinese consider binding on them as Chinese (even when they are unable to 
attain them)”.39 These may include being an ethnic “Chinese” by descent – often the 
only “reason” needed to be considered “Chinese”; having the ability to speak the 
language (Mandarin) and/or the ancestral dialects; having the ability to understand 
and write the Mandarin script; practicing the “Chinese” code of ethics (notably 
Confucian values); participation in “Chinese” religions and its practices; observation 
of “Chinese” social practices such as customs relating to birth, death and marriage, 
and having an attachment to China as “home”.  
While the above quotes illustrate the belief that cultural dis-affinities 
notwithstanding, one is regarded as “Chinese” – ethnically and culturally – by dint of 
one’s birth to “Chinese” parents. This primordial line of argument follows that anyone 
with remotely any “Chinese” blood can be and is considered “Chinese”, regardless of 
how far removed they may be from the culture. There are several problems with this 
perspective. One, this argument fossilises an identity in a seemingly timeless and 
nebulous fashion that eschews change. Second, such a perception assumes a fixed 
cultural memory that is shared by all members of the collective. But this is not the 
case, especially in the case of hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan as the case studies 
will show.  
In the first extract, Pan also highlighted another index of cultural identity, 
which she did not go on to elaborate – eating with chopsticks. The practice of eating 
with chopsticks is taken to measure the “Chineseness” of the Thai girl in question as 
                                                
39 Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p 213. 
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eating with chopsticks is perceived as a universal “Chinese” practice. Practices, 
hence, are also key indicators of one’s cultural identity which forms the basis of this 
thesis. Before I elaborate on the issue of practice as cultural indicator, I explore the 
existing dominant theoretical frameworks used to study “Chinese” identity and 
culture.   
 
THE MYTHSCAPE OF BEING CHINESE 
This thesis argues that “being Chinese” is an ideological myth. It is not a 
canonical narrative with rules and guidelines on how “Chinese” have to behave or 
what rituals to go through to define one as “Chinese”. Instead the narrative of 
“being Chinese” is constructed by a discursive Chinese mythscape. Here, I use the 
idea of mythscape articulated by British scholar Duncan Bell who defines it as  
a temporally and spatially extended discursive realm in which the 
myths of the [subject] are forged, transmitted, negotiated, and 
reconstructed constantly.40 
 
Drawing on this concept and the theories of myth and ideology, I contend that the 
Chinese mythscape is one in which the representations and articulations of being 
“Chinese” are generated and perpetuated.  
In many critical disciplines, myths are more than just stories; they are 
critical tools in imagining a community. In narration, myth becomes a 
representation and articulation of the values and beliefs of the community. It 
generates and takes on significance and meaning through which the world is 
understood. Myth is also, following Walter Benjamin’s argument, a state of 
affairs in which human beings perceive reality as being regulated by forces too 
                                                
40 Duncan Bell, “Mythscapes: memory, mythology and national identity,” British Journal of Sociology 
54, no. 1 (March 2003): 63-81 at p 63. 
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immense for their understanding.41 Literary critic and theorist Roland Barthes, in 
analysing myth through a semiotic approach, further argued that myth is 
“depoliticised speech” because it abolishes the complexities, nuances and 
contradictions that abound in societies.42 Even though myth “establishes a blissful 
clarity”,43 it is not random but involves a calculated act of selection, which can be 
a conscious effort or otherwise, by the crafters of the myth and its believers. At 
this point, myth intersects with ideology. The construction of a myth is an 
ideological act, one that is used to legitimise and order the actions and behaviours 
of the society by decontesting and prioritising, for the society, an acceptable 
paradigm for action through selective acts of inclusion and exclusion.44 
The Chinese mythscape is seemingly democratic: the group of players is 
sizeable – scholars, literary writers, artistes and artists, the media, grassroots 
organisations, as well as people who have published their memoirs, 
autobiographies and essays, among others. The narratives generated seemingly 
acknowledge the changing nature of “Chineseness” as well as the multiplicities of 
“Chinese” identities. But the dominant narrative that emerges from this 
mythscape is an essentialist and uncontested narrative of “being Chinese”. This 
narrative is essentialist and uncontested because it freezes perceived “Chinese” 
cultural norms and values into an assumed set of guidelines that all “Chinese” are 
expected to adhere to, in various degrees. It is a supranational ethnic myth, 
transcending national boundaries, and built on the idea of “Chinese” as an 
                                                
41 Joseph Mali, Mythistory: the making of a modern historiography (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003), p 236. 
42 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p 143. 
43 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and political theory: a conceptual approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1996), p 63. 
44 Ibid.  
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ascribed identity, “deeply rooted, given at birth and largely unchangeable”.45 This 
is possibly because “Chinese” traditions have endured, uninterrupted, over 
millennia.46 They have become easily identifiable as “Chinese”.  
A major part of the Chinese mythscape that contributes to the fossilising 
of “Chinese” identity and the perpetuation of the above-described “norms” is the 
narrative of the “Chinese Diaspora”. Like the term “Chinese”, the concept of 
“Chinese Diaspora” is a concept that transcends geographical, national and 
cultural boundaries. Historically, the term diaspora was used specifically to refer 
to the Jewish people in exile from their homeland in Palestine.47 The term was 
thus suggestive of the ideas of dispersal, fragmentation and exile. The term 
“diaspora” subsequently came to be used to refer to several historically significant 
waves of migrations – the Palestinians, Armenians, Africans. It was applied to the 
Chinese in the 1990s after it gained currency in the study of African migration 
history to the New World, now popularly known as the African Diaspora.48 
While there is no exact definition of “diaspora”, there are several features of 
the diaspora as discerned from the scholarship. The first feature is that members of the 
diaspora (or their ancestors) have been dispersed from an original homeland to two or 
more foreign regions, either as a result of political oppression or social instability. 
Second, the dispersal is not permanent, but temporary, given the reluctance to move. 
Third, members of the diaspora entertain the possibility of an eventual return to the 
homeland. As a result of the preceding features, the diasporic community has a 
                                                
45 P L Van den Berghe, “Race and ethnicity: a sociological perspective,” Ethnic and racial studies 1, 
no. 4 (1978): 401-411. 
46 Vera Schwarcz, Bridge across broken time: Chinese and Jewish cultural memory (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1998), p ix. 
47 Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur, "Nation, migration, globalisation: points of contention in 
diasporic studies," in Theorising diasporas, ed. Jana Evans Braziel and Anita Mannur, 1-22 (Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003), p 1.  
48 Patrick Manning, The African diaspora: a history through culture (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2009), p 3.  
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tendency to retain a collective memory, vision or myth about their original homeland, 
which “acts to ‘root’ a diasporic consciousness and give it legitimacy”.49 Usually, the 
more ancient and venerable the myth, the more useful and stronger the bond becomes. 
Because of these conditions, members of diasporas believe they are not – and 
perhaps can never be – fully accepted in their host societies and so remain partly 
separate. In such cases, even though they may live in a society, they are not of it. 
They continue, in various ways, to maintain their particular ethnic and cultural 
consciousness despite their geographic locations. They often continue with their 
religious practices, speaking their native tongue and eating their particular cuisine. 
Very often, they cluster in particular geographical regions or areas, forming ethnic 
and cultural enclaves which today are a feature in many cities. One can easily find a 
Little Italy, Little France, Chinatown, Little Arabia and the like in the major cities 
across the world. The formation of such ethnic enclaves is an attempt by these 
communities to reproduce the environment of the homeland, however limited. This 
reaching out to the familiar is a way for the members to respond to their new physical 
location: it provides some form of comforting familiarity in a strange place where one 
is a stranger. In addition to such self-ascriptions, the ethnic identities of groups are 
also externally imposed on the community by the host countries.  
But the enclaves also causes a “generalising” of culture; it often flattens 
regional, dialect and even religious differences. Instead, the diasporic communities 
are frequently seen as fairly homogenous,50 and that the bonds within the group are 
                                                
49 Robin Cohen, Global diasporas: an introduction (London: University College of London Press, 
1997), p 184.  
50 Ronald Skeldon, "The Chinese diaspora or the migration of Chinese peoples?," in The Chinese 
diaspora: space, place, mobility and identity, ed. Laurence J. C. Ma and Carolyn Cartier, 51-66 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p 53. 
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usually stronger than those with any other social relations outside of the community. 
In short,  
a diaspora may said to exist where group migration has occurred, where 
acculturation has not taken place, where a people maintain themselves 
in accordance with the culture of their original homeland, and where 




Measured against these conditions, except for the temporality and the related 
condition of maintaining separateness, the Chinese Diaspora is not really a diaspora in 
the strictest sense. Historically, Chinese emigration has been largely voluntary in 
nature, motivated by the unsatisfactory socio-economic in late imperial China and the 
economic attraction of European colonies. It does not have the implication of exile as 
is the case in the Jewish or Palestinian diasporas, for example. Chinese emigration 
was also not political in the sense that it was not a deliberate policy on the part of 
imperial China. The emigration was one that was largely economic in nature. If, as 
Adam McKeown argues, the term “diaspora” has a moral and political dimension,52 
the Chinese emigration lacks these dimensions to “qualify” as a diaspora.  
Yet, the mass migration of the Chinese peoples since the 19th century has been 
regarded as a diaspora largely because of the numbers and the geographic reach 
involved. Generally, the “Chinese Diaspora” refers to the waves of migration from 
China in the 19th and early 20th century to all parts of the world. It is estimated about 
20 million Chinese left China between 1840 and 1940, mostly as labourers.53 The 
migration was economically motivated, coinciding with the capitalist expansion in 
                                                
51 "The Chinese Diaspora in America, 1850-1943," in The Asian in North America (Santa Barbara: 
ABC-Clio, 1977), p 13. 
52 "Chinese emigration in global context, 1850–1940," Journal of Gloabl History 5, no. 1 (2010): 95-
124, p 100. 
53 Adam McKeown, "Chinese emigration in global context, 1850–1940," Journal of Gloabl History 5, 
no. 1 (2010): 95-124, p 98. 
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various colonies and the resultant insatiable need for a large body of cheap labour. 
Often, “push” factors, such as political, economic and social instability within China 
are also cited as motivations for the migration wave. The migration was meant to be 
temporary – the migrants would return home once they had made their fortunes. 
Although some Chinese did return to China after they had fulfilled their contracts 
(such as the labourers who were shipped to France and Europe during the First World 
War), by and large, most of the migrants stayed behind and settled in the host 
societies, often starting their own families in the process. Many of the subsequent 
generations of offspring took the citizenship of the “host” country. These offspring 
grew up in a cultural environment in which they retained their parents’ cultural 
heritage while at the same time, taking on the culture of the “host” society. They, and 
their parents, became regarded as “Overseas Chinese”, a part of the “Chinese 
Diaspora”. This point is debatable. 
While it is relatively easy to pinpoint the start of the historical Chinese 
Diaspora, when the phenomenon ended was not so clear-cut. Lyman and McKeown 
suggested that the Second World War marked the transition from Diaspora to 
citizenship when host countries of “Chinese” migrants granted them the right of 
naturalization, citizenship. At this time  migration from China was also cut off and 
Chinese sojourners stayed on in their host countries instead of returning to the 
“homeland”.54 It was with the birth of subsequent generations of “local” Chinese that 
“a diasporic people” became “an ethnic group”.55 It can be also said that the 1955 
Bandung Conference marked the end of the Chinese Diaspora. At the conference, 
PRC renounced citizenship claims on the “Overseas Chinese” when PRC Premier 
                                                
54 Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas 1842 to 1949," The Journal of Asian Studies 
58, no. 2 (May 1999): 306-337, p327; and Lyman, "The Chinese Diaspora in America”, p 22. 
55 Lyman, "The Chinese Diaspora in America”, p 22. 
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Zhou Enlai stated that the “overseas Chinese” owed their loyalty to their home 
nations, not to China.56 Until then, jus sanguinis – a principle which holds that a 
person’s right to citizenship and nationality is the same as that of his natural parents –
was a significant thread that held the “Chinese” people to China, regardless of cultural 
affinity.  
In recent years, the historical specificity of the term diaspora has been eroded. 
The concept has become a catch-all phrase to speak of all movements of people and 
for all dislocations, even symbolic ones, including exile groups, overseas 
communities, and even ethnic and racial minorities.57 Recent scholarship on 
“Chinese” communities around the word has used the term “diaspora” 
interchangeably with “migration” when referring to post-1980 migration from PRC, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong.58 Included in the “diaspora” are also “ethnic Chinese” from 
Southeast Asia who have migrated to other parts of the world. Some scholars have 
named the recent trend of migration as “transmigration” and “transnationalism”. In 
this sense, the migrants are no longer simply migrants or assimilated citizens of the 
host countries. Instead they are able to establish and maintain multiple relations as 
well as identities that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously;59 they 
have multiple identities and are often comfortable juggling between what has been 
referred to as “flexible citizenship”. Scholars also argue that these transmigrants no 
                                                
56 Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: non-alignment and Afro-Asian solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier 
Millet, 2005); 唐灝, 《周恩来万隆会议之行 (北京: 中国工人出版社, 2003). [Tang Yin, Chou En-
lai’s Bandung Conference Trip, Bejing, 2003] 
57 Khachig Tololyan, “Rethinking diaspora(s): stateless power in the transnational movement,” 
Diaspora 5, no. 1 (1996): 3-36. 
58 Kuah-Pearce Khung Eng and Andrew P. Davidson, At home in the Chinese diaspora: memories, 
identities and belongings (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Aihwa and Donald M Nonini (eds) 
Ong, Ungrounded empires: the cultural politics of modern Chinese transnationalism (New York: 
Routledge, 1997). 
59 Laurence Ma, “Space, place and transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” in The Chinese 
Diaspora: space, place, mobility and identity, ed. Laurence and Carolyn Cartier Ma, 1-49 (Lanham: 
Rowman & LIttlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003) at p4. 
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longer represent a simple connection between China and the host countries, but a 
complex web of multidirectional connections between multiple centres of origins and 
destinations. Furthermore, the negative connotations of diaspora – loss of homeland, 
collective memory of oppression, desire to return to homeland – have been replaced 
by more positive connotations such as supermobility, flexible identities, 
multiculturalism and transmigration.60 Some scholars have proposed the idea of 
diaspora-as-diversity61 as a counter to the nation-state driven narrative. Proponents of 
this perspective argue that  
a diasporic perspective would complement and expand upon nation-
based perspectives by drawing attention to global connections, networks, 
activities and consciousness that bridge these more localised anchors of 
reference.62  
 
Both the historical narrative and the current use of the Chinese Diaspora are 
unsatisfactory frameworks in which to study the hua ren communities. The historical 
approach locks the hua ren in a seemingly timeless and nebulous frame and does not 
take much consideration of the changes in historical and circumstantial conditions. 
Despite their relative social distance from China, the subsequent generations of hua 
ren are still often regarded as part of the Chinese Diaspora, and the issue of their 
identity as “Chinese” is, in the words of cultural theorist Ien Ang, “complicated 
entanglement”.63 Their “being Chinese” is constantly jostling with the “foreign” 
environment and culture in which they live. On the one hand, while they may often 
feel the pressure to “be Chinese” – through their actions and behaviours for example – 
they are also often expected to “be” the nationality of the country they are born in. 
                                                
60 Ibid., p 5. 
61 McKeown, “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas”.  
62 Ibid., p 307. 
63 Ien Ang, On not speaking Chinese: living between Asia and the West (London: Routledge, 2001), p 
1. 
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Often marked by the hyphens in their identities – Chinese-American, Chinese-
Singaporean, Malaysian-Chinese, Thai-Chinese and so on – “Chinese” is often the 
main signifier of their identity rather than a component of, or an adjective. They are 
inevitably compared to the yardsticks set by the ideological myth of “being Chinese”.  
On the other hand, the contemporary usage of the concept is too expansive in 
its coverage and stretches the concept of diaspora far beyond what is analytically 
useful. In not differentiating the different groups of migrants – temporary, transient, 
permanent, forced, or voluntary – the contemporary usage of “diaspora” muddies the 
analysis and adds to the confusion in understanding “Chinese” identities and 
practices. Like the historical approach, the contemporary understanding of the 
“Chinese diaspora” fossilises the “Chinese” as a collective which undermines the 
dynamic process of changes in the cultural identities of the respective hua ren 
communities.  
Several paradigms and concepts have been dominant in the analysis of the 
culture of hua ren communities and their identities. One of them is the core-periphery 
paradigm. The core refers to China, the motherland of all things “Chinese”, and the 
periphery refers to the “overseas Chinese” communities. Two prime examples of this 
paradigm can be found in Sinologist Tu Wei-ming’s “Cultural China” theory and 
Lynn Pan’s “Chinese melon” analogy. Tu proposed the concept of a global “Cultural 
China” as “a community defined by participation in an intellectual discourse” to 
“understand and try to bring understanding to China and Chinese culture”.64 This 
community is made up of three symbolic universes, consisting of the cultural and 
ethnic Chinese dominated communities of China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore 
                                                
64 Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural China: the periphery as the center,” in The living tree: the changing 
meaning of being Chinese today, ed. Wei-ming Tu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p 264, 
footnote 37. 
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in the first; the Chinese diaspora in the second; and non-Chinese who are trying “to 
understand China intellectually and bring their conceptions of China to their own 
linguistic communities” in the third.65 The concept “transcends the ethnic, territorial, 
linguistic and religious boundaries that normally define Chineseness”.66 
On one level, Tu’s privileging of the periphery challenges the traditional 
notion of the core – China – as the leader of the “Chinese” communities. He argues 
that the periphery – Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore –now leads the way as a 
result of their economic achievements vis-à-vis China (in the 1990s). But Tu’s 
postulation is far too encompassing. His concept of “Cultural China” is one that 
“seems to be devised precisely to exalt and enlarge the global significance of 
Chineseness, raising its importance by imbuing it with new, modernised meanings 
and heightening its relevance by expanding its field of application far beyond the 
given spatial boundaries of geopolitical China”.67 This notion of “Cultural China” is 
an immensely sprawling one, so much so that even “non-Chinese” can “become 
Chinese”, according to Tu’s definition of his third symbolic universe, as long as they 
take “full participation in the economic, political, and social life of a Chinese 
community or civilisation”.68 
Alongside this notion of China as the cultural core is Tu’s “living tree” 
analogy, first employed in the title of the 1991 edition of a special issue of 
Daedalus.69 Used to indicate the “changing meaning of being Chinese”, the metaphor 
nevertheless remains rooted in China as the cultural core of “being Chinese”. With his 
inclusion of the Chinese-dominated communities of Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
                                                
65 Ibid., pp13-14. 
66 Ibid., p v. 
67 Ang, On not speaking Chinese, p 43.  
68 Tu, “Cultural China”, p 15. 
69 Ibid.  
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Singapore, as well as the other communities where there are Chinese, albeit in the 
minority (Malaysia and the United States), Tu clearly regards all Chinese 
communities as part of a living tree, even if they reside on the periphery. Hence, 
regardless of where one is born, the living tree analogy encompasses all ethnic and 
cultural Chinese as Chinese, a far more inclusive notion than of “Chinese” as merely 
the citizens of China. Japan and South Korea were also included in the “periphery” of 
Cultural China because of their economic positions and Confucian cultural base. 
Sociologist Chua Beng Huat wrote of Tu’s Cultural China concept as one which is 
based on Confucianism, the perceived cultural denominator. He wrote:  
The desire behind the concept of “cultural China” was…the possibility of 
a resurrection of a neo-Confucianism that will unite not only the 
dispersed Chinese population, but by extension the large population of 
East Asia.70 
 
Similarly, the China-as-the-cultural-and-historical-core argument also 
underlies one of the seminal works on the Chinese diaspora, The Encyclopedia of the 
Chinese Overseas edited by Lynn Pan.71 While this text acknowledges “varieties” of 
Chinese, Pan views China as the Chinese cultural core with “varieties of Chinese” as 
different slices of the Chinese “melon”. More significant is the positioning of the text, 
which is aimed at the “foreign Chinese” – “people who are Chinese by descent but 
whose non-Chinese citizenship and political allegiance collapse ancestral loyalty”.72 
This statement has several implications. First, it privileges cultural loyalty over other 
identifications, including national citizenship. Secondly it underscores an urgency to 
reconnect these “Chinese-yet-non-Chinese” back to their cultural and historical roots, 
                                                
70 Chua Beng Huat, “Conceptualising an East Asian popular culture,” in The inter-Asia cultural studies 
reader, ed. Kuan-hsing Chen and Chua Beng Huat, 115-139 (London: Routledge, 2007), p 116. 
71 Pan, The encyclopedia of Overseas Chinese, p 15. 
72 Ibid., p 16.  
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lest their development of an autonomous identity, independent of China and all things 
Chinese, becomes irreversible. For Pan, who “baulks at deracination”,73 the need to 
maintain the cultural connection is almost a “tribal feeling”74 and the cultural 
distinction of one’s ethnic identity is an important part of being.75 Her sentiments are 
summed up thus: 
I have always respected Chinese who speak English or French or Dutch 
or Thai as their first language, but I would be a hypocrite to pretend that 
I do not sometimes see them as dispossessed beings, or think that there is 
something pallid and wistful about them.76 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction, cultural theorist Ien Ang is one of these 
“dispossessed beings” that Pan talks about. Reflecting on her embarrassment at her 
inability to speak Mandarin even though she has been labelled a “Chinese”, Ang 
wrote of being “haunted by Chineseness”.77 Ang quoted Malaysian writer Ruth Ho 
who wrote of being made to feel ashamed for not knowing the Chinese language or 
for not feeling “very Chinese”:  
Must we know that language of our forefathers when we have lived in 
another country for many years? Are the descendants of German, 
Norwegian and Swedish emigrants to the USA, for instance, expected to 
know German or Norwegian or Swedish?  Are the descendents of Italian 
and Greek emigrants to Australia expected to study Italian and Greek. Of 
course not, and yet overseas Chinese are always expected to know 
Chinese or else they are despised not only by their fellow Chinese but 
also by non-Chinese!78 
 
Ang argued that such “double standard” expectations and  
                                                
73 Pan, Sons of the yellow emperor, p 387. 
74 Ibid., p 379. 
75 Ibid., p 385. 
76 Ibid., p 388. 
77 Ang, On not speaking Chinese, p 31. 
78 Quoted in ibid., p 33.  
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the idea of the diaspora serves as a ploy to keep non-white, non-Western 
elements from fully entering and therefore contaminating the centre of 
white, Western culture.79  
 
In her case, and in many cases of Asians in Western contexts, “the question of 
‘where you’re from’ threatens to overwhelm the reality of ‘where you’re at’”.80 Many 
of Ang’s reflections and the issues she raised are especially pertinent in the context of 
Chinese or Asians in Western settings. It seems almost natural that the Westerners 
would “expect” Chinese to “be Chinese” whatever that may be. The expectations of 
“being Chinese” is also apparent within the hua ren community, in which (generally) 
the older generation expect some demonstration of “being Chinese” either in the form 
of speaking Mandarin , or engagement in “Chinese” cultural practices such as 
ancestor worship.  
 
RETHINKING DIASPORA, RETHINKING “CHINESE” 
Contemporary scholars have put up counter arguments to these essentialist views of 
“Chinese” cultural identities.81 Two oft-cited theorists who have called for a 
rethinking of these issues are Rey Chow and Ang. Chow suggested that 
“Chineseness” be examined as a theoretical problem since the ethnic is inevitably 
rationalised, produced and consolidated by discourse.82 Chow argued that ethnic 
identification with Chineseness is a “myth of consanguinity, a myth that demands 
absolute submission because it is empty”.83 She calls for diasporic intellectuals 
                                                
79 Ang, On not speaking Chinese, p 34. 
80 Ibid.  
81 See for example Susan D Blum and Lionel M Jensen, China off center: mapping the margins of the 
middle kingdom (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002). 
82 Rey Chow, “On Chineseness as a theroretical problem,” in Philosophies of race and ethnicity, ed. 
Peter Osborne and Stella Sandford (London: Continuum, 2002), pp 132 – 149. 
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especially to resist succumbing to the submission to one’s ethnicity – specifically 
“Chinese” in this case – as the ultimate signified. Transposing Walter Benjamin’s idea 
of the mechanical reproduction of art onto humans, Chow argued that the fascination 
with the “authentic native” – in this case, the ideological myth of “being Chinese” – is  
a search for the equivalent of the aura even while our search processes 
themselves take us further and further away from that “original” point 
of identification.84  
 
Chow argues for the need to unpack the meaning of “Chineseness” and of 
“being Chinese”, to re-evaluate its signification and historical construction.85 This 
unpacking of meaning can be achieved through a “tactic”, borrowed from 20th century 
French Jesuit scholar Michel de Certeau. A tactic, according to de Certeau, is “a 
calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus”.86 For Chow, to avoid 
or “unlearn” one’s submission to one’s ethnicity, one needs to adopt a tactic of 
intervention where it is not an issue of one field taking over another – Chinese versus 
non-Chinese. Instead, a tactic of intervention is one where the borders between the 
two fields are eroded slowly.87  
In her argument against the essentialist view of “Chineseness” Ang highlights 
her multiple identifications, describing herself as “an ethnic Chinese, Indonesian-born 
and European educated academic who now lives and works in Australia”.88 She 
further describes herself as  
suspended in-between: neither truly Western nor authentically Asian; 
embedded in the West yet always partially disengaged from it; 
                                                
84 Ibid., p 36. 
85 Chow, “On Chineseness” p 149. 
86 Chow, Writing diaspora,  p 16 
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disembeddedi from Asia yet somehow enduringly attached to it 
emotionally and historically.89  
 
Identification, for Ang, is clearly an issue of positionality. Drawing from the 
works of Homi Bhaba, Stuart Hall, Gayatri Spivak and Paul Gilroy, Ang argued that 
hybridity should be utilised as a tool against “retreating into an essentialised Chinese 
identity – the diasporic solution”.90 She argued for the necessity of hybridity – an “in-
between space” between two (or more) identities – as a more appropriate framework 
in which to understand the contemporary Chinese identity.91 The notion of hybridity 
will, according to Ang, liberate the Chinese overseas from the mind-forged manacles 
of the master signified that is China and Chineseness,92 for with “hybridity” China is 
no longer the norm93 and the yardstick of authenticity. This, for Ang, should be seen 
as a result of a “productive, creative syncretism”.94 It should mark the emancipation 
of the diaspora from ‘China’ as the transparent master-signified of ‘Chineseness’: 
instead, ‘Chineseness’ becomes an open signifier invested with resource potential, the 
raw material for the construction of syncretic identities suitable for living ‘where 
you’re at’.95 
In Ang’s imagination, the identity for a diasporic person like herself is always 
unstable and it is in this instability that the dominant can be constantly interrogated 
and challenged. But for analytical purposes, instability cannot be the all and end all. I 
agree with Ang’s argument that although the concept of diaspora has the potential to 
link the local and the global, the here and the there, the past and present, it has 
become a hindrance rather than an enabling and empowering principle when 
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discussing identity simply because of the over-emphasis on “origins” – “where you’re 
from”. 
Given the “varieties” of Chinese and with the understanding that each 
community has had its own historical and social trajectories, how can we approach 
the studies of these communities without undermining their particularities yet provide 
a common denominator for comparison? Here I highlight two alternative approaches. 
The first is “pop culture China” conceived by sociologist Chua Beng Huat. Chua’s 
framework is based on the consumption of “Chinese” popular culture – films, movies 
and pop songs – in Chinese communities in East Asia, including Singapore. Pop 
Culture China is a cultural terrain where “the dense flow of cultural-economic 
exchanges between geographically dispersed Chinese populations” takes place.96 It is 
one without a substantive and symbolic centre, because of the usage of various 
Chinese languages – Mandarin, Cantonese, Hokkien. This approach allows for 
collaborative and comparative work without undermining the pluralities of these 
societies by tying them to a “shared past” and a “shared culture”.  
Similarly, Shih Chu Mei offers the concept of Sinophone to understand 
Chinese communities around the world. Sinophone as Shih conceptualised, is a 
heteroglossia of  
a network of places of cultural production outside China and on the 
margins of China and Chineseness, where a historical process of 
heterogenising and localising of continent Chinese culture has been 
taking place for several centuries.97  
 
In using this specifically to refer to visual art and language in the construction 
of Chinese identity, Shih argued that the conception of “Chinese” identity need to be 
                                                
96 Chua Beng Huat, “Pop culture China,” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 22, no. 2 (2001): 
113-121, at p 114. 
97 Shu-mei Shih, Visuality and identity: Sinophone articulations across the Pacific (Berkeley: 
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reconceptualised in terms of communities of Sinitic language culture rather than 
ethnicity and nationality. The Sinophone concept was meant to frustrate the  
flawless suturing…of either monolingual putonghua (Beijing standard), 
monological Chineseness, or a monolithic China and Chinese culture’ by 
‘foregrounding the values of difficulty, difference, and heterogeneity.98 
 
 
In her work, Shih used the examples of linguistic dissonance in film to 
illustrate the heterogeneity of the Sinitic language and speakers. Shih argued that 
“place matters as the grounding where the Sinophone acquires its valance and 
relevance.”99 Sinophone articulation, by the acts and practices of cultural production – 
naming, writing, making art, making film, and so forth – disrupts the symbolic totality 
that is Chinese and instead projects the possibility of a new symbolisation beyond 
reified Chinese and Chineseness.100 But as Chua pointed out, Shih’s conception of the 
Chinese identity based on language is problematic. The term “Chinese” does not 
reflect the “difficulty, difference, and heterogeneity” which are present in the 
everyday life of ethnic Chinese communities from variations in food to language, 
Chua argued: 
[N]o individual ethnic Chinese would ever presumed ‘being Chinese’ 
means a ‘singular/mono’ anything and a self-proclamation of ‘being 
Chinese’ is always a vague claim which is only substantiated 
contextually, depending on which among the array of possible cultural 
elements is called forth to substantial the claim.101  
 
Then, to fruitfully analyse “Chinese” communities would require a non-
chauvinistic approach that is at the same time unencumbered by linguistic limitations. 
Hence, I propose to use the Mandarin term hua ren in place of the term “Chinese” to 
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refer to non-PRC national ethnic “Chinese”, or the so-called “Overseas Chinese”. The 
term hua ren is a common term used throughout Malaysia and Singapore to refer to 
ethnic Chinese, regardless of nationality. In this thesis, I use hua ren as a generic term 
to refer to people of Chinese descent without regard to political or cultural affinity. It 
is also less restrictive than terms such as hua qiao (华侨)  and  hua yi (华裔) which 
have specific historical and geopolitical connotations. The main problem with these 
terms is their diasporic implications. The term hua qiao was used to refer to citizens 
of dynastic and Republican China who migrated overseas but retained Chinese 
citizenship. Theoretically, this term ceased to be useful in referring the hua ren 
communities outside China with the PRC renouncing their claims of the ethnic 
Chinese overseas at the 1955 Bandung Conference.102 Hua qiao was then replaced 
with hua yi (华裔，descendents of a Chinese person) or hai wai hua ren (海外华人, 
overseas Chinese) notably in discourses by PRC scholars. Both the Taiwan and PRC 
governments define hua yi as descendents of zhong guo ren (citizens of PRC) who 
were born outside China.103 They refer to their citizens residing overseas as hua 
qiao.104 
The term hua ren does not have the implications of citizenship. The term hua 
(华) is derived from the term hua xia (华夏), a reference to the earliest civilisation in 
China. The term hua ren thus took its reference from the ancient civilisation to refer 
to people of China. According to the Chinese dictionary Ci Hai (词海), hua ren is 
                                                
102 The term hua qiao can still be used to refer to PRC citizens outside the PRC today.  
103 中華民國(台灣)僑務委員會 （Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, 华侨经济文献, 
http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/dep3topicpublic.asp?selno=2476&no=2476 (accessed 6 11, 2012);  中
华人民共和国国务院, 中华人民共和国国务院, www.gov.cn. 
104 国务侨务办公室 （Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council), 中华人民共和国归侨
侨眷权益保护法 , http://www.gqb.gov.cn/node2/node3/node5/node9/userobject7ai1272.html 
(accessed June 12, 2012); R.O.C.) 中華民國(台灣)僑務委員會 （Overseas Compatriot Affairs 
Commission, 華僑身分證明條例, 
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defined as a collective noun referring to PRC citizens (zhong guo ren 中国人), and 
ethnic Chinese with citizenship of foreign countries, or “foreign Chinese” – wai ji hua 
ren (外籍华人).105 In using the term hua ren in this thesis, I conceptualise it as a 
neutral term to refer to people with “Chinese” ethnicity. In using this term, I have 
dropped the pre-fixes of “overseas” and “foreign” – which denotes a centre/periphery 
relationship with China – and retained only the term hua ren. There are several 
reasons for this. First, the subjects of my study are “local” to their sites and are not 
“overseas” Chinese in relation to China. Second, it is a more nuanced term than the 
English word “Chinese”, which flattens out the various levels of meanings and 
connotations as discussed earlier. “Chinese” is a general term that does not elucidate 
the nuances of the reference as hua ren does. Finally, in using the term hua ren in this 
dissertation, I avoid the confusion over nationality while retaining the significance of 
referring to people of “Chinese” descent. It also allows cultural identities to be 
separated from ethnicity.  
 
THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE, PROSTHETIC MEMORIES AND SYMBOLIC ETHNICITY 
As indicated earlier, this thesis uses practices as an index of culture. Practices are one 
of the manifestations of cultural identities; the very visible rites, rituals and customs, 
and ways of doing things reflect the intangible values and beliefs of the group. The 
importance of studying practices is not so much in what makes them culturally 
identifiable (for example, Chinese, French, English, Russian or whatever 
ethnicity/culture) or why people do what they do. Instead, as Pierre Bourdieu argued, 
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practices may “have no other raison d’être than that they exist or are socially 
recognised as worthy of existing”.106 Practices are “ends in themselves” and are  
justified by their very performance: things that one does because they are 
“the done thing”, “the right thing to do”, but also because one cannot do 
otherwise, without needing to know why or for whom one does them, or 
what they mean…107 
Indeed, the reading of and analysis of these practices  
which seeks to restore their meaning, to grasp their logic, makes one 
forget: they may have, strictly speaking, neither meaning nor function, 
other than the function implied in their very existence…108 
 
This logic of practice, especially in the case of ancestor worship (which will 
be discussed in the following chapter), is a common refrain from my hua ren 
respondents in both Singapore and Taiwan. Even for those who may not understand 
the meanings, the details and the nuances of the rituals, the act of performing these 
practices are ends in themselves. Such “traditional” practices and customs are taken to 
be such an integral part of the hua ren cultural identity that to not practice them or to 
modify them is take to signify a cultural shift, and that in doing so, the social agent is 
seen as less authentic – although the ideal is never fully concretised. Many of these 
practices may not be purely cognitive, that is to say, there is no logical or rational 
explanation for why the practice changed or is continued. Questions of this nature are 
often answered with, “it’s just how it has been done”. Regardless, the 
Enlightenment’s promotion of reason, rationality, systematic acquisition of 
knowledge over tradition and faith, “it’s just how it’s been done” is not good enough 
explanation for the continued existence of practices for many tertiary educated 
individuals.   
                                                
106 Pierre Bourdieu, The logic of practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p 18. 
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 Following Bourdieu’s argument that practice need not necessarily acquire 
meaning and explicit representation,109 I contend that the continuation of “traditional” 
practices such as ancestor worship falls under the condition of practice “as is”, rather 
than practice “because of”. In understanding hua ren cultural identity within this 
framework of the logic of practice, it is then conceivable to recognise that practices do 
not pre-determine one’s cultural identity and that practice is a culture that can be 
acquired cognitively or otherwise, such as a change in religious orientation.  One of 
the components of one’s cultural identity is cultural memory. German Egyptologist 
Jan Assmann defined cultural memory as 
a collective concept for all knowledge that directs behaviour and 
experience in the interactive framework of a society and one that obtains 
through generations in repeated societal practice and initiation.110  
 
He argued that collective memory, as conceptualised by French sociologist Maurice 
Halbawch, has a cultural bias because memory is not stored facts but  
the ongoing work of reconstructive imagination: which are processed 
and mediated by the social framework in which an individual exists in a 
given present.111  
 
As such, cultural memory is an interaction of symbol and memory which 
bonds and connect individuals of a group with a shared past, rituals, which in 
themselves are “forms of memory that are designed to stabilise a common identity 
and a point of view that span several generations”.112  
Cultural identity and memory do not exist in spatial vacuums but are formed 
around specific places and network of relationships. They are embedded and 
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transmitted in places and materials which French historian Pierre Nora called the sites 
of memory.113 Cultural practices are one of these vessels of cultural memory. Yet, the 
process of cultural transmission does not take place in complete isolation and the 
contents are not transmitted “as is”, that is, in their entirety without modifications and 
changes. Memory is not just lived experience, but also an acquisition of knowledge of 
people, events and ideas that one has not experienced personally. Such mediated 
knowledge – or vicarious memories – may “extend memories across generations and 
beyond individual lifespans”114 and may constitute memories in their own right.115 
 Alison Landsberg aptly conceptualised such projected and vicarious memories 
as prosthetic memory,  
…a new form of memory (which) emerges at the interface of a person 
and a historical narrative about the past, at an experiential site such a 
movie theatre or museum.116   
 
Landsberg’s concept is situated in the context of the impact of the mass media on how 
a society remembers the past. She posits that the moment of contact between the 
individual and the past through a mediated sited and channel produces an experience 
in which the individual places oneself within the larger history. In the process, 
Landsberg argued, one can sometimes  
                                                
113 Pierre Nora, Realms of memory: rethinking the French past, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Vols. 1, 
Conflicts and divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 
114 Maria Cattell and Jacob Climo, “Introduction - meaning in social memory and history: 
anthropological perspectives,” in Social memory and history: anthropological perspectives, ed. Jacob 
Climo and Maria Cattell, 1-52 (California: AltaMira Press, 2002), pp 12-13.  
115 Marianne Hirsch, “Projected memory: Holocaust photographs and personal and public fantasy,” in 
Acts of memory: cultural recall in the present, ed. Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe and Leo Spitzer, 3-23 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1999), p 8.  
116 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic memory: the transformation of American remembrance in the age of 
mass culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p 2.  
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Take on a more personal, deeply felt memory of a past even through 
which he or she did not live. The resulting prosthetic memory has the 
ability to shape the person’s subjectivity and politics.117 
 
The concept of prosthetic memory can be extended to how individuals 
construct their cultural identities in the society through practices. The practices 
create a space in which past traditions and present contexts interact. These 
interactions, I argue, generate cultural memory and shapes the cultural identity 
of the individual. Part of the cultural memory generated may be prosthetic but is 
no less important. In such situations, the individual’s identification with his or 
her ethnic identity may be a symbolic one – that is, one of “nostalgic allegiance” 
underpinned by sentiments and surfaces at particular points in time, such as 
during festive celebrations. The term “symbolic ethnicity” was coined by 
American sociologist Herbert Gans to refer to an identification that is  
characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant 
generation, or that of the old country; a love and pride in a tradition that 
can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour.118 
 
In Gans’ conceptualisation, symbolic ethnicity is individualistic and has no 
real social cost for the individual, since the identification is neither intense nor 
frequent. Taking the form of leisure time activities and festive celebrations, for 
example, symbolic ethnicity is rooted in family traditions. It is also carried by 
symbols of ethnicity, which Gans argued, have to be visible, clear in meaning, easily 
expressed and felt “without requiring undue interference in other aspects of life”.119 
The adherence to traditions is voluntary and, at times, superficial. Symbolic ethnicity 
                                                
117 Ibid.,  
118 Herbert J. Gans, “Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,” Ethnic 
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is thus not about an essence of being, or orthopraxy, rather it is underpinned by 
sentiment. Gans argued that symbolic ethnicity is a feature of third or fourth 
generation Americans who, unlike their immigrant forebears, are not as anchored to 
preconceived groups and roles. While Gans used the term in the context of 
immigrants to the United States, I propose that this concept can be applied to hua ren 
in Singapore and Taiwan. In examining the practice of ancestor worship, this thesis 
has found that contemporary hua ren ancestral practices are largely symbolic. 
 
SINOSCAPE: A PRACTICE-BASED APPROACH 
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Chinese Diaspora and other existing 
frameworks used to study “Chinese” identity fail to account for the changes and 
adaptations in contemporary hua ren cultural identities. This is because even though 
the study of the Chinese Diaspora has tried to expand the parameters by emphasising 
on the local, the use of the term “Chinese” remains a blindspot. In this thesis, I 
propose that we break out of the rigid limitations in understanding hua ren cultural 
identities by articulating the latter through a practice-based cultural space I call the 
Sinoscape.  
The Sinoscape is informed by the project of articulating a cultural space that is 
neither culturally essentialist nor triumphalist. Chua’s “Pop culture China” is 
premised on a material product – popular culture – while Shih’s notion of Sinophone 
is based on the foundation of language. Sinoscape is another platform to understand 
the abstract notion of cultural identity and is focused on cultural practices. In this 
study, the cultural practices involved are those related to the memorialisation of 
ancestors, which will be discussed in the following chapter. The Sinoscape is meant to 
be a space which grounds the discussion in a more defined framework. The prefix 
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“Sino” indicates the cultural tradition from which the practices discussed originate but 
does not lock it into the “Chinese” framework. This frees the discussion from the 
rigidity of the concepts of “China” and “Chinese” as Sino denotes a range rather than 
a singular meaning.  
Similarly, in envisaging the cultural space as a “scape”, the intention is to 
highlight the concrete-ness of the cultural space while allowing room for flexibility. 
As Arjun Apparduria succinctly explained: 
[The] terms with the common suffix -scape indicate that these are not 
objectively given relations that look the same from every angle of vision, 
but rather, that they are deeply perspectival constructs, inflected by the 
historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of 
actions…for these landscapes are eventually navigated by agents who 
both experience and constitute larger formations, in part from their own 
sense of what these landscapes offer.120 
 
The original meaning of “scape” as a botanical term, referring to the stalk of a 
plant that emerges from the root or rhizome, is a useful idea to employ here: that the 
conceptual space does not exist in a vacuum but is grounded within a framework. Yet, 
the product is not fixed but determined by the various factors as noted in the quotation 
above. It is important to note that the usage of the Sinoscape as framework is not an 
attempt at rooting the discussion in Sinocentrism where “China” and “Chinese-ness”, 
however defined, is the core. Instead, Sinoscape offers is an alternative where 
numerous possibilities are present.  
In articulating the Sinoscape, two key points have to be kept in mind. First, 
following Chua and Shih’s proposed frameworks for understanding the Chinese 
communities, the Sinoscape provides an analytically more helpful framework than a 
shapeless and abstract notion of cultural identities based on intangible values such as 
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Confucianism, which ironically has never really taken root in overseas Chinese 
communities. Second, and more importantly, this conceptual framework places the 
hua ren communities in their particular locations, with an emphasis on “where you’re 
at”, as Ien Ang argues, rather than the Chinese Diaspora’s narrative focusing on 
“where you’re from”. This approach, too, allows us to understand “what you’ve 
become” this recognising that cultural identity is a process rather than an unchanging 
and fixed entity. This approach is an alternative to the core-periphery and centre-
margin paradigms that have informed the approaches outlined in previous sections. In 
taking up this practice-based approach, I regard the sites of hua ren communities as 
legitimate sites of cultural production and not as residual elements of the “original” or 
the China-centric cultural map.  
This study contextualises the Sinoscape vis-à-vis a framework of analysis that 
uses the notions of locale, network and memory. This approach is based on Peter 
Preston’s study of political-cultural identity in the 1990s as a result of the global 
structural changes following the end of the Cold War.121 His approach offers a clear 
schematic method of unpacking the various aspects of identity as the three concepts of 
locale, network and memory highlight the  
way in which we inhabit a particular place, which is a sphere of routine 
activity and interaction and is richly suffused with meanings, which in 
turn is the base for a dispersed series of networks of exchanges with 
others centered on particular interests, all of which are brought together 
in the sphere of continually reworked memory.122  
 
Indeed, identity, culture and memory do not exist in spatial vacuums. One’s 
identity – national, ethnic and cultural – is formed around the specific places in which 
one lives and work – home, school, workplace, neighbourhood, city and country – 
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through activities, rituals and interactions with other members at these locations – 
family members, neighbours, colleagues, friends. These places and interactions are 
networks of relationships – kinship, friendship, religion affinities, commercial 
exchange networks and even casual acquaintances. Over time and space, these 
interactions generate cultural memory, forming the basis on which one’s cultural 
identity is formed. This, in turn, has a bearing on the individual’s or community’s 




The distinction between ethnic and cultural identities is important. Culture, however 
articulated and expressed, remains a potent element by which one is indentified. 
Because of the dominance of the ideas that link culture inextricably with ethnicity, 
hua ren are often expected to be well-versed in their culture, which should come 
“naturally”. Contemporary ethnic studies argue that this is not always necessarily the 
case. On a fundamental level, we are born into our ethnicity however constructed. In 
that sense, it is almost inescapable. But culture is acquired rather than an innate given. 
People are multicultural selves, adding to and subtracting from the cultural equation 
of their multilayered identities (including elements related to nationality, gender, 
ethnic and the like) as they develop throughout their lives. A person does not 
necessarily identify with the culture of his or her own ethnicity. This is especially true 
in the contemporary social context of globalisation and cosmopolitanism given the 
ease of travel and movement across territories, and the proliferation of education, 
mass media and other cultural products. This makes it all the more obvious that ethnic 
labels are functions of the politics of identity.  
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The same can be said of other hua ren communities or any other ethnic and 
cultural communities as such. “Being”, “becoming” or “unbecoming” is a result of 
acculturation, and at times, of political positioning and labelling. An important capital 
in the formation of one’s identity is cultural memory constructed through stories 
heard and personal experiences, and passed on from one generation to another. In the 
process the cultural memory is re-modelled and reinterpreted according to the 
temporal, spatial and personal contexts. One of the most important sites of the 
creation and transmission of cultural memory remains the family, as the following 
chapter examines. 
      
~ 
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CHAPTER 2 




As indicated in Chapter 1, this study contextualises the Sinoscape through the 
schematic framework of locale, network and memory. The locales – Singapore and 
Taiwan – will be discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter considers the 
other two elements of network (family and kinship) and memory (memorialisation of 
ancestors). The kinship network in hua ren society encompasses not just immediate 
family relations, but also the broader social institutions, such as family temples and 
clan associations. Within the kinship network, the individuals are bound to the matrix 
of relations by “rights and duties” and exert an important effect on their political, 
religious and economic conduct at large.123 The kinship network provides guidelines 
for the social order and behaviour of its member. The acquisition and formation of 
cultural identity, as well as the transmission of cultural memory, take place within this 
matrix of relations.  
Within the kinship network, the immediate family is where an individual first 
learns his or her native language and comes into contact with the social-cultural 
norms of the larger ethnic group in which the family belongs. Beyond the family, the 
kinship network also includes social organisations such as clans, which are, in 
essence, the family writ large. Here, the individual is exposed to the larger cultural 
memory of the ethnic group. 
The family is regarded as the cornerstone of hua ren society because of its 
centrality in the social life of the individual. The significance of the family is 
                                                
123 Maurice Freedman, The study of Chinese society: essays, (Selected and introduced by G William 
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underscored by the ideas of kinship, ancestors and filial piety. Among kinship ties, 
none is more central than that between the ancestors and their descendents. The 
obligations that inform the ancestor-descendent relationship form an important part of 
hua ren cultural identity. It also highlights two fundamental principles: the imperative 
of continuing the family name and the importance of symbolic blood relations. These 
two principles are manifested through ancestor worship, a ritual practice still in 
currency in hua ren societies today. But increasingly, ancestor worship is no longer 
the sole memorialisation activity practiced by hua ren. Other forms of secular and 
personal memorialisation activities imported from the West and based on personal 
experiences, are also becoming common. While different in form and substance, the 
underlying principle of these activities is memorialisation – of the ancestors, of the 
family history and of one’s cultural background. This thesis expands the boundary of 
memorialisation practices beyond rituals to include activities such as compiling of 
genealogy, family history, telling of family stories, and visiting ancestral villages.  
This chapter thus reviews the historical and cultural significance of the family 
and ancestors in hua ren cultural identity. The review is followed by a discussion of 
the various memorialisation activities and the significance of the act of 
memorialisation.  
 
THE HUA REN FAMILY 
In this thesis, I use the terms as follows: family to refer to the social unit of parents 
and children; lineage to refer to a descent line with genealogical links; and clan to 
refer to a social group with a shared surname though not necessarily with genealogical 
links. The latter is also referred to as a clan association. In Singapore, clan 
associations are often known as hui guan (会馆) which literally refers to the building 
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of the association, whereas in Taiwan, similar social institutions are known as tong 
xiang hui (同乡会) or zong qin hui (宗亲会). 
The family is often regarded as “one of the most representative of all Chinese 
social institutions”,124 but also a complex one.125 The main feature of the hua ren 
family, regardless of how it is organised, is the subservience of the individuals to the 
group, for  
…it was not the family which existed in order to support the individual, 
but rather the individual who existed in order to continue the family.126  
 
This highlights an important idea fundamental to the concept of the family – the 
continuum of descent. Baker wrote: 
…Descent is a unity, a rope which began somewhere back in the remote 
past, and which stretched on to the infinite future. The rope at any one 
time may be thicker or thinner according to the number of strands 
(families) or fibres (male individuals) which exist, but so long as one 
fibre remains the rope is there. The fibres…are the representatives of the 
rope as a whole. That is, the individual alive is the personification of all 
his forebears and of all his descendants yet unborn. He exists by virtue 
of his ancestors, and his descendents exist only through him…127 
 
The family, as a representation of the continuum, takes on many forms: 
nuclear (or elementary), joint (or extended), or stem.128 Significantly, although the 
joint or extended family – consisting of parents, unmarried children, and married 
                                                
124 Olga Lang, Chinese family and society (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968), p xi. 
125 Among the most often cited references relating to Chinese families include: Hugh D. R. Baker, 
Chinese family and kinship (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Olga Lang, Chinese family 
and society (Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968). Maurice Freedman, Chinese family and marriage in 
Singapore: Report to the Colonial Social Science Research Council (London: HMSO, 1957). Maurice 
Freedman, Lineage organization in Southeastern China (London: Altone Press, 1958)Myron L Cohen, 
House united, house divided: the Chinese family in Taiwan (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1967). 
126 Baker, Chinese family, p 26. 
127 Ibid., pp 26-27 
128 For a discussion of the family structure, see ibid and Olga Lang, Chinese family and society 
(Connecticut: Archon Books, 1968).  
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children with their spouses and offspring – is often regarded as a feature of hua ren 
society, scholars have argued that this is essentially a myth and an ideal, rather than a 
reality.129 It was believed that in an ideal family five generations lived under one roof. 
This, in reality, was and is a very rare occurrence. Historically, the size of families in 
China was related to political developments of the day. During the Tang Dynasty 
(618-906 BC), family members were forbidden by law to register separately or divide 
family property while their parents or grandparents were still alive. By the Sung 
dynasty (960-1279 BC), some families took to registering fathers and sons separately 
to avoid onerous service levy responsibilities or conscription, a practice which 
continued till the mid-Ming period when the taxation policies and political situation 
stabilised.130 Following a period of political stability and economic development, 
family sizes in late Ming and Qing period could expand by registering the family as 
one unit and through adoption. Historian Zheng Zhenman argued that families 
adopted male children for various reasons: to help fulfill the family’s service levy 
responsibilities, expand the family’s opportunities to engage in maritime trade, and, of 
course, to continue the descent line.131 
While some scholars believed that extended or large families were only the 
purview of the wealthy and elite,132 Zheng argued that wealth was not a necessary 
precondition for large families. Citing an example of a large family of five 
generations living together but in poor socioeconomic standing, Zheng argued 
                                                
129 Baker, Chinese family and kinship; Paul Chao, Chinese kinship (London: Keagan Paul International 
, 1983), p 11; Lang, Chinese family and society, p 16. 
130 See Zhenman Zheng, Family lineage organization and social change in Ming and Qing Fujian, 
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It was precisely because the family was so impoverished and isolated 
that its members were forced into long-term economic cooperation in 
order to survive.133 
 
In Zheng’s analysis, the development of large families was a response to the 
economic condition of the times: it coincided with the expansion of the economy, both 
in agriculture and trade. Hence a larger family provided more labour to establish itself 
in various fields, hence ensuring a sufficient economic foundation.134 Large families, 
thus, were not just “a cultural tradition that idealised filiality and fraternity”135 but a 
pragmatic response to the existing socio-economic and political environment. 
Regardless of size, the foundation of family relations laid in the father-son 
relationship; all other relations within the family “are regarded as extensions of the 
father-son relationship or subordinate or supplementary to it”.136 Under this patriliny, 
the authority resided with the father, the head of the household. A son was expected to 
show “reverence and support his parents”,137 as well as marry and produce legitimate 
sons of his own138 in order to carry on the family name. To not have a son to carry on 
the family name was considered an act of filial impiety.139 The patriliny underscored 
the continuum of descent: the continuity of the family was ensured through the 
production of male heirs who inherited the family name. The father-son relationship 
continued even after the death of the father. Mourning and the performance of rites of 
worship after the death of his father (and mother) was a son’s responsibility and moral 
                                                
133 Zheng, Family lineage organization, p 42. 
134 Ibid., pp 44-48. 
135 Ibid., p 44. 
136 Francis Hsu, Under the ancestors' shadow: Chinese culture and personality (London: Routledge & 
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obligation. The concept and practice of ancestor worship acts to keep the family and 
clan solidarity alive,140 as shall be discussed in detail later.   
The continuity of the family name and the big family ideal are further 
manifested in lineages and clans. These social organisations can be regarded as the 
family writ large: being built on a foundation of consanguinal relations, real or 
fictive.141 In the traditional hua ren social structure, the clan or lineage is a significant 
institution representing kinship ties and is an important site of ancestor worship. A 
lineage is defined as  
a corporate, property-owning group which celebrates ritual unity 
through worship of common ancestors and which admits members on 
the basis of demonstrated descent from these ancestors.142 
 
This kinship grouping, which varies in size and scale,143 is built on the main 
principle of the family – patrilineal descent. There is often an accompanying lineage 
shrine or temple144 hosting the spirit tablets of the lineage ancestors. The ancestral 
rites are financed through income from the lineage-owned assets and properties, 
usually land and buildings. Only male members descended from the progenitor can be 
included as members of the lineage. In imperial China, the lineage not only acted as a 
trust fund for the family, it performed the important function of social control and 
discipline, as well as the organisation of daily life.145 It must be noted that not all 
lineages are strong lineages, that is, with elaborate segmentation, economic strength 
                                                
140 Lang, Chinese family and society, p 19. 
141 Zheng, Family lineage organization, p 24.  
142 Patricia Ebrey, “Family and kinship in Chinese history,” Trends in History 3, no. 3/4 (1985), p 156 
143 See Myron Cohen’s discussion of the scale of Chinese lineage as originally analysed by Maurice 
Freedman in Myron Cohen, Kinship, Contract, Community and State (Stanford: Stanford University 
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145 See Zheng, Family lineage organization.  
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and depth of agnatic relations,146 compiled genealogies and built ancestral halls. Some 
are “small, weak lineages with neither halls nor genealogies and with little 
properties”.147 Yet others were just households of all manners – “small and large, 
whose members lived and owned property in common”.148 However organised and 
whatever forms they took, the lineage was a common feature of the southern Chinese 
provinces of Fujian and Guangdong,149 and rural Hong Kong150 and Taiwan.151 The 
lineage was, in fact, regarded as “the predominant order of rural society”.152 Maurice 
Freedman theorised that this was the result of the existence of “paddy rice, corporate 
ownership of land, weak government, and frontier society” in south-eastern China.153  
Unlike the lineage which is defined by blood relations, the clan is based on 
symbolic relations and is of a more voluntary nature. It may be defined as  
an artificial kin group … consisted of a deliberate amalgamation into one 
loose federation of a number of lineages all of which bore the same 
surname.154  
 
Such clans do not necessarily have one progenitor ancestor from which all its 
members descend, although members may worship one common founding ancestor of 
the clan’s surname. Like lineages, clans may establish an ancestral hall to host the 
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ancestral tablets of its members. In imperial China, clans were usually found in cities 
to provide residence for its members taking the imperial exams.155  
Although found in imperial China, surname-based and locality-based clans 
were a more significant feature of hua ren communities outside China. While not 
considered as lineage by some scholars such as Freedman, others argue that they 
were.156 Historian Yen Ching-hwang noted: 
Most overseas clans were localised lineages based on geographical and 
dialect origins; they retained many characteristics of their parental bodies 
in structure and function…But most important of all, they perpetuated 
Chinese descent lines, preserved Chinese tradition and Confucian values, 
maintained the identity of the Chinese communities and served as a 
important transmitter of Chinese culture and a whole. Although they 
existed physically overseas, they strove to mould a type of society 
similar to the one they knew in China.157   
 
In migrant societies such as Singapore, the clan associations are key social institutions 
for hua ren communities, especially during the British colonial period. In Taiwan, 
where the instances of mobility are high, clan associations act as a family for those 
working or studying outside their place of origin.  
 
MEMORIALISATION PRACTICES 
Among the most tangible manifestations of family relations, history and memory are 
memorialisation practices: activities with the aim of remembering and honouring 
individuals or the collective, and of events that form part of the family/collective. 
                                                
155 Ibid., p 68. 
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Before discussing these activities in detail, I will examine the concept of 
memorialisation.  
The past is not simply there in memory, but it must be articulated to 
become memory. The fissure that opens us between experiencing an 
event and remembering it in representation is unavoidable….this split 
should be understood as a powerful stimulant for cultural and artistic 
creativity.158 
 
 The act of memorialising is what makes remembering possible. It makes 
tangible the otherwise fuzzy notions of family ties, history and cultural identity. In the 
process of remembering, to paraphrase Barbie Zelizer, one establishes a relationship 
with an individual, event or entity in the past.159 These practices and activities of 
remembering may be longstanding and habitual, they may be ritualistic or 
spontaneous. But at the heart of memorialisation is the construction of an internally 
coherent narrative on which to build one’s identity and maintain one’s position vis-à-
vis the environment. Countries and groups remember their past through constructed 
monuments, memorials, museums, plaques, ceremonies, books, television shows and 
websites. In many cases, there are controversies over almost every aspect of the 
conceptualisation, planning and execution of the project,160 especially in cases of 
national commemorations. Take for instance the case of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial Wall in Washington, D.C. Designed to honour American soldiers killed or 
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missing in action in the Vietnam War (1959-1975), the memorial had roused intense 
reactions even before it was completed. The Wall was designed by Maya Lin, then an 
architectural student at Yale University, and was chosen as the winning entry in a 
national contest. It was criticised for its lack of ornamentation and the choice of 
colour – black. The design was, at that time, considered unconventional for the 
commemoration of a national event. Many felt that the design was a snub instead of a 
proud commemoration of heroes; that it was about mourning (because of the colour 
black) and shame (the Wall was described as a “black gash of shame” because of its 
recess into the ground) rather than a celebration of heroism and patriotism 
(conventional memorials were often white in colour and rising triumphantly from the 
ground). The controversy that surrounded the Wall – the design, the designer, its 
meanings, representations – arose in part because of the controversial nature of the 
Vietnam War in US history and politics.161 It also reflected the competing stakes and 
claims different groups may make on a national event because it is part of the 
construction of a narrative that defines one’s national, ethnic and group identity.   
 The act of commemoration is a contested one, for embedded in the act of 
remembering is memory, a highly contested concept. Although memory is integral to 
one’s sense of self, it is also highly social, highly selective and political. French 
sociologist Maurice Halbawchs argued that individuals  
preserve memories of each epoch of (their) lives, and these are 
continually reproduced; through them, as by continual relationship, a 
sense of (their) identity is perpetuated.162  
 
                                                
161 See Marita Sturken, “The wall, the screen, and the image: the Vietnam Veterans Memorial,” 
Representations 35 (1991): 118-142; Robin Wagner-Pacific and Barry Schwartz, “The Vietnam 
Veterans Memorial: commemorating a difficult past,” The American Journal of Sociology 97 (1991): 
376–420. 
162 Pierre Nora, Realms of memory: rethinking the French past, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Vols. 1, 
Conflicts and divisions (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p 47. 
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Halbawchs further argued that memory is highly dependent on the social environment 
and cannot be divorced from society, for  
it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in 
society that they recall, recognise and localise their memories.163  
 
 
Following Halbwachs’ argument, an individual’s membership in a group provides the 
material for memory, and can influence the individual’s ability to recall or forget 
particular events and details. Membership in a group may even “produce” memories 
of events in individuals even if they did not experience the events personally. Thus, 
memory becomes a highly contested entity within a framework where there are 
multiple sources of influence competing for one’s memory. This is exacerbated by the 
continuous process of construction and reconstruction.  
 Among the biggest issues regarding memory are fabrication (false memories, 
counter-memories) and variability. On one hand, these inconsistencies may be 
regarded as   
resource(s) for revealing the relationship between what people remember 
and the ideological dilemmas of their past and present socio-economic and 
political circumstances.164  
 
Although scholars have highlighted the potential danger of over-reification of 
memory into an alternative discourse,165 memory and nostalgia can be useful 
analytically, especially if they are not divorced from the general social/historical 
                                                
163 Maurice Halbawchs, On collective memory, ed. Lewis A. Coser, trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1992), p 38. 
164 David Middleton and Derek Edwards, “Introduction” in David Middleton and Derek Edwards (eds), 
Collective Remembering, London: Sage, 1990, pp 1-22 at p 3. 
165 See for example, Avishai Margalit, The ethics of memory, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2002; James Edward Young, The texture of memory: Holocaust memorials and meaning, New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1993; David Cesarani, Tony Kushner and Milton Shain (eds) Place and 
displacement in Jewish history and memory: zakor v'makor, Edgware: Vallentine Mitchell, 2009. 
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contexts in which they were produced and consumed. As American historian David 
Thelen noted: 
In a study of memory the important point is not how accurately a 
recollection fitted some piece of a past reality, but why historical actors 
constructed their memories in a particular way at a particular time.166  
 
As noted in Chapter 1, collective memory and cultural memory are 
interactions of symbol and memory which bonds and connects individuals of a group 
with a shared past, and rituals. These rituals, are themselves, “forms of memory that 
are designed to stabilise a common identity and a point of view that span several 
generations”.167 Cultural memory is articulated through various material and tangible 
forms: the written script, oral renditions of myths and folklore or everyday objects, 
cultural practices, kinship ties, and “myths, songs, legends, proverbs, genealogies, 
rituals and other forms of knowledge”.168 Edward Bruner holds that  
cultures…are better compared through their rituals, theatres, tales, 
ballads, epics, and operas than through their habits. For the former are 
the ways in which they try to articulate the meaning.169  
 
These symbolic acts reflect human behaviours and the identities of the 
performers and audience, and the meanings marked in circumscribed contexts. But 
mingled with social performance – day-to-day interactions with people and social life 
– the meanings of the cultural performance change. Performance scholar Diana 
Taylor argued that embodied performances are channels of conserving memories and 
                                                
166 David Thelen, Journal of American History 
167 Jan Assman, "What is cultural memory?," in Religion and cultural memory: ten studies, trans. 
Rodney Livingstone, 1-30 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p19. 
168 Maria G Cattell and Jacob J. Climo, “Meaning in social memory and history: anthropological 
perspectives,” in Social memory and history: anthropological perspectives, ed. Jacob J. Climo and 
Maria G Cattell, 1-36 (California: Altamira Press, 2002), pp12-13. 
169 The anthropology of experience cited in Soyini D. Madison, Critical ethnography: method, ethics 
and performance (London: Sage, 2005), p 152 
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consolidating identities,170 through reiteration.171 These performances make up the 
repertoire, the embodiment of knowledge which has no stability:  
As opposed to the supposedly stable objects in the archive, the actions that 
are the repertoire do not remain the same. The repertoire both keeps and 
transforms choreographies of meaning.172  
 
It is this fluid and dynamic nature of the repertoire that allows performers and those 
who study them trace the traditions and influences of the performances.  
 As mentioned in the previous section, memorialisation practices are among the 
most tangible manifestations of family relations, history and memory. In this thesis, 
these family memorialisation practices include ancestor worship, compilation of 
genealogies, writing of family histories – whether published or for private purposes, 
and visits to ancestral villages for the purposes of engaging in family history or other 
forms of genealogy. In some cases, the aim of the trips is to establish more regular 
links with the ancestral village through participation in the social, economic and 
infrastructural reconstruction of the village.173 In this thesis, I study the various 




The practice of ancestor worship has dominated hua ren society for centuries and 
continues to do so. In fact, it is synonymous with hua ren cultural identity. Such 
                                                
170 Diana Taylor, The archive and the repertoire: performing cultural memory in the Americas 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), pp xvii-xix. 
171 Ibid.,  pp 2-4. 
172 Ibid., p 20. 
173 An example is the heavy involvement of the Singapore Ke clan in the socio-economic 
reconstruction of their ancestral village in Anxi, China. For a comprehensive account, see Kuah Khun 
Eng, Rebuilding the Ancestral Village: Singaporeans in China, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2000. 
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veneration of ancestors is by no means unique to the hua ren culture,174 but in the hua 
ren social order, ancestor worship is a key institution of memory and a vehicle of hua 
ren cultural identity as it incorporates the accepted markers of cultural identity – filial 
piety, kinship ties, religion and language. To participate in the practice of ancestor 
worship is to be bound up in the past of the family. The Book of Rites,175 a Confucian 
classic often cited as the source authority of rites and rituals, had this to say of kinship 
bonds: 
The way of humanity is to treat the kin [with the sentiments appropriate 
to] kin. Because the kin are treated [with the sentiments appropriate to] 
kin, the ancestors are venerated. Because the ancestors are venerated, the 
descent-line is respected. Because the descent-line is respected, the 
lineage is united.176  
 
 
In hua ren society, death does not spell the end of family ties. The ancestors, 
though dead, still participate in the social world of the living, although in a different 
mode.177 The continuity of ties between the living and the dead is a significant 
concept that informs hua ren cultural memory. The notions of yin shui si yuan 饮水思
源 – literally remembering the source of water that one drinks – and shen zhong zui 
yuan 慎终追远 – attending to the funeral rites of one’s parents and offering due 
sacrifices, are important hua ren cultural values. These are manifestations of filial 
piety – xiao 孝，which dictates one’s actions to one’s parents. It is also associated 
                                                
174 For an overview to the role and significance of ancestors and their veneration in the cosmologies of 
various societies, see Ancestors in post-contact religion: roots, rupture and modernity's memory, ed. 
Steven J Friesen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
175 礼记,  li ji. A classic Confucian text that described the social forms, governmental system, and 
ceremonial rites of the Zhou Dynasty (c. 1050–256 BC) 
176 Quoted in Zheng, Family lineage organization, p 269. 
177 Meyer Fortes, "An introductory commentary," in Ancestors, ed. William H. Newell (The Hague: 
Mouton Publishers, 1976) pp 1-16 at p 5. 
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with the idea of loyalty to one’s kin – family, clan, affined relations and the 
community.178  
This belief in the continuity of ties between the living and the dead has existed 
since the Bronze Age,179 and is maintained through a series of rites and rituals that 
were later institutionalised by the philosopher Confucius and his disciples. The Book 
Of Rites outlined rules and standards of conduct and ceremonies, including those 
relating to death and funerals. These and the teachings of Confucius (551 – 479 
BC),180 a thinker, political figure and educator that lived during the Warring States 
period (770 – 476 BC),181 form the foundational principles of Confucianism which, in 
turn, informs hua ren cultural identity. Confucianism emphasises the importance of 
social relations, hierarchy and proper behaviour. It originated as a response to the 
political turbulence of Confucius’ time, where civil wars were rampant.182 The chief 
cause of the upheavals were attributed to a breakdown in human relationships – 
family quarrels, usurpation of power and/or disloyalty.183 It was therefore natural for 
Confucius to advocate the careful regulation of human relationships184 as a critical 
and necessary element in achieving harmony and social order.  
In Confucianism, social harmony is expressed through a code of conduct 
embodied in the value of ren (benevolence, humaneness 仁), yi (righteousness, justice
义), li (proprieties, rites and rituals 礼) and zhi (wisdom 智), manifested in the 
principle of the Five Relations. These relations – “those between prince and minister; 
                                                
178 For a comprehensive summary of the significance of filial piety and its manifestation in hua ren 
cultural behaviour, see Chao, Chinese kinship, pp 71-101. 
179 Evelyn S. Rawski, "A historian's approach to Chinese death rituals," in Death ritual in late imperial 
and modern China, ed. James L Watson and Evelyn S. Rawski, 20-34 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), p 24 
180 Confucius, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/confucius/ (accessed September 2012, 
2012). 
181 Yao Xinzhong (ed), RoutledgeCurzon Encyclopedia of Confucianism, vol 1, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p 6. 
182 D. Howard Smith, Confucius, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973, pp 36 – 37. 
183 Ibid., p 64. 
184 Ibid., p 63. 
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between father and son; between husband and wife; between elder and younger 
brothers; and between friends”185 – are seen to be “of utmost importance under 
Heaven”. 186 The keys are order and obedience to authority – the ruler, the father, the 
husband, the elder brother and the wise friend. In this hierarchical social ideal, 
harmony and peace is maintained as everyone has their stated place, duties, 
obligations, and by extension, rights.187 These rights are not the rights of the 
individual as rooted in the tradition of liberalism we have come to know. Instead they 
are derived from an individual’s membership in society, for the Confucian concept of 
a human being is that he is a relational being.188 A breakdown of peace is, to 
Confucius, a breakdown in the order of relationships.189 Peace is preserved with the 
observation of these social regulations through the practice of li, which governs how 
the living treats both the living and the dead.   
Until the Sung dynasty (960-1279 AD), ancestral rituals were the preserve of 
the rulers and the elite gentlemen-official class. Commoners were forbidden to build 
ancestral shrines, and could not make offerings to ancestors beyond their 
grandparents,190 thereby resulting in a proliferation of non-standard practices and 
rituals. The late Sung period (circa the 11th and 12th  centuries) a new Confucian 
officialdom backed by court support, “began to look closely at and correct popular 
                                                
185 Quoted in William McNaughton (ed and trans), The Confucian vision, Michigan: The University of 
Michigan Press, 1974, p 41. 
186 Ibid.  
187 Although these rights are not based on the autonomy of the individuals as understood in the West, 
but based on one’s membership of a community. See Henry Rosemont, Jr, “Whose democracy? Which 
rights? A Confucian critique of modern western liberalism” in Kwong-Loi Shun and David B. Wong 
(eds), Confucian ethics: a comparative study of self, autonomy and community, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp 58 – 68. 
188 David B. Wong, “Rights and community in Confucianism,” in Confucian ethics: a comparative 
study of self, autonomy and community, ed. Kwong-Loi Shun and David B. Wong, 31-48 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), at p 34.  
189 Judith A. Berling, “Confucianism and peacebuilding,” in Religion and peacebuilding, ed. Harold 
Coward and Gordan S. Smith (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), p 103. 
190 Rawski, A historian’s approach, pp 29-30. 
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mores through reform of marriage and mourning customs”.191 Many practices and 
customs were normalised, and these norms became more widespread with the 
development of printing and expansion of the scholar-official administration.192  
Not all family members who pass away can be considered as ancestors; only 
those who were married and had male heirs qualify for inclusion. This criterion thus 
excludes single men and women, and children. Because of the significance of having 
male heirs – to continue the family name and to carry out ancestor worship – those 
without children would often foster or adopt sons for these purposes. With ancestors 
and descendents embellished in a network of relationships based on descent, the 
perpetuity of the lineage is ensured.  
Scholars have referred to ancestor worship as the cult of the ancestors or “cult 
of the dead” because the practice involves “something more than ‘the ancestors’ and 
more than ‘worship’ is involved.” 193 Emily Ahern argued that at the heart of ancestor 
worship is reciprocity – the living are expected to care for the dead in payment of the 
debts they owe them. In so doing, the living  
 
hope to inspire a further reciprocal response from the ancestors, to obtain 
through them the good life as they perceive it: wealth, rich harvests, and 
off spring who will unsure the undying memory and sustenance in the 
afterlife.194 
 
In this perspective, ancestors are perceived to have divine power (much like gods and 
ghosts) and are benign, especially to family members, to whom they manifest. In 
return for the offerings made to them on a regular basis, the ancestors offer protection 
                                                
191 Ibid.,  pp 30-31.  
192 Ibid.,  p 31. 
193 M. Emily Ahern, The cult of the dead in a Chinese village (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1973), p 91. 
194 Ibid.  
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and blessings to their descendents. Unlike gods and ghosts in the hua ren cosmology, 
the ancestor’s powers are only limited to the family.  
 American missionary Justus Doolittle recorded his observations of how 
ancestor worship was carried out by the Chinese in the southern China city of 
Foochow in the 1860s. Generally, the rites of ancestor worship include  
 
personal devotions, domestic rites, the ancestral rites of a kinship group 
such as a lineage, periodic rites on the death day of the deceased, and 
annual rites for the collectivity of ancestors.195  
 
Much of the rites, rituals and practices that Doolittle described still resemble ancestral 
worship practices today, albeit with some simplification and modification.  
 There are two important aspects to ancestor worship – the private and the 
public. The private form of ancestor worship essentially includes domestic rites: daily 
offerings of joss sticks at the family altar where the ancestral tablets are installed, as 
well as more elaborate offerings during special occasions (such as birth and death 
anniversaries). Under this private form, I also include family visits to the graves, 
niches, or tablets hosted in temples and columbaria. Even though these sites are 
public, the motivation for such visits and the associated activities private, that is, 
participants are restricted to the family. Strangers are not included. This private 
practice can further be divided into two kinds – individual ancestor worship and 
general ancestor worship.196 David K Jordan defines individual ancestor worship as 
that which is directed to a particular ancestor while the general worship is directed at 
the collective ancestors memorialised in one’s family.  
                                                
195 Mircea Eliade (ed), The Encyclopedia of Religion, Volume 1, New York: Macmillan Publishing, 
1987, p 263 
196 David K. Jordan, Gods, ghosts and ancestors: the folk religion of a Taiwanese village (Berkeley: 
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 In contrast, the public form of ancestor worship refers to general ancestor 
worship writ large. Unlike the private practice, public ancestor worship is not 
restricted to the nuclear family but usually involves the entire clan or community in a 
collective worship of its founding ancestors. Participants may or may not be related by 
blood ties. The annual Spring and Autumn Sacrificial Rites197 carried out by surname 
clans to commemorate the founding ancestor of the surname is one such example.  
 The practice of ancestor worship is often regarded as part of the “Chinese 
religion”. This is possibly because ancestors are often grouped together with ghosts 
and gods, who make up the tripartite of supernatural beings that form the foundation 
of what is often referred to as “Chinese folk religion” or “Chinese religion”. Scholars 
have described “Chinese religion” by various other names and description, including 
“Shenism”,198 “religion of the masses”,199 and an anonymous religion that is “an 
amorphous mass of beliefs and practices from various sources”.200 However described, 
Chinese religion is characterised as syncretic. It draws from various strands of greater 
religions and philosophies such as Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism as well as from 
hua ren history, mythologies and legends (as reflected in the expansive pantheon of 
deities, many of whom were characters from these narratives). Vivienne Wee pointed 
out that Chinese religion is “not a random hodge-podge but a systematic religion with 
a cultural logic of its own”.201 Bai shen (拜神) is a general term that defines hua ren 
religion in practice, and a person who bai shen is likely to practice ancestor worship. 
                                                
197 春秋二祭, chun qiu er ji. 
198 J. A. Elliot, Chinese spirit-medium cults in Singapore (London, 1955), pp 27-29 
199 Leon Comber, “Chinese temples in Singapore,” in Through the bamboo window: Chinese life and 
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Heritage Society, 2009). 
200 Marjorie Topley, “Chinese relifion and religious institutions in Singapore,” in Cantonese society in 
Hong Kong and Singapore: gender, religion, medicine and money - Essays by Marjorie Topley, ed. 
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Perhaps this is why it is hard to talk about ancestor worship, especially in the hua ren 
context, without referring to it as being religious.  
This thesis regards ancestor worship as a form of cultural practice that is so 
embedded in the hua ren cultural system that many practitioners do not regard it as 
something separate from the rest of their culture. Ancestor worship, with all its rituals 
and meanings, is more like a ritual of kinship, “a function of descent”202 since it is 
generally practiced by individuals. It is “an act of obeisance”203 that reflects the social 
obligation of respecting one’s elders in the family, although the acts may include 
religious elements – such as the offering of joss sticks, joss papers and food offerings, 
as are also offered to deities. Although some scholars have put forward a theological 
framework for ancestor worship,204 many of the practitioners, including my 
informants, do not consciously consider these theological or cosmological elements 
when they engage in the act. To them, ancestors are simply family members who 
came before them and who should be accorded the respect in their death through the 
act of ancestor worship. The underlying principle of maintaining kinship ties takes 
precedence over the correctness or details of the rites and rituals which will be 




The compilation of genealogy is another practice that is predicated on the importance 
of ancestry and descent. Today, genealogy is considered a part of family history 
(discussed below) although it is not family history per se. Rather, it is a technique of 
establishing family relations, ties and links through documentary evidence, notably 
                                                
202 Arthur P. Wolf, "Gods, ghosts and ancestors," in Religion in Chinese society, ed. Arthur P. Wolf, 
131-182 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974). P146 
203 Ibid., p159 
204 See for example, Wee, “Religion and ritual among the Chinese of Singapore”. 
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birth, death and marriage registrations. In many societies, including both Western and 
Asian, the original intent of genealogies was for the purpose of the inheritance of 
money, assets and titles, and to prove one’s royal status. Today, it has become a 
popular activity as part of the family history obsession, especially in Western 
societies. The Chinese have a long tradition of compiling and maintaining 
genealogies. Genealogies were generally products of private enterprise, undertaken by 
a clan and drawn up by scholars, and were never a layman’s activity. Like Western 
genealogies, the purpose of hua ren genealogies was closely related to inheritance and 
the protection of the lineage’s corporate wealth.  
A Chinese genealogy is an important record of patrilineal kinship relations, 
origins of the family name, family rules, family tree, members’ achievements and 
biographies of prominent members of the family.205 It is usually constructed after a 
lineage has settled in an area for a certain period of time and achieved financial and 
social stability.206 The construction of a genealogy suggests the need to consolidate 
the lineage, root itself in an area vis-à-vis other lineages, and maintain social order 
within the lineage.207 Each lineage keeps their genealogy under lock and key in the 
ancestral hall, and access to the book was limited to a few senior lineage elders. The 
genealogy was updated, generally at intervals of between 20 to 30 years, or when sons 
were born.208 The compilation, maintenance and preservation of the genealogy was 
one of the main functions of the lineage. It was one that entailed rituals for the 
“opening” and “closing” of the genealogy book. 
                                                
205 Hsiang-lin Lo, "The history and arrangement of Chinese genealogies," in Studies in Asian 
genealogy (Utan: Brigham Young University, 1972), p 
206 周芳玲；阎明广, 《中国宗谱》 (北京: 中国社会出版社, 2008). (Zhou Fang Ling and Yan Ming 
Guang, Genealogies of China, Beijing: China Society Publishers, 2008) 
207 Ibid., pp 1, 5-6. 
208 Ibid., p 14. 
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As a formal structure, genealogy has been described as an intellectual 
discipline whose  
concern is with recording and putting into systematic order the 
histories of families, differentiating them by rules of descent and 
allocating to each a share of those enduring human valuables that 
consist of privileges and honors, titles and powers.209  
 
A simpler and more concise definition of genealogy is that it is “the construction of 
family pedigrees: lists of ancestors and descendants”.210  
Chinese genealogies can be divided into different types, the most common 
being zong pu 宗谱, zu pu 族谱 and jia pu 家谱. Although these terms are used 
interchangeably to refer to a documentary record of pedigree,211 there are differences 
between them. In principle, zong pu is a genealogy that records the main descent line, 
that is, it traces a single line of descent of eldest sons of eldest sons, going back to the 
first progenitor. The zu pu is less restrictive in that it records the known male heirs of 
all male heirs of the descent line. Girls were generally excluded, while the wives of 
the heirs were sometimes recorded. This register of the common descent group is 
sometimes constructed by compiling several jia pu, family genealogies.212 The latter 
records only the descent line within a particular family. In this thesis, I shall use the 
English term of equivalence – genealogy – to refer to all these records.  
Chinese genealogies are closely related to lineage. Generally, the genealogies 
include the family’s pedigree, tracing the clan’s descent back to ancient times, if 
                                                
209 Eliade, The encyclopedia of religion, p 502. 
210 Jeanne Kay Guelke and Dallen J. Timothy, "Location personal pasts: an introduction," in 
Geography and genealogy: locating personal pasts, ed. Dallen J. Timothy and Jeanne Kay Guelke, 1-
20 (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p1. 
211 周芳玲， 中国宗谱.  
212 Information provided by Secretary General of the Genealogy Society of Singapore Tan Ngiap Hong. 
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possible, and the achievements of clansmen. Included in the genealogies are also 
eulogies to ancestors, especially the notable ones, encouragement to motivate 
subsequent generations of clan member to great achievements and to uphold the 
reputation and name of the clan.213 More importantly, the genealogy offers a picture 
of familial and kinship relations. The Chinese genealogy is typically based on a 
format devised by Ou-yang Hsiu (欧阳修), a Sung dynasty politician scholar. Quoted 
at length below is a description of the format, highlighting the importance of 
hierarchy and order in the Chinese genealogies: 
 
one’s family tree should begin with the primogenitor who first settled in 
or moved to a place and raised his family there; it should end with the 
contemporary generation which draws up the genealogy, and the 
intermediate ancestors are to be enumerated in between. The 
primogenitor and his great-great-great grandsons compose the first five 
generations and are tabulated on one form, which may consist of more 
than one sheet. Names of the primogenitor and his first-born son, 
grandson, and so on are listed vertically downward on the right-hand side 
of the sheet, but names of the brothers of the firstborn are listed laterally 
on the left. Descriptions of each generation are confined in relatively 
narrow, horizontal divisions of the form which contain the names of each 
person, but ordinals of generations are put on the right side of the 
primogenitor and his firstborns. Here the word description means each 
ancestor’s name and aliases, dates of birth and death, academic degrees, 
official ranks, if any, and location of grave; his wife’s dates of birth and 
death and location of grave; and the names of his sons and daughters and, 
sometimes, the daughter’s husbands. The next five generations and the 
third and fourth and so on are recorded in a similar manner. So are the 




Compiling or re-constructing existing genealogies was, and remains, a 
specialist activity given the breadth and depth of work needed to trace and record 
details. This job is made harder by the fact that not many Chinese keep up with 
documentary evidence. Furthermore, because of its traditional function as a record of 
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the families and implications of inheritance, genealogies were inaccessible except to a 
few elders of the lineage. Only individuals with a deep knowledge of ancient China 
history, geography and language are able to decipher the information available in 
ancient materials. With the transition from an agricultural socio-economic setting to 
one of urban capitalism, the relevance of the genealogy has also been gradually 
eroded.  
While the practical relevance of the genealogy may have been eroded, it 
remains a significant expression of hua ren cultural memory. Although the genealogy 
is a record of descent group membership, the act of compilation is also the 
construction of a selective collective memory. It produces the very social 
relationships that the genealogy seeks to cement and allows those who consult the 
genealogy to “construct knowledge about the nature of social relationships among 
relatives”.215 The passing down of the genealogy and the act of adding to it 
perpetuates the group identity and cements the members to a framework of social 
relations. The genealogy is not just an establishment of practical kinship relations; it 
also “establishes a pool of potentially useful local social relationships, only a few of 
which might ever be made real”.216 The genealogy, and the compilation of it even in 
contemporary times, remains a powerful force “in the production, reproduction, and 
reinvention of Chinese people, Chinese culture, and Chinese identity”.217 
 
CONSTRUCTING FAMILY HISTORY 
Today, family history and genealogy is no longer reserved for the rich and aristocratic 
classes as an avenue to uphold and maintain their social status. In European and 
American societies, family history has become a leisure pursuit and a cultural 
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practice.218 Alex Haley’s 1976 bestseller Roots and the television series it inspired is 
often cited as a landmark that sparked interest in genealogy and family history in 
America. The increased interest in family history is reflected and stimulated by the 
increasing number of family history related publications and even television shows 
such as the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) Who Do You Think You Are219  
which has since spawned similar series in the United States, Australia, Canada, South 
Africa and Sweden. Academically, with the development of fields of studies such as 
public history and cultural studies, everyday life and the ordinary have become a 
source of data and objects of analysis.  
 
Unlike genealogy, family history is not necessarily dependent on documentary 
evidence as it is usually based on individuals’ memories – stories and tales of family 
members and their experiences. Family history is as much about the social and 
historical contexts in which the family developed rather than simply an exercise in 
constructing one’s family tree. As such, it is considered a subset of heritage and 
closely related to the realm of the personal and the domestic.220 The family history of 
public figures has the added dimension of sitting at the nexus of the public and the 
private. The stories of the individuals are set within the framework of the greater 
societal and national narratives, building their personal stories into public accounts. 
Family history enthusiasts give different reasons for their interests. One oft-
heard reason for embarking on family history is to leave a legacy for one’s 
                                                
218 Roy Rosenzweig and David Thelen, The presence of the past: popular uses of history in American 
life (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
219 The BBC series was first aired in 2004. Each episode features one celebrity and his/her search for 
one part of his/her family history. This includes searching through records offices, consultation with 
experts and interviews with individuals, either distant relatives or individuals who may have known the 
family member in questions. The process usually takes months, but in each episode, is presented 
through time compression as a process with little obstacles and in linear progression.  “Who Do You 
Think You Are?,” 24 September 2004, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2004/09_september/24/who.shtml (accessed 
September 24, 2012). 
220 Guelke and Timothy, "Location personal pasts”, p 2. 
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descendents so that they would know where they came from. Another reason is that 
the process of doing family history is an avenue to better self-understanding, to 
understand where one came from and family attributes and beliefs. For others, it is 
simply a mater of solving family mysteries or finding out about one’s ancestors out of 
curiosity.221  
Family history is a form of memory work, since it is based on archival 
memory (documents and records), oral history and personal recollections.  Doing 
family history also creates a collective/shared history and memory for an immediate 
group of people. The individual memory is contextualised within a larger group of 
individual memories and forms a collective shared memory. These are then ordered 
into a narrative of the self and/or family, creating a sense of connection with a wider 
group and social contexts. Critics of family history have argued that one’s identity is 
not constructed by blood quantum, imaginary ties to a remote ancestral land or of 
progenitors of two or three centuries previously. They argue that the over-emphasis 
on constructing family history can lead to unrealistic and romanticised beliefs about 
one’s identity and past, and serve to reify essentialist concepts of self and identity, 
class, ethnicity and citizenships. But that has not stopped it from becoming a popular 
leisure activity for many laypersons.  
Family histories have also become an invaluable source of texts and narratives 
– “human documents” – used in studying the histories of societies.222 These 
documents form the basis of the family case history approach developed by French 
sociologist Daniel Bertaux to study intergenerational social mobility. He argued that 
the case histories can “function as small mirrors of general cultural and social 
                                                
221 Ibid., pp 2-3. 
222 See for example, Brian Roberts, Biographical research (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
2002); Ken Plummer, Documents of life 2: an invitation to a critical humanism (London: Sage 
Publications, 2001); Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson, Pathways to social class: a qualitative 
approach to social mobility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
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patterns, of societal dynamics and change”223 because of its emphasis on the various 
inter-connecting kinship ties and social relations. He argued that compared to 
collecting life stories of individuals, which tends to place the social relations at the 
periphery, family case histories explore the links between the individuals within the 
family – by birth or marriage – and offer a more complete view of the network of 
social relations.  
 
VISITING ANCESTRAL VILLAGES 
Related to the belief that the family is the basic unit of society, knowing one’s origins 
is an important feature of hua ren cultural memory. The importance of one’s origins is 
reflected in several sayings, such as yin shui si yuan 饮水思源,224 luo ye sheng gen 
（落叶生根）225 and luo di gui gen (落地归根)226 among many others. This theme of 
origins is especially significant among the generation of the hua ren who did not have 
the intention of permanent exile or leave of absence from their home villages. The 
offspring of the diasporic generation often engaged in xun gen (寻根) activities – 
search for their roots – through returning to the ancestral, either as attempts to 
understand their own family members or as a personal mission to understand the 
meaning of “being Chinese” themselves.227 Although many of them came to different 
conclusions about their experiences, many nevertheless felt the initial urge to return to 
the land of their cultural origins.228 
                                                
223 Daniel Bertaux and Catherine Delcroix, “Case histories of families and social processes: enriching 
sociology,” in The turn to biographical methods in social science, ed. Chamberlain. Prue, Joanna 
Bernat and Tom Wengraf, 71-89 (London: Routledge, 2000), p 71.  
224 The phrase literally translates to mean remembering the source of water one drinks. It is an 
admonition for one to remember one’s provenance.  
225 Growing roots where the leaves fall.  
226 Returning to one’s roots. 
227 See for example, Josephine M T Khu, Cultural curiosity: thirteen stories about the search for 
Chinese roots, California: University of California Press, 2001. 
228 Ibid.  
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Such trips back to ancestral villages are not unique to hua ren communities. In 
recent years, such trips, known as heritage tourism or cultural tourism, has also 
become popular in Western societies.229 Generally these trips are made by members 
of “diasporic communities” who “return” to their “homelands” in search of their 
roots. These forms of secular pilgrimages are undertaken “in the vain hope of 
discovering more about themselves, their ancestry, their heritage, their families and 
their extended communities”.230 Some do it to retrace the steps of their ancestors, or 
to reaffirm kinship bonds with the “home country”, while others undertake such travel 
for genealogical research purposes.231 Though not a culturally exclusive activity, 
returning to one’s ancestral homeland has an added significance for hua ren, given the 





Cultural practices are performances that articulate a group’s underlying values and 
beliefs. In the case of hua ren society, activities that memorialise ancestors reflect the 
significance of kinship. Although ancestor worship dominates the understanding of 
hua ren memorialisation, it is by no means the only activity that hua ren conduct to 
call to remembrance their family members or family history. As the quote at the 
beginning of the section on “memorialisation” shows, the turn to memory can provide 
an opportunity for the re-examination of how we negotiate our identifications. Indeed 
                                                
229 Dallen J. Timothy, "Genealogical mobility: tourism and the search for a personal past," in 
Geography and genealogy: locating personal pasts, ed. Dallen J. Timothy and Jeanne Kay Guelke, 
115-135 (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008). 
230 Tim Coles and Dallen J. Timothy, "'My field is the world': conceptualising diasporas, travel and 
tourism," in Tourism, diasporas and space, ed. Tim Coles and Dallen J. Timothy, 1-29 (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p14. 
231 Ibid., pp14-15.  
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the reorganisation of temporality in the world has played a big part in how individuals 
and communities imagine themselves and negotiate between their multiple selves. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, the Chinese Diaspora is a particular feature of a particular 
time. While one’s cultural heritage is an important part of an individual’s identity, the 
identity is not an unchanging one. In addition to memory, one’s locale and network 
can also affect one’s identity and identifications. Religion, education and the structure 
of the socio-economic environment in which one resides play a large part in 
informing one’s life and shaping one’s cultural identifications. If identity, culture and 
memory do not exist in spatial vacuums, then it follows that the interactions between 
the factors informing one’s identity, culture and memory will generate new elements 
that form the basis of oneself and one’s sense of self, the longevity of cultural heritage 
notwithstanding. These points are elaborated in Chapters 4 and 5, where the case 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
The research for this comparative study was conducted in various stages between 
2010 and 2011 in Singapore and Taiwan. Guided by the overarching historical 
comparative framework, the data for the study was collected through a combination of 
methods including interviews, participant observation, survey and a review of 
published materials. This chapter outlines the rationale for the choice of sites studied, 
the research framework and the various sources of data used.  
 
RESEARCH SITES 
Singapore and Taiwan were selected for this study as they are the only two territories 
outside the People’s Republic of China (PRC) where the hua ren population forms an 
ethnic majority. In addition, Singapore and Taiwan are politically independent 
entities, the political limbo of Taiwan’s sovereignty notwithstanding. Hong Kong was 
initially considered as a candidate for case study, but it was dropped from the final 
study as it is now politically part of the PRC, even though it may have some 
administrative autonomy. Although there are debates about the sovereignty of the 
island, it is, at the point of study, still a politically separate entity from the PRC.  
The two sites, which share a common ethnic heritage, present interesting 
contrasts. Taiwan faces stronger contesting tensions over its cultural identity as it is 
strongly intertwined with politics. The “Han”/”Aborigine” dichotomy has given way 
to a Chinese/Taiwanese one. Although politically motivated to distance its cultural 
identity from “Chinese”, it can be argued that Taiwan is the last vestige of “traditional 
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Chinese” culture – brought over to the island by the Republic of China government 
under Chiang Kai Shek in 1949 – which has since been ruptured on the PRC.232 On 
the other hand, Singapore is an independent nation state in Southeast Asia with a 
strong British heritage, and a multicultural and multiracial population albeit one that 
is dominated by hua ren.  Although it has developed its own identity with western 
influences (specifically in terms of politics, language and capitalist outlook), 
Singapore claims “Chinese” heritage by virtue of its hua ren majority population. Its 
government promotes the retention of “Chinese” culture, most notably language and 
moral values, while constantly reminding its hua ren population that their political 
loyalty should lie with the island state. 
While both Singapore and Taiwan claim (some) hua ren cultural identity, 
Singapore and Taiwan have developed along separate historical and social 
trajectories. How has this changed the cultural identities and imaginations of the hua 
ren population? What does this mean? Thus the two case studies provide an 
interesting space to examine the issue of hua ren cultural identity.  
 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA COLLECTION 
For this study, the research methodology was guided by the subject matter and 
objective, that is, to articulate a theoretical framework in which to understand and 
articulate contemporary hua ren cultural identity in Singapore and Taiwan. The 
primary aim of the research is not to generate a representative sample for each site, 
nor to prove or disprove a premise. Instead, I hope to use the case studies – grounded 
                                                
232 Allen Chun, "From nationalism to nationalizing: cultural imagination and state formation in postwar 
Taiwan," The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 31 (Jan 1994): 49-69. 
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in their respective contexts and observations – to make sense of the current state of 
how hua ren in these sites imagine their cultural identities.  
With this in mind, I decided to use the historical comparative case study 
approach as I was more interested in how the social, historical and cultural contexts of 
the two sites affected the development of hua ren cultural identity rather than with the 
idea of cultural identity per se. This approach was appropriate given its emphasis on 
processes over time and contextualisation.233 Furthermore, the approach is able to 
present the dynamic process in which cultural identities are constructed through 
locale, network and memory. Additionally, there are several advantages to the 
approach. First, the case study approach allows for the utilisation of information from 
multiple sources that enable a more holistic study of complex social phenomena. 
Second, the approach enables the grounding of observations and concepts in natural 
settings. Third, and most critically, the case study provides a socio-historical context 
in which to situate the phenomenon studied. I contend that an understanding of the 
historical dimension of a social phenomenon is just as important as studying the 
phenomenon itself as it reveals patterns and developments which provide insights to 
the phenomenon studied.  
This study utilises two case studies. The comparative framework is a research 
method employed in the social sciences to identify, analyse and explain similarities 
and differences across societies and is thus well suited to illustrate the various 
processes and factors at work in the production of cultural identities of hua ren in 
Singapore and Taiwan. A comparison between Singapore and Taiwan provides the 
contextual framework for examining and addressing the issue of cultural identities in 
                                                
233 James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, “Comparative historical analysis: Achievements and 
agendas,” in Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, pp 3-38 at p 10. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2003). 
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different environments. At the same time, the cross-national comparison places 
emphasis on contextualisation, providing a better understanding of societies that are 
considered culturally similar but have developed under different circumstances.  
There are several limitations and criticisms of the comparative approach. 
Some of the issues most often discussed include case sampling, what unit, level and 
scale of analysis to use, and whether to take a variable-oriented or case-oriented 
approach, among others.234 In comparative studies of countries, societies and 
communities of different cultures, problems of adequate understanding of the cultures 
being studied, appropriateness and equivalence are also critical concerns235 as they 
relate to the understanding of the cultural context of the research sites. Questions that 
arise relate to whether the methods employed are suitable for the stated 
conceptualisation and research questions, and whether the research samples 
correspond (for example, age range and population characteristics) across the various 
sites. All these variables influence the validity of the results.  
Nevertheless, the comparative approach has the potential to reveal possibilities 
– of similarities and differences over time and space – taking into consideration the 
particular contexts of the research sites. It is also a suitable approach for the study of 
relationships – with all its complexities and dynamism – between groups of people or 
between the social, economic and political systems at work.236 
The data for this research was collected in various stages and through various 
means. The main bulk of my data was collected mainly through interviews, 
                                                
234 For a summary of the debates surrounding methodologies in comparative research, see for example, 
Melinda Mills, Gerald G. van de Bunt and Jeanne de Bruijn, “Comparative research: persistent 
problems and promising solutions,” International Sociology 21, no. 5 (September 2006): 619-631. 
235 Tim May, Social research: issues, methods and process, 3rd edition (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 2001)., pp 212-217. 
236 Ibid., pp 208-212. 
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participant observation and a survey. Published materials were also consulted. My 
approach was inspired by what has been termed “biographical methods” in which 
materials such as memoirs, oral accounts, letters, diaries and other personal artefacts 
form the basis for analysis. Although I had originally intended to draw on all these 
biographical materials, due to time constraints and the scope of this research, I have 
concentrated on oral accounts – interviews in this case – on the topic of the specific 
cultural practices in question and hua ren attitudes towards these practices. Where 
possible, I also spoke to family members or other associates of the interviewees in 
order to get a clearer picture of the practices in questions.  
Data collection was conducted in various stages in both Singapore and Taiwan 
between 2010 and 2011 over several phases. In the initial stage, I asked hua ren 
participants in Singapore and Taiwan about their participation in memorialisation 
activities and reasons for their participation. The information was gathered through a 
survey (see Appendix A). The survey was distributed via the email through known 
contacts. This was especially important for me to recruit Taiwanese participants, as I 
have no direct connections in Taiwan. In Singapore, I also conducted the survey with 
random students at the National University of Singapore (discussed in “Singapore 
data” section). As indicated earlier, the purpose of the study was not to generate a 
statistically representative sample but to complement the data collected from 
interviews and participant observation. My main aim was to have an outline of current 
attitudes towards memorialisation practices and activities from which I could then 
obtain an idea of how respondents viewed themselves in terms of cultural identity.   
In the second stage, I approached respondents to the survey for a follow-up 
interview. The interview sessions were based on the same questions listed in the 
questionnaire but the sessions were not overly structured. In addition to personal 
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contacts, students at NUS and two universities in Taiwan, I also managed to recruit 
several respondents from Singapore Khoh Clan Association (SKCA) and the 
Singapore Geneological Society (SGS). 
 On many occasions, thesessions were almost conversational, especially as the 
session progressed. The informants, especially the senior interviewees, were often 
interested in my experiences and why I was interested in the topic. For them, 
memorialisation of ancestors was not something young people were keen on.237 
Furthermore, in Singapore, the senior interviewees often assumed I was an “Overseas 
Chinese” – or hua qiao as they put it – from Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong or China 
when I broached the subject with them. They were surprised that a young 
Singaporean would be interested in such a topic. In addition, they were impressed 
with my fluency in Mandarin and several Chinese dialects. The Taiwanese informants 
were curious about my cultural experience as a “Chinese from Singapore” and often 
compared their experiences and mine.  
On several occasions, the interview sessions evolved into group discussions. 
This usually happened during interviews with members of the clan and the SGS. In 
the case of the clan, the interviews were usually conducted at the clan building and 
usually during a clan activity. Even though there was a clear informant, who would 
usually be the one to explain the activities, other members would often mill around or 
flit in and out of the interview, adding their comments and sharing their experiences. 
At times, the informant would engage with the other members in a conversation that 
rose out of the interview. Again, I initially saw these as distractions and disruptions. 
But I found the experience illuminating as it gave a better idea of how others of the 
                                                
237 This perception is an interesting indication of how the older generation of respondents viewed the 
cultural identification of the younger generation. This point will be further elaborated in the respective 
sections in the next two chapters.  
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“same group” may think, either affirming the opinions or attitude of the informant or 
disagreeing with them, in which case were alternative views and propositions.  
I experienced  similar situations in Taiwan. With interviews conducted in the 
homes of the informants, there were often interjections and clarifications of the 
informants’ expressed views from other members of the family, and peers as was the 
case in interviews with university students. This proved to be an interesting situation 
as such interactions reflected the idea of a joint construction of cultural memory and 
demonstrated how different individuals – some from the same family or from the 
same generation of different families – negotiated the cultural memories of a similar 
set of practices.  
The third phase of the data collection process, which ran concurrently with the 
survey and interviews, consisted mainly of participant observation. In Singapore, I 
attended several meetings of the SGS and events organised by the SKCA over two 
years. On these occasions, I was able to interact with members and observe the 
proceedings, many of which have not been documented in any publications. While I 
did not have the access to similar associations and groups in Taiwan, I was able to 
visit some of my informants at their homes and offices. A large part of the 
observation in Taiwan comes from my visits to temples, columbaria and cemeteries in 
Taipei, Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan.  
In constructing the survey (see Appendix 1) and structuring the interviews, I 
was inspired by the biographical approach. The biographical approach encompasses a 
wide range of research types and data, such as life history, biography and 
autobiography, oral history and memory, among others. These materials are generated 
by the life of the individual, and at the same time, is a form of knowledge production. 
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Embedded in these materials are an individual’s networks, life experiences and 
memories. In collecting data relating to cultural identity and memories, I found the 
biographical approach a suitable method to guide data collection, in this instance 
information given through interviews. In this way, the materials gathered revealed a 
respondent’s sense of identification with a specific site at a specific time, rather than 
set out an absolute definition of identities, which risks being fossilised into a timeless 
representation of an ideal. Biographical methods – with its focus on the individual 
life238 – is appealing for many cultural studies researchers because  
it is exploring, in diverse methodological and interpretive ways, how 
individual accounts of life experience can be understood within the 
contemporary cultural and structural settings and is thereby helping to 
chart the major societal changes that are underway, but not merely at 
some broad social level.239 
 
Initially, I planned to adopt the family case history approach developed by 
French sociologist Daniel Bertaux for his study on intergenerational social mobility. 
His family case histories start with the ego (a student) who traces his or her family 
tree up two generations. Once the family tree is constructed, biographical data of each 
member will be collected. This includes gender, year of birth, place of birth, level of 
education and occupation – information which serves Bertaux’s research purposes. 
Then, stories about the respondent’s family members are collected, usually through 
interviews.240 Bertaux’s method is an interesting take on the usual interview, which 
generally focuses on an individual only. Bertaux argued that case histories can 
                                                
238 For a comprehensive overview of the methods of and debates surrounding biographical research, see 
Brian Roberts, Biographical research (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2002). For a sense of the 
application of biographical research in various contexts, see Prue Chamberlayne, Joanna Bornat and 
Tom Wengraf, The turn to biographical methods in social science: comparative issues and examples, 
ed. Prue Chamberlayne, Joanna Bornat and Tom Wengraf (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
239 Roberts, Biographical research, p 5. 
240 Daniel Bertaux and Catherine Delcroix, "Case histories of families and social processes: enriching 
sociology," in The turn to biographical methods in social science, ed. Prue Chamberlain, Joanna 
Bernat and Tom Wengraf, 71-89 (London: Routledge, 2000), p 71.  
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“function as small mirrors of general cultural and social patterns of societal dynamics 
and change”241 because of their emphasis on the various interconnecting kinship ties 
and social relations. Compared to collecting the life stories of one individual, which 
tends to place the social relations at the periphery, family case histories explore the 
links between the individuals within the family and offer a more complete view of the 
social relations.  
Although I was keen to replicate Bertaux’s research method, it became clear in 
the course of data collection that it was not possible to do so. The main difficulty lay 
with the limited ability of a single researcher, myself in this case, to reproduce the 
rigorous and extensive methodology given the limited time frame and funds. 
Furthermore, the difficulty was compounded by the problem of recruiting a 
representative sample of participants. Most of the participants who responded to the 
survey were unwilling to participate in a follow-up interview, nor did they want to 
involve their families in the endeavour. Bertaux developed this approach as a 
university lecturer and the data collection was implemented as part of his curriculum, 
in which his students undertook the data collection for their respective families. 
Unfortunately I did not have the network and the reach of the lecturer-student 
relationship to be able to replicate the scale and scope of Bertaux’s study. When I first 
started on my fieldwork, I found it a struggle to recruit candidates for my  survey and 
interview. Furthermore, most of the people who responded to my survey either turned 
down my request for a follow-up interview and/or for their family members to be 
involved. In addition, my relationship with my informants was decidedly shallower 
and had not reached the level of reciprocity where they felt comfortable sharing their 
personal information freely with me. In contrast, Bertaux’s students had conducted 
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the interviews with their own family, and they were able to elicit a richer data set 
given their intimate knowledge and access to the information source.  
As such, I modified the Bertaux’s method to suit this research. For each 
research site, efforts were made to include informants of a range of ages and gender. 
In the case of Taiwan, I also tried to include respondents from various regions, as 
shall be discussed later. My aim was to interview several family members, including 
the informants, where possible. When this was not impossible, I tried to solicit as 
much information as I could from the informants about their families and their 
memorialisation practices. I also tried to obtain information about the informant’s 
familial situation by interviewing him or her at their home. Not only did it give me 
the opportunity to witness the interactions between the family members, it also 
allowed the informants to be more comfortable and open as they were in a familiar 
setting. In addition to families, I also included clan associations, lineages and other 
related social groups in the study. In Singapore, I conducted interviews and 
participant observations with the Singapore Khoh Clan Association242(SKCA) and the 
Singapore Genealogy Society.243 Besides conducting formal interviews with 
informants, I also attended their meetings and activities which allowed me to observe 
the interaction and practices at close quarters. In Taiwan, I interviewed several 
members of the various Hsu244 clan associations in three cities and visited several clan 
temples, based on recommendations and introductions by the SKCA. 
For this study, I have concentrated on oral accounts – interviews in this case – 
of the specific cultural practices and the respondents’ attitudes to these practices. The 
                                                
242 The Chinese name of the association is 新加坡许氏总会. 
243 The Chinese name of the association is 新加坡族谱学会. 
244 Same surname group as the SKCA. Different transliteration of the surname Xu. 
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interviews were conducted in English, Mandarin and Hokkien, a dialect most of my 
respondents – especially the older interviewees in Taiwan – spoke. 
Although the individual forms the key unit of analysis in this study, the 
informants were also placed in both the macro socio-historical contexts and the more 
immediate networks in which they were embedded. These networks included, most 
notably, the family, and the lineage and clan. The family was selected as a unit of 
analysis since it is  
the main channel for the transmission of language, names, land and 
housing, local social standing, and religion; and beyond that also of 
moral values and aspirations, fears, world views, domestic skills, taken-
for-granted ways of behaving, attitudes to the body, models of parenting 
and marriage – resulting in the condensation of experiences.245 
 
Many studies have discussed the significance of the family as a social 
unit in “Chinese” societies. The perpetuation of the family line is a mark of filial 
piety and attests to its importance. That the family is a “cultural image 
constructed out of real individuals, and also, sometimes, mythical ancestry”246 is 
as true in “Chinese” societies as it is in non-Chinese societies. This definition of 
the family can be applied to groups such as lineage, clans, and related 
associations that draw on such networks of relations, which are also included in 
this study as sources of information and units of analysis. Lineages were 
considered as one’s extended families. Clan associations are also considered 
families, for conceptually, they provide the same sort of support and functions 
as a family especially to a migrant community, such as Singapore during 
colonial times.  
                                                
245 Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson, "Introduction," in Between generations: family models, myths 
and memories, ed. Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p 1 
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As a hua ren with an understanding of Mandarin (and related Chinese 
dialects), culture and customs, I have an embedded knowledge of the research 
contexts. This is especially true in the case of Singapore since I am 
Singaporean. In Taiwan, I was able to draw on my cultural knowledge to build 
an adequate picture of the social historical contexts. The “controls” for this 
comparative study is the set of activities related to ancestor memorialisation 
discussed in Chapter Two. Although the resultant group of informants may not 
square up exactly in terms of statistical equivalence, the data – in this case the 
narratives of self, family and cultural practices – can be compared based on the 
cultural equivalence.  
Like any methodology, there are limitations to biographical research. Some of 
the key criticisms include the reliability and validity of the materials and information, 
a critique often made of memory-related studies. There are also issues regarding the 
adequacy of the information on the final analysis, and the applicability or 
generalisability of the material to other situations and sites. Critics have argued that 
the biographical approach gives too much emphasis to an individual and that it 
privileges the experiential as authentic.247 This failing can be ameliorated by not using 
biographical research as the sole method, unless studying, for example, a particular 
prominent personality. Biographical research, in the case of this study, is taken as a 
starting point and complementary approach to other methods, not as the only means 
of data collection. This approach was chosen in order to capture the dynamism and 
flow, rather than a statistical and scientific picture. of the social space and identity 
change process. This is significant because individuals and communities are 
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embedded in a network of family, occupational and social ties. Any study on a 
community is as much a study on the network praxis and individual agency.  
 
STRANGER INSIDER, INSIDE STRANGER 
Before I present the data collected from Singapore and Taiwan, I would like to make 
an observation of my role as a researcher. As with most social science researchers, the 
issue of distance to the research topic and subjects is an interesting subject. 
Throughout the course of the research, I experienced the classic case of the 
sociological “stranger”/“insider” dichotomy in both sites. On several levels, I am an 
“insider” to the research topic and subject – I am a hua ren who speaks the language, 
understands the script and was brought up with knowledge of the various associated 
cultural values and practices. As a history student, researcher and Singapore citizen, I 
am an “insider” to the Singapore site. To some extent, I am part of the history and 
society of the very site of my research.  
Being an “insider” in Singapore – being Singaporean and of Chinese heritage 
– has provided me with several advantages where data collection is concerned. I was 
able to gain access to informants more easily than in Taiwan. I was also able to follow 
up more immediately with any leads and informants in Singapore, unlike in Taiwan, 
where I was constrained by my limited stay there. There were also disadvantages of 
my being an “insider” in Singapore. Very often, the informants would assume and 
expect me to know about what I was researching since I am a Singaporean and hua 
ren, like them. I am often asked “why are you studying this topic, shouldn’t you 
know”. This reaction belies the assumption of a common cultural practice and 
knowledge shared by all hua ren. Furthermore, unlike the Taiwanese informants, 
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many of the local Singapore informants were quite cryptic and brief in their 
explanations, often punctuating their responses with “you should know” or “as you 
know”.  
This insider/outsider dichotomy further complicated my position as a 
researcher, especially in Singapore. In two cases in Singapore, I was enlisted as a 
member of the groups from which I had drawn my informants, source of information 
and conducted observations. One was the Singapore Khoh Clan Association and the 
other was the Singapore Genealogy Society. A senior member of the Khoh Clan 
teased me about joining the clan as a member if I wanted them to share information 
with me. I was unable to refuse as he had made the statement in front of a group of 
senior members, who also agreed I should become a member, not least because of our 
shared surname. They also urged me to join the clan as a means of continuing the 
“tradition”, since my late grandfather was a member of the clan. For them, my interest 
in the subject and my needing their help was an ideal opportunity to oblige me to join 
the clan membership. In the case of the Singapore Genealogy Society, the secretary 
included me as a member of one of their research committees on hearing that I was a 
postgraduate researcher. I had arranged to meet with him for an interview, but the 
session turned out to be a committee meeting with other Society members. He did not 
ask if I would like to join the society but assumed my participation since I turned up 
at the initial meeting. In both cases, I was enlisted because of my position as a 
researcher, which they saw as adding academic credibility to their respective groups.  
At the same time, I am also a stranger, not one with prejudice or the marginal 
man,248 but one with prestige. In Taiwan, I am a stranger because I am not local but a 
                                                
248 During the 1920s, American sociologist Robert Park conceptualised the “marginal man” as a 
product increased migration and interaction with people from other cultures. Park drew on Georg 
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foreigner. Associated with my stranger status is the prestige of being able to speak 
and understand their language and at the same time having some sort of cultural 
affiliation. The prestige is enhanced by my fluency in English and Mandarin, and that 
I come from a “modern” country, and am a postgraduate researcher. This status of a 
stranger-insider has benefitted my research to some extent. Because of my ability to 
understand their language and culture, my informants were open to speaking with me 
on issues of hua ren culture and identity, often candidly expressing their attitudes and 
beliefs. An informant once mentioned that it was easier for me to speak to the 
Taiwanese about such issues and get more out of them because I was a stranger. It 
would not be the case if I were a local. Furthermore, because I was not local, my 
informants felt the need to “fill me in” on much of the local history and social 
developments. As a stranger, the interviewees were less likely to presume knowledge 
about their culture and experiences on my part. This worked to my advantage as they 
were willing to explain details and contexts to me. They were also more open to 
answering my probing questions. This gave me insights on how the interviewees 
understood themselves and their cultural practices so that I did not have to extrapolate 
them from stereotypes or published materials.  
While my “insider” status made the conversation easier, it also made the 
information subject to their interpretation, hence the information received was shaped 
by their bias and experience. But this was generally not an issue because the intention 
of the study was to solicit personal experiences rather than “objective truth”. Because 
of my identity as a stranger, the Taiwanese informants were similarly very interested 
                                                                                                                                      
Simmel’s “stranger”, one who “lives in intimate association with the world about him but never so 
completely identifies with it that he is unable to look at it with a certain critical detachment”. Park’s 
marginal man is “a man living and sharing in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples; 
never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions and not 
quite accepted in the new society in which he now sought to find a place.” See Robert E. Park, “Human 
migration and the marginal man,” American Journal of Sociology 5 (1928); Georg Simmel, The 
sociology of Georg Simmel, trans. Kurt H. Wolff (Illinois: Free Press , 1950). 
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in my situation and experiences which they assumed was different from theirs. As 
such, quite often during the Taiwanese interviews, the informants would often turn 
around and ask me questions about my family and my cultural experiences. Initially 
this seemed like an interruption to the flow of events and I worried that I spoke more 
than my informants. But I also viewed it as being advantageous, because it provided 
for more genuine conversations. 
 
SINGAPORE DATA 
The fieldwork in Singapore was conducted between 2008 and 2011, using a 
combination of survey,249 interviews and participant observation. In total, I had 57 
respondents for both interviews and surveys. Of the 57 respondents, 35 responded to 
the survey only, 9 responded via face-to-face interviews only and 13 responded to 
both the interviews and the survey. Thirty-four of the 57 respondents were female 
while 24 were male.  
By chain referral, I was able to gather interviews from a range of individuals, 
which can be loosely grouped into four categories: (1) general individuals – friends 
and their associates who were not affiliated to cultural or academic organisations, (2) 
Singapore Khoh Clan Association (SKCA) members, (3) Singapore Genealogy 
Society (SGS) members and (4) National University of Singapore (NUS) students. I 
had begun with the first group through my contacts, hoping to get a cross section of 
society so that the results would be as diverse as possible. The latter three groups of 
respondents were introduced to me via chain referral, and although I had not 
deliberately chosen the specific groups, they provided the control groups and 
                                                
249 See Appendix 1 for survey 
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increased the possibility of a diversity of data. The SKCA and SGS groups also 
provided me with the sites for participant observation.   
Initially, I attempted to use the random sampling approach but was unable to 
make much headway: returns were low and the possibility of following up with an 
interview was even lower as many respondents chose not to include their contact 
details. With chain referral, I was able to access a pool of respondents who were more 
open to being interviewed within the limited time frame I had. It was a more fruitful 
attempt than random sampling. While it was easy to administer the questionnaire to 
general individuals and NUS students, it was more difficult to do so with SKCA and 
SGS members. Fortunately, these individuals were open in interviews and 
conversation. In contrast, the general individuals and NUS students were not as 
willing to be interviewed, although they were willing to fill out the questionnaires.  
Generally, those who participated in interviews only were older members of 
the clan association and Genealogy Society. Younger respondents aged between 12 
and 81 years old tended to favour the survey. There were 34 female respondents and 
24 male. Twenty-one respondents claimed to have no religious beliefs, while 8 
indicated Buddhism and 7, Taoism. Only one respondent indicated “a mix of 
Buddhism and Taoism” as his religious beliefs. Six others said they were “bai shen 
de”. There were also 12 Christians and 2 Catholics. 
Among the memorialisation practices, the most common activities which the 
respondents participated in was visiting ancestral graves during Qing Ming (25), 
followed by visiting temples, columbaria and niches where the cremated remains 
and/or ancestral tablets are hosted (20). Of the ritual practices, the domestic rite of 
offering joss sticks daily at the ancestral tablet ranks fourth, in terms of frequency, 
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among all the activities surveyed (10). Of the informal memorialisation practices, the 
telling of family stories was most common, with 19 respondents saying that they 
participated in this form of practice. The other forms of memorialisation practices 
respondents said they participated in included clan activities (6), the compiling of 
genealogy (7), the compiling of family history (3), collecting photographs (6) and 
visiting ancestral villages in China (5).  
At the end of the interviews, I asked the informants if I could speak to their 
family members. Some agreed to ask their family members but most of them said it 
was inconvenient for me to do so or that they did not want to involve their family 
members. I was able to interview and/or administer the survey with the family 
members of three of my informants. Of the three families, data was gathered via 
survey (1 family), face-to-face interview (1 family) and over the phone (1 family).  
The participant observation in Singapore was largely carried out with the 
SKCA and the SGS, at times running concurrently with scheduled interviews. The 
SKCA is a surname-based clan established in 1954. It was an amalgamation of two 
mutual aid associations, both founded in 1936 by different groups of people with the 
surname Khoh.250 The amalgamated association was registered as the SKCA in 
1953.251 A former senior colleague who was active in the clan associations first 
introduced me to his contact, who happened to be a member of the SKCA. This 
member then invited me to a clan activity and introduced me to the other members, 
who subsequently invited me to several activities where I was able to observe the 
proceedings and talk to various members.  
                                                
250 Also spelled Koh, Ko, Khor, Khaw depending on the various dialect transliterations. But these 
transliterations could be for surnames such as Gao (高) or Ke (柯) which sound similar to Xu (许), 
which is Khoh in this case, in dialects.  
251 新加坡许氏总会，《世界许氏宗亲第五届恳亲大会特刊》 [Singapore Khoh Clan Association, 
The 5th World Convention of Khoh Clan Representatives souvenir magazine, Singapore: 1990], p58. 
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Similarly by the chain referral system, I was introduced to members of the 
Singapore Genealogy Society (新加坡族谱学会). The SGS was set up in 2010 with 
the aim of promoting the development of Chinese genealogies originating in 
Singapore. The main champion of the Society is its Secretary, Tan Ngap Hong (陈业
雄), a retired physical education teacher from Catholic High School. He appears to be 
the main person coordinating Society meetings and pushing for things to get done. 
The SGS chairman is Ng Yew Kang, a former civil servant and Consul General to 
Xiamen (2002 – 2004). The main objective of the SGS is to promote genealogy work 
among Singaporeans and encourage them to start constructing their genealogies with 
a Singapore perspective, starting from the ancestor who first came to Singapore. The 
membership of the Society was, as I observed, rather fluid. It consisted of mostly 
Tan’s former students and associates. Academics, such as Professor Wang Gungwu, 
were listed as academic consultants for the Society’s main project of compiling a 
master genealogy of the hua ren in Singapore.252  
I also surveyed and interviewed a group of National University of Singapore 
undergraduates from various faculties to gather information about the attitudes of the 
younger generation to memorialisation activities. This came about after an initial 
review of the interviews and surveys collected when I realised that most of the 
respondents and informants were aged 30 and above. Those under 30 were clearly 
under represented. I do not consider this group of under-30 respondents and 
informants as representative of the cohort, since they have clearly a distinct viewpoint 
because of their education level. But they do provide insight into a segment of the 
youth population, which I had been unable to access up to this point. Among the 30 
students surveyed, I conducted follow-up interviews with nine of them.  
                                                
252 See Chapter 4 – Singapore case study for details.  




As with the fieldwork in Singapore, research in Taiwan was conducted between 2010 
and 2011, using a combination of surveys, interviews and observation. The method of 
soliciting information and respondents was similar to that used in Singapore. I first 
contacted friends and associates who connected me to their Taiwan contacts. During 
the initial phase, I emailed the Taiwan respondents with the survey form. I then 
followed up with those who returned the form to arrange for a face-to-face interview. 
I spent a total of 12 weeks in Taiwan conducting interviews in Taipei, Hsinchu, 
Taichung and Tainan. For 5 weeks in November and December 2010, I was hosted by 
the Graduate Institute for Social Research and Cultural Studies253 (SCRS) at 
Hsinchu’s National Chiao Tung University.254 During my stay, I interviewed several 
groups of people: (1) SCRS graduate students and their families, (2) members of the 
Xu clans, (3) families and friends of contacts made during the August trip. The 
interviews were conducted in Hsinchu, Taipei and Taichung. For four weeks in April 
2011, I was hosted by the National Cheng Kung University255 in Tainan where I was 
able to conduct interviews with respondents in Tainan.   
 In total, I had 41 respondents for both interviews and surveys. Of the 
respondents, 7 responded to the survey only, 14 responded via face-to-face interviews 
only and 20 responded to both the interviews and the survey. There were 12 male and 
29 female respondents. The age range of the respondents was between 19 and 85 
years old, with those in their 20s making up the largest group of the respondents (15). 
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 Among my Taiwan respondents, a large proportion of them claimed either no 
particular religious beliefs (8) or Taoism (8). I had 7 Christian informants, 5 of whom 
weremembers of the Mormon Church (Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day 
Saints). This disproportionately high number of Christians was a result of chain 
referral, with one contact referring another of their associates to me. Six of my 
informants were Buddhists while only one described his religious beliefs as a 
“mixture”, probably a reference to Chinese folk religion. 
 The Taiwan respondents were drawn from different parts of Taiwan – Taipei, 
Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, Hsinchu, Lugang, Nantou, and Jiayi among them. I had 
not deliberately chosen respondents based on their place of birth/origin. My initial 
idea was to conduct the survey and interviews in some of the major regions of Taiwan 
– Taipei, Taichung and Tainan – to take into account the regional differences in 
Taiwan. During my fieldwork in Taiwan, I based myself in Taipei, Hsinchu and 
Tainan, three of the major cities in Taiwan. Because of the high mobility of 
Taiwanese, who travel for work and study outside their place of birth, I was able to 
recruit respondents from different areas. But, by far, the largest number of 
respondents came from Taipei, the capital city of Taiwan (19), followed by Taichung 
(9), Tainan (3), Kaohsiung (2), Hsinchu (2), Lugang (1), Nantou (1) and Jiayi (1). 
Three of the respondents did not indicate their place of birth.  
 It must be noted that the place of birth of the respondents did not necessarily 
correspond to the site of interview. This was due to the mobility of the Taiwanese 
population, many of whom do not work or study in the city or county they were born 
in. I did not intentionally select informants based on their regional origins as most of 
the informants were introduced to me by the referral system. I had not specified any 
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regional or religious requirements, except that the informants be hua ren, not 
Taiwanese Aborigines.  
 Like Singapore, the most common memorialisation practices were the visiting 
of ancestral graves (30), or columbaria, temples and niches where the remains and 
tablets are housed (20). These visits usually took place during Qing Ming. One clear 
difference with the Singapore data was the high incidence of the domestic rites, with 
23 respondents indicating that they or their family participated in this form of 
memorialisation. The most common informal memorialisation activity undertaken 
was the telling of family stories (17). Respondents also indicated that they 
participated in clan activities (4), compiled genealogy (6) and family history (3), as 
well as visited their ancestral villages in China (4). 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, I did not have the same level of access to 
clan associations and groups in Taiwan as I did in Singapore. Hence, my observations 
were limited to visits to temples, columbaria and cemeteries in Taipei, Hsinchu and 
Tainan. I was also able to visit some of my informants at their homes and offices. A 
large part of the information gathered in Taiwan came from such meetings, and in the 
(more) prolonged interactions with the students of the two universities at which I was 
hosted during my fieldwork.  
The following two chapters will discuss the research findings at the respective 
sites in greater detail. Where individual respondents are quoted, they are given 
notations denoting their initials, gender, age and location. For example: JK/F35/SP 
indicates that the informant’s initials are JK, she is a female aged 35 and located in 
Singapore. Similarly, TB/M42/TW will indicate a respondent with the initial TB, he is 
a male, aged 42 and located in Taiwan.  
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CHAPTER 4  
SINGAPORE HUA REN:  
A CASE OF EMOTIONAL CULTURAL IDENTITY 
 
  
Map 1: Singapore in Southeast Asia256 
 
Singapore is often considered a “Chinese” society because of its hua ren majority 
citizenry. Neo-Confucian Sinologist Tu Weiming placed Singapore in the first 
symbolic universe of his conceptual “Cultural China” together with Hong Kong and 
Taiwan by virtue of their overwhelmingly Han Chinese population.257 Such a 
perception is largely the result of historical developments. The majority of hua ren in 
Singapore descended from the Chinese migrants who came from the southern 
provinces of Guangdong and Fujian during the 19th and early 20th centuries. By the 
time of the first official census in 1871, the Chinese population constituted the largest 
ethnic group in Singapore, comprising 56.2% of the population.258 Since 1901, the 
                                                
256 Map adapted from http://math.nie.edu.sg/atcm/map01.htm, accessed 26 September 2012. 
257 Wei-ming Tu, “Cultural China: the periphery as the center,” in The living tree: the changing 
meaning of being Chinese today, ed. Wei-ming Tu (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 
258 J.F.A. McNair, Miscellaneous numerical returns [and] Straits Settlements population [for the year] 
1871 (Singapore , 1871). 
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Chinese population constituted just over 70% of the total population.259 As such, 
Singapore is often featured as a case study in “overseas Chinese” studies, and is 
positioned as a regional centre for “overseas Chinese” studies.260  
But Singapore is not a purely “Chinese” society due to the presence of a 
substantial “non-Chinese” population. The Malays and Indians comprise 13.1% and 
9.2% of the Singapore population respectively.261 The “Chineseness” of Singapore 
society is highlighted mainly because it is geographically located in the Malay 
Archipelago, a Malay/Muslim dominant region. Sociologist Kwok Kian Woon argued 
that Singapore is not a Chinese society like Hong Kong, Taiwan and China because of 
its long history as a British colony and its being part of the geopolitical Malay 
world.262 These factors, Kwok argued, have “indelibly shaped the socio-cultural life” 
of Singapore hua ren that renders it incomparable to the other “Chinese” societies.263 
He further contended that generations of localisation, diverging political allegiances 
and identifications have added to the complexity of the Chinese community in 
Singapore. He argued that there is  
no single historical definition of “Chineseness” in the course of the 
social transformation of the Chinese community in Singapore. The 
vicissitudes of some of the key qualifying terms used by members of 
                                                
259 See Lynn Pan, ed., The encyclopedia of Overseas Chinese, (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 
2006), Table 5.14 – Distribution of Singapore’s total population by ethnic group, p 200. 
260 Singapore has been lauded as a pioneer in the study of the Chinese overseas, dating back to 1955 
when hua qiao shi (overseas Chinese history) and Nanyang yan jiu (research on Nanyang) at the 
Nanyang University (Nantah). See Weng Kam Leong, "Study of Chinese diaspora no longer like 'an 
orphan'," The Straits Times (Singapore, May 30, 2010). The Chinese Heritage Centre, located at the 
Nanyang Technological University (former Nantah site), was founded in 1995 with the mission “to be 
a leading research and resource centre on the Chinese outside China”, with a strong focus on the 
“Chinese diaspora”. See CHC website, The Chinese Heritage Centre, 
http://chc.ntu.edu.sg/AboutUs/Pages/Home.aspx (accessed November 23, 2012) and Elgin Toh, "New 
NTU library focuses on Chinese diaspora," The Straits Times (September 15, 2010). 
261 3.3% of Singapore’s population is categorised as “Others”. Department of Statistics, “Census of 
Population 2010 Statistical Release 1: Demographic Characteristics, Education, Language and 
Religion,” Census, Department of Statistics (Singapore). 
262 Kian Woon Kwok, “Social transformation and the problem of social coherence: Chinese 
Singaporeans at century's end,” Working paper No. 124, Department of Sociology, National University 
of Singapore (Singapore, 1994), p 3.  
263 Ibid.  
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the community … offer one way of exploring the historical problem of 
Chinese identity in Singapore.264 
 
But it is not just the vicissitudes of historical terms that define Singapore’s hua 
ren cultural identity; cultural identity is also reflected in practices and cultural 
outlook. This chapter examines the cultural identity of Singapore hua ren as reflected 
through the memorialisation practices they participate in.  Through a discussion of  
the findings of my fieldwork, I argue that one of the major features of the Singapore 
hua ren society is the manifestation of its cultural beliefs and identities via practices 
rather than through a scriptural framework. I also contend that the material basis for 
hua ren cultural identity in Singapore is weak, which may explain the shift to a more 
emotional basis of cultural identifications. That is to say, while Singapore hua ren 
may continue to practice some of the “Chinese” acts of memorialisation, their cultural 
identity is one of symbolic ethnicity. Yet, this has, by no means, diminished their self-
perception as “being Chinese”.  
 
THE HUA REN FAMILY IN SINGAPORE 
Although regarded as the cornerstone of hua ren society, the family – defined in this 
study as the social unit of parents and children265 – is a relatively new social structure 
in Singapore that only became a social norm in the second half of the 20th century. 
Prior to 1933, the colonial Chinese community was largely “monosexual” – one made 
up of male migrants, most of whom were single.266 The married men usually did not 
bring their wives and children. The ratio of men to women in colonial Singapore was 
                                                
264 Ibid., p 5. 
265 See Chapter 2. 
266 Thomas John Bellows, “The Singapore party system: the first two decades,” PhD Thesis, Yale 
University (Michigan, 1968), p 6. 
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as high as 14:1 (1860 figures).267 It was only after the introduction of the Aliens 
Ordinance of 1933 which restricted the number of male migrants, that the sex balance 
improved as the restrictions did not apply to female immigrants. Control was only 
imposed on female immigration after 1938 because of the large numbers of females 
who were pouring in as a result of the loophole. As a result, the Ordinance, which 
addressed the sexual imbalance, had the effect of  
establish(ing) marital relationships as the norm, and made Singapore less 
a way station for transients and more a permanent domicile.268 
 







Table 1: Males as percentage of Chinese migrant population269 
 
 
The improved sex ratio meant that “for the first time marriage and families 
become possible for large number of men”, making the two institutions of marriage 
and family normative for a hitherto transient society. That the family became a feature 
of Singapore society was also reflected in the increase in children born to the 
“Chinese” families during the first half of the 20th century – 18% in 1911, 26% in 
1931, 36% in 1947 and 43% in 1957. This trend “solidified the position of the family 
as an institution capable of transmitting an ethnic heritage”.270 
 One of the elements of ethnic heritage for hua ren families is ancestor 
worship, as discussed in Chapter 2. The most common form of ancestor worship is the 
                                                
267 James Francis Warren, Ah ku and karayuki-san: prostitution in Singapore, 1870-1940 (Singapore: 
Singapore University Press, 2003), p 34. 
268 Bellows, “The Singapore party system”, p 7 
269 Ibid., p 8. 
270 Sock Foon Chew, Ethnicity and nationality in Singapore (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987)., p 117 
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“domestic cult”271 which is focussed is the ancestral tablet. The tablet is usually a 
small piece of wooden board inscribed with the names and the death dates of the 
deceased. It can be elaborately carved, with the words painted in gold, or it can 
simply consist of a piece of red paper, with the details (names, dates of death) written 
in ink and pasted on the block. The ancestral tablet is typically hosted on an altar in 
the home of the eldest son. On his death, the tablet is passed on to his eldest son. 
Historically, in cases where the son has no male offspring of his own, he may adopt 
the children of his siblings or from within the clan, to carry on the family name and 
continue the practice of ancestor worship. The domestic rituals of ancestor worship 
includes daily offerings of joss sticks to the tablet, and on specific occasions such as 
festivals and anniversaries, a more elaborate ritual that includes formal prayers, food 
offerings and the burning of joss papers. 
The transient nature of the Chinese society in colonial Singapore and the 
subsequent shallow family line of led scholars to argue that the lack of ancestral 
tablets in the home reflected the mentality that “the house in which people live in the 
Nan-yang” are not genuine homes”.272 That the family is not as institutionally 
entrenched in Singapore is reflected in the practice of the domestic cult. Although 
theoretically, only sons can lead the formal worship rites, daughters and daughters-in-
law carry out the actual practice of the domestic rites.273 Another significant 
difference in ancestor worship practices in southern China and Singapore is the 
number of generations of ancestors memorialised. Freedman and Topley who studied 
Chinese society in Singapore in the 1950s noted that the tradition of maintaining an 
                                                
271 Maurice Freedman, Family and kinship in Chinese society (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 1970), p 164. 
272 Maurice Freedman, “Chinese family and marraige in Singapore,” Report to the Colonial Social 
Science Research Council, Colonial Social Science Research Council (Singapore, 1953), p 204. 
273 See for example, Huan Chie Leong, “Ancestor worship in Singapore: Intergenerational narratives of 
Chinese women,” B.A. Thesis, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore (Singapore, 
2006/2007), which shows that domestic ancestor worship is largely the work of women.   
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ancestral tablet for “three to five generations away from the oldest living generation 
was not observed strictly”. They found that “once the tablet reaches the fourth or sixth 
generation, it was destroyed or buried near the grave of the individual for whom it 
stood”. In some cases, the earlier generations were then “promoted” to be worshipped 
in the lineage ancestral halls,274 or enshrined in “public shrines” – clan associations, 
temples and cemeteries.275  
If the individual household, and not the lineage hall, was “the only regular 
ancestor-worshipping unit”276 as Freedman and Topley noted, the ancestral practice 
was a shallow one. In the early 1960s, a scholar researching ancestor worship 
practices in Singapore found that none of the 104 households he interviewed hosted 
any ancestral tablets at home.277 By the 1970s, research found that ancestor tablets 
were not necessarily hosted at home, but in various other places such as clan 
associations and temples.278 Sometimes, the deceased  
is not even given a permanent spirit tablet; instead, a temporary spirit 
tablet is set up on such occasions as the Seventh month.279  
 
This simplicity reflected the sojourner mentality that many first generation migrants 
maintained: they felt that everything was transient and nothing was permanent. 
Compared to the stability of village life in China, the family in Singapore experienced 
high mobility, with people being apt to move houses. Hence, family members had 
little faith that the ancestral tablets would be taken care of, making it logical to not 
install ancestral tablets at home.  
                                                
274 Maurice Freedman and Margaret Topley, “Religion and social realignment among the Chinese in 
Singapore,” in South and Southeast Asia, ed. J. A. Harrison, 41-61 (Tucson: The University of Arizona 
Press, 1972), p 44 
275 Ibid.  
276 Ibid., p 45. 
277 Ban Seng Hoe, "Ancestor worship in Singapore," Diploma thesis, Department of Social Studies, 
University of Singapore (Singapore, 1963). 
278 Vivienne Wee, "Religion and ritual among the Chinese of Singapore: an ethnographic study," 
M.Soc.Sci thesis, University of Singapore (Singapore, 1977), p 414. 
279 Ibid., p 415 
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Among my 52 Singapore respondents, only 10 indicated that their families 
hostrf ancestral tablets at the homes. Of the 10, only one personally made daily 
offerings. The other nine did not participate in the daily offering of joss sticks, a task 
usually undertaken by their mothers or grandmothers. Instead, in terms of ancestral 
worship, the participation of most of my respondents was limited to special occasions 
such as Qing Ming, birth and death anniversaries, or festivals when they offered joss 
sticks, helped to lay out food offerings and/or helped with the burning of the paper 
offerings. Furthermore, most of my respondents, especially those under 40 years old, 
relied on senior family members such as parents and grandparents to remember and 
remind them of the dates and time for these activities. They did not keep track of the 
details themselves.  
This point agrees with Freedman’s earlier description of ancestor worship in 
Singapore as being one of “memorialism”,280 that is the symbolic nature of 
commemoration. Indeed, the cosmic consequences associated with ancestor worship 
are no longer an issue.281 The belief that misfortune will fall on the living family if 
one does not participate in ancestor worship no longer stands. None of my 
respondents raised this point. Respondents who practiced ancestor worship said they 
were continuing  a family tradition. Respondents who did not practice ancestor 
worship said their actions, or rather inaction, was an adaptation to modern conditions. 
 
 
                                                
280 Freedman, “Chinese family and marraige in Singapore,” p 209. 
281 See the following works for a detailed description of the perceived cause-and-effect of honouring 
(or not) of one’s ancestors: M. Emily Ahern, The cult of the dead in a Chinese village (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1973), Maurice Freedman, Family and kinship in Chinese 
society (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970). David K. Jordan, Gods, ghosts and 
ancestors: the folk religion of a Taiwanese village (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1972).Vivienne Wee, "Religion and ritual among the Chinese of Singapore: an ethnographic study," 
M.Soc.Sci thesis, University of Singapore (Singapore, 1977). 
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THE CLAN IN SINGAPORE 
Until the family became a norm in Singapore hua ren society in the second half of the 
20th century, the extended family of clan associations was the leading feature of the 
colonial Chinese society. As discussed in Chapter 2, the clan or lineage is a 
significant institution representing kinship ties, and an important site of ancestor 
worship in traditional Chinese society. The Chinese migrants in colonial Singapore 
did not totally replicate the customs, traditions and practices of their village, nor did 
they construct clan or lineage halls. The lineage, as found in China, did not take root 
in Singapore for several reasons. First, most of the migrants to Singapore were not of 
the literati class but of peasant stock.282  They would not have had the necessary 
knowledge or funds to replicate the lineage organisation with its appended 
organisations of the genealogy and ancestral worship hall. Second, most of the first 
generation migrants were unlikely to have come to Singapore with the idea of a 
permanent migration. Hence the establishment of the lineage – a symbol and 
representation of permanence and continuity – was unnecessary. Third, most of the 
migrants who came to Singapore were not necessarily related by descent but from 
different counties and villages.283  The “highly individualistic” nature of the migrant 
society did not necessitate the establishment of lineages.284 In Singapore, the 
institution closest to a lineage is the clan association (会馆, hui guan), which 
resembled a mutual aid society.  
Most of the clan associations were built around dialect and/or regional origins. 
One did not have to prove blood descent to join the clan associations. Often, sharing 
the same surname or coming from the same region was enough. These associations 
                                                
282 Freedman, “Chinese family and marriage”, p 6. 
283 Such as the case of the Mans of Hong Kong. See James L Watson, Emigration and the Chinese 
lineage: the Mans in Hong Kong and London (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). 
284 Maurice Freedman, “Chinese family and marraige in Singapore,” Report to the Colonial Social 
Science Research Council, Colonial Social Science Research Council (Singapore, 1953), p 57. 
  Jaime Koh 
 
 123 
took care of the social and welfare needs of its members. Some of the wealthier clans 
such as Ngee Ann Kongsi285 purchased burial sites for their fellow clansmen. These 
were the closest attempts at replicating the function of the ancestral halls.286 The 
hosting of ancestral tablets and performance of ancestor worship rituals were the next 
closest effort to replicate the lineage hall in China. Traditional lineage halls have 
stringent criteria for the inclusion of ancestral tablets. In the most general sense, only 
lineage members – namely, those from the same line of descent – could have their 
ancestral tablets installed at the hall. The few lineage halls registered in Singapore had 
less stringent criteria: as long as one has the same surname, regardless of lineage, 
one’s tablets may be hosted in these lineage halls.  
The hosting of ancestral tablets in the clan associations is also a recent 
phenomenon. According to one respondent, the clan association, of which he was a 
member, only started hosting the ancestral tablets of fellow clansmen after the Second 
World War in the 1950s after they purchased their own building and were granted 
permission to operate a clan temple. For the halls, hosting the ancestral tablet is more 
than just an obligation; it is also a way to generate revenue. Members have to pay 
either an annual fee or a one-off fee to the clan to have the tablets hosted. The amount 
paid will depend on several factors: the number of tablets to be installed, the design of 
the tablet (elaborate or simple) and the location of the tablet. The closer the tablet is to 
the front of the altar, the more expensive it is. Many people prefer to have the tablets 
located to the front because it is more visible. 
                                                
285 义安公司 （yi an gong si). This organisation was established by a group of Teochew merchants in 
1830 as a charitable organisation to cater to the needs of migrants of Teochew origins. National Library 
Board Singapore, Ngee Ann Kongsi 义安公司, http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1877_2012-03-
29.html (accessed June 26, 2012). 
286 Tham, Religion and modernization, p 94. 
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One such lineage hall in Singapore is the Singapore Lim See Tai Chong Soo 
Kiu Liong Tong Self-Management Association, established in 1928.287 The ancestral 
tablets hosted there are all Lims from different dialect groups and lineages.288 The 
Kheng Jai Wee Tee Soo, on the other hand, limits its membership to only Hainanese 
people with the surname Wee.289 Some surname-based clans also host ancestral 
tablets, space permitting. The Singapore Khoh Clan Association, for example, has 
under its aegis a temple hosting several patron deities and several ancestral tablets of 
people with the surname Koh.290 Any one with the surname may place their ancestral 
tablets at the temple, regardless of dialect or regional origins, or clan membership. 
This is to accommodate to members from the broader society, an effort that stems 
partly from the self-help objective of the clan and partly as an attempt to attract more 
members. 
With modernisation and urbanisation, many of the rites and rituals related to 
ancestor worship have been simplified or relegated to secondary importance.291 
Today, ancestor worship at the collective level is no longer a demonstration of the 
lineage’s pedigree and strength as a social group. For instance, although most 
surname-based clans continue to perform the Spring and Autumn sacrificial rites,292 
which originated in agricultural China, to pay ritual respects to the founder of the 
                                                
287 新加坡林氏大宗祠九龙堂家族自治会. According to the listing on the Singapore Federation of 
Chinese Clan Association, the Association has 900 registered members. Singapore Federation of 
Chinese Clan Associations, 会员团体组织类别 (Classification of member organisations), 
http://www.sfcca.org.sg/member/classes?c=2&s=209#sch (accessed December 11, 2012). 
288 林，Lin in hanyu pinyin rendition. 
289 王, Wang in hanyu pinyin rendition. Information gathered from interview. 
290 许, Xu in hanyu pinyin rendition. Because of dialect differences, the surname may be spelt Koh, Ko, 
Kaw or Khor，which are some of the more common spelling found in Singapore. Information gathered 
from interview. 
291 Chee Kiong Tong, Kong Chong Ho and Ting Kwong Lin, "Traditional Chinese customs in modern 
Singapore," in Asian traditions and modernization: perspectives from Singapore, ed. Mun Cheong 
Yong, 67-88 (Singapore: Easterm Universities Press, 2004) and Chee Kiong Tong and Lily Kong, 
"Religion and modernity: ritual transformations and the reconstruction of space and time," Social & 
Cultural Geography 1, no. 1 (2000): 29-44. 
292春秋二祭, chun qiu er ji. 
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clan’s surname, this ceremony has little relevance in urban Singapore. Instead, it has 
become another item on the clans’ calendar of activities. Attendance at such events is 
relatively small; often limited to the core committee members who are also in charge 
of organising the events.  
Because of the nature of Singapore’s migrant society, the clans function less 
as as lineage hall than a community centre where members can mingle and network. 
Some of the larger clans, such as the Hokkien Huay Kuan293 or the Hainan Hwee 
Kuan,294 run educational and cultural courses covering a wide range of topics from 
Chinese history to language and customs for the general public, in addition to 
organising social functions such as excursions and festival celebrations for their 
members. Some clans also organise biannual conferences with clans from other parts 
of the world for networking and research purposes. The smaller clans, with 
comparatively less human and financial resources, conduct more recreational 
activities, such as mahjong playing and karaoke singing sessions, with the simple aim 
of keeping the clan operational and generating revenue. 
Clan membership in Singapore is on the decline, with many clans struggling to 
attract new and younger members.295 One respondent who is a member of a locality-
based clan296 said his clan has been recruiting students from China studying in 
Singapore for its youth section. This is partly due to the difficulty of recruiting local 
members. Respondents said that neither their children nor grandchildren are interested 
in attending clan activities. Except for the six respondents from SKCA and one 22-
year old respondent, none of the other 56 respondents attended clan activities or were 
                                                
293 新加坡福建会馆. Singapore Hokkien Huay Kuan, http://www.shhk.com.sg/. 
294 海南会馆. Singapore Hainan Hwee Kuan, http://www.hainan.org.sg/. 
295 Elgin Toh, “Chinese immigrants boost 100-year-old clan group ,” Straits Times (Singapore, 18 
August 2010); personal interviews with individuals active in clans. 
296 Clan associations in Singapore can be categorized into two groups: surname-based clans and 
locality-based clans. The latter is generally a congregation of people who originate from the same 
geographical area, and are not necessarily bound by blood ties.  
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members of any clans. The 22-year old respondent, VL/F22/SP, attended activities of 
the clan her mother belonged to, but her reason was pragmatic: the clan distributes 
bursaries for children of members. Since her mother is a member and has asked her to 
apply for a bursary, she usually attends the clan event when the bursary is handed out.  
Many older members of the clan associations I spoke to opined that the 
cultural dilution – as reflected in the dwindling membership numbers – needed to be 
arrested.  Respondent XJC/M81/SP, who managed a clan temple, had on several 
occasions expressed his disappointment over the lack of knowledge on the part of the 
younger clan members. He said that he was usually the only one who attended to the 
placement of offerings and oversaw the worship procedure on occasions where 
worship rituals, either for ancestors or related deities, took place. He claimed that the 
executive committee members of the clan association did not know the “proper 
procedures”. During one particular ceremony, when the team leading the ancestor 
worship fumbled with the items that were supposed to be presented to the ancestors, 
XJC had to point the men to the right item. After each offering, he had to adjust the 
position of the joss sticks and the items. 
XJC was disappointed that the members were so reliant on him and 
uninterested in learning the ropes. His disappointment was tinged with anxiety about 
the potential break in knowledge transmission: 
What should be done where, what should be placed where, they did not 
want to learn…When I want to teach them, they said they are not free. I 
tell them, how are you going to do this when I die? 
 
For him, a break in the transmission marks a break in the cultural knowledge. 
Declining clan membership worsens the situation. “The young ones stop coming (to 
the clan) when the older ones (parents, grandparents) die,” said XJC. “We have one 
less member when one dies.” 
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Many of the older respondents regarded a break in cultural transmission and 
continuity of tradition (in the form of clan membership) as a form cultural dilution. 
They believed that the idea of kinship was losing traction with the younger 
generation, citing their lack of interest in joining the clan, their non-participation in 
ancestor worship, and their ignorance about the significance of such practices. One 
clan member said the clan management was trying to encourage clan members to 
bring their children and grandchildren into the clan so that the knowledge and cultural 
memory could be passed on to subsequent generations. But they were doubtful that 
the younger generation was interested: “But are they willing? Do they have the time?”  
More significantly, this criticism of cultural dilution reflects the decreasing 
material dependency of belonging. Historically, the clan associations were families 
writ large who took care of the social welfare of its members, living or dead. It 
provided basic food and shelter, employment, medical and educational needs for its 
members, functioned as an arbitrator in disputes and provided a social network for its 
members. In today’s urban context, the clan associations are no longer the sole 
providers of these services, many of their function have been taken over by the 
government. Those who continued with clan membership tended to do so for 
sentimental reasons. Several members said that they were just following the footsteps 
of their fathers or uncles, who were clan members. But most of these existing clan 
members did not expect their children to continue with this “tradition” as they 
claimed their children were not interested. Another respondent, whose father and 
paternal uncle were members of a clan, discontinued membership after his mother 
passed away. The respondent said he had kept the membership while his mother was 
still alive because she insisted on it; seeing it as a form of continuation of kinship ties. 
But in the 26 years between his parents’ death, the respondent said he did not attend 
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any clan activities: “I don’t know anybody there. Go for what?” was his pragmatic 
answer.  
In addition to disinterest on the part of the younger generation, the older 
respondents also said that the dominance of the English language and religious 
conversion to Christianity also contributed to cultural dilution. The latter two reasons, 
as shall be further discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter 6, are seen to 
undermine the cultural identity – and hence the ethnic identity – of young Singapore 
hua ren because of the differences in cultural values.  
 
RELIGION AND THE PRACTICE OF ANCESTOR WORSHIP 
Within a generation or two, a substantial paradigm shift has taken place among hua 
ren in Singapore: one’s cultural identity is no longer equated with one’s ethnic 
identity. The change is most apparent in the attitudes towards ancestor worship, with 
very different belief systems often existing within the same family, usually between 
parents and their children. One of the major factors that account for this change in 
attitude is religious conversion. Religious conversion often marks a rupture in the 
ethnic identity,297 and is a major break in tradition in hua ren community. Convention 
obliges hua ren to perform ancestor worship rites and rituals for, at least, their 
deceased parents and grandparents. But this custom is no longer a given, especially in 
families where conversion to Christianity has taken place. The break is even more 
acute if the parents have also converted to Christianity as a result of (sub)conscious 
pressure that their Christian children might treat them as outsiders (in relation to the 
                                                
297 George de Vos, “Ethnic pluralism: conflict and accommodation” in George de Vos and Lola 
Romanucci-Ross (eds), Ethnic identity: cultural continuities and change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982, pp 5-41 at p 13. 
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religious family) and excluded them from the family life.298 As outlined in Chapter 2, 
ancestor worship is a mainstay of hua ren ethnic and cultural identity.  
 
CHRISTIANS AND ANCESTOR WORSHIP 
Conversion to Christianity undermines the believer’s hua ren cultural identity. 
This is because Christianity stems from another cultural system – that of the Western 
Anglo-Saxon world. The inherent values and beliefs of the Christian ideology are 
diametrically opposed to ancestor worship: it prescribes worship to only one supreme 
God. In this understanding, ancestor worship is viewed as incompatible with 
Christianity as the ancestors in being the object of worship, are being elevated to the 
position of gods, rivalling the centrality of the Christian God. Thus, ancestor worship 
is viewed as idolatrous because the object of worship is not God but ancestors. 
Ancestor worship is thus placed on the same footing as idol worship. Furthermore, 
Christianity is said to undermine the cultural institution of the family as ancestor 
worship is the core of the hua ren family. For ideological reasons, many hua ren 
Christians do not practice or participate in ancestor worship.  
Among my Christian respondents is a group that eschews ancestor worship 
altogether.299 They do not participate in any form of ancestor worship, be it the 
domestic cult or visiting of ancestral graves during Qing Ming, as they feel that these 
activities conflict with their religious beliefs. This group believes ancestor worship to 
be coterminous with religion, placing the emphasis on the “worship”, which as 
indicated above, threatens the centrality of the Christian God. Many older non-
Christian respondents who practice ancestor worship dispute this view. They argue 
                                                
298 Kristina Goransson, The binding tie: Chinese intergenerational relations in modern Singapore 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai'l Press, 2009).  
299 I did not set out to conduct the research with one or the other as the control group. This situation 
was a natural occurrence. The Christians in this study includes those of various denominations, 
including Mormonism.  
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that ancestor worship is not a religious activity and that equating ancestor worship to 
religion is merely an excuse for not participating. Ancestors, they argue, do not 
replace the Christian God as the focus of worship; instead they are family members 
who should be honoured and remembered regardless of religious beliefs. In this 
respect, the non-Christian respondents emphasised the “ancestor” element in 
“ancestor worship”. These non-Christian hua ren believe that conversion to 
Christianity leads to the dilution of the idea of family and clan. One clan association 
respondent said the young Christians do not even hold joss sticks anymore even 
though, in his mind, there is nothing wrong with holding joss sticks.  
The hua ren Christians who do not participate in the ancestor worship contend 
that while they recognise and respect ancestors, they do not accord the latter any 
special spiritual status or treatment.300 For them, the act of ancestor worship is only an 
act, which to them has become meaningless; they argue that respecting the deceased 
and holding their memories dear (without the respect being manifested in ancestor 
worship) is good enough. They argue that non- participation in ancestor worship does 
not mean a lack of respect for ancestors. Some of the Christian respondents argue that 
they show respect for the deceased in other ways, as shall be elaborated later.  
A number of respondents who were new converts, and whose family members 
were non-Christians said they felt obliged to participate in ancestor worship. 
Although reluctant, they felt compelled by family pressure to participate. AL/F19/SP, 
a recent convert to Christianity said she continued to visit the columbarium with her 
parents and hold the joss sticks as she did before her conversion. While she felt that 
the practice of offering joss sticks was a “pointless” act that was incompatible with 
Christianity, she continued to do so due to family pressure. Being the only Christian 
                                                
300 John Clammer, The sociology of Singapore religion: studies in Christianity and Chinese culture 
(Singapore: Chopmen, 1991), pp 84-85. 
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in the family, she did not want her reluctance to participate in ancestor worship to be 
fodder for her parents to “bash up Christianity”. They had previously made it clear 
that she was expected to turn up for these events even though she was now a 
Christian. In these families, Christianity is often viewed as an ideological threat to 
accepted traditions and customs. Parents fear that the family ties would be broken if 
the young converts did not continue to participate in events such as ancestor worship, 
which are occasions when the family got together.  
This case appears to lend credence to the argument that one’s cultural 
practices reflects one’s cultural identity, which is not necessarily the same as one’s 
ethnic identity. Yet it is not often so straightforward. While some hua ren Christians 
may cite ideological reasons for not participating in ancestor worship, there are also 
hua ren Christians who continue to practice some form of ancestor worship 
voluntarily. Some of my hua ren Christian respondents were able to rationalise, 
according to their value system, that ancestor worship is a cultural practice and not a 
religious one. These respondents  were typically older and appeared better able to cast 
a psychological distance between the meaning and the act in order to inject their own 
interpretation of the symbolism of the act. For them, ancestor worship provided 
occasions for family gatherings, which overrode the “religious” atmosphere of such 
occasions. Before her conversion to Mormonism301 in 1969, HH/F68/SP used to 
participate in ancestor worship activities with her family, including visiting the graves 
of their ancestors during Qing Ming at the Pek San Theng cemetery: 
We usually hire a big lorry, and we prepare the offerings: Chicken, 
pork, roast pork, baos (steamed buns), fruits and a lot of paper money. 
There’ll be about … 10 graves we have to pay respect to…So it’s a 
                                                
301 Mormonism is a strain of the Christian faith which emerged in America in the 19th century. The 
official title of the church is Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. See the church’s official 
website, www.lds.org 
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whole day affair. We go early in the morning and finish (at) about 1 or 
2 pm… 
 
When the cemetery was slated for urban redevelopment in the 1980s, all the 
graves belonging to her grandparents and grand-aunts were exhumed:  
I think nobody thought of putting them anywhere so (the family just left 
it) to the government. I don’t know what happened to (them).302  
 
While HH has converted to Mormonism she no longer practiced ancestor worship in 
the traditional sense, but she continued to visit the graves of her deceased parents with 
her siblings and their families during Qing Ming. Since all her siblings have 
converted to Christianity (HH is the only Mormon among her siblings), they typically 
bring fresh flowers to the graves instead of food and paper offerings. HH and her 
husband also continue with the practice of visiting the niches of his deceased parents 
at the columbarium. Unlike HH, the extended family of ACH/M68/SP are not 
Christians. As such, they still practice ancestor worship as most Chinese religionists, 
with the offering of joss sticks, food and paper offerings. HH and ACH still attend 
these events as a sign of respect, and they also pay for their share of the offerings. 
“His sisters insisted on having all those things, we let it be,” said HH. Of their 
participation, ACH explained: 
Even as Christians, we see it as a respect for elders because we don’t 
think (just because) we are Christians excludes (us) from showing (our) 
loyalty and respect. So when we go to the columbarium, my sisters 
(who are not Christians) would do all the preparation, they’d buy the 
stuff and all that. They’d offer me the joss sticks (to offer to the 
deceased parents) I always take it. I never refuse. To me, that is a sign 
of unity in the family, that although they do not share my faith in 
Christianity, you know, we are no different in paying respect to our 
parents.” 
 
                                                
302 The land occupied by the Pek San Theng cemetery has since been transformed into a housing estate, 
which takes after the name, Bishan. The unclaimed graves were exhumed by the government and 
collectively cremated, and the ashes were scattered at sea. Today, there’s a plaque at the PST temple, 
which also houses a columbarium, to commemorate this group of people. 




Some Roman Catholics also adopt a more flexible attitude towards such 
ancestral worship practices which they regard as being more about memorialisation 
than religion. Some Catholic families are known to set up altars where the deceased 
family members, including spouses and children, are remembered. In the case of 
MC/F21/SP, her family has an altar where the photographs of the deceased are set up. 
This altar was specially set up with the photographs of family members used during 
their funerals and a daily ritual akin to offering joss sticks was performed faily: 
We have an altar for Jesus and Mary and stuff, and the altar for the 
deceased is somewhere else separately (in the house)…We have a habit 
of lighting candles. The altar for Jesus and Mary (has) oil candles, (and) 
for the deceased, long white candles.  
 
The family members memorialised are MC’s maternal grandparents and her older 
sister who passed away in an accident. MC explained that because her sister’s death 
was still relatively recent, her mother continued to hold her close in her memory: 
my mother still, on special occasions like Christmas, Chinese New 
Year, cook…and set up food in front of her altar (at home). Her ashes 
are still in the house, it hasn’t been moved to a niche yet. 
 
NON-CHRISTIANS AND ANCESTOR WORSHIP 
The cultural paradigm shift is not just limited to hua ren Christians. Some 
parents whose children have converted to Christianity believe that death and its 
aftermath should not be a contentious issue for the living. YLC/F57/SP said she and 
her husband have instructed their children to cremate them and scatter their ashes at 
sea when they die. “I don’t want to trouble my children and make things difficult for 
them,” she said. She explained that her son is a Christian (and would not practice 
ancestor worship) and her non-Christian daughter, as tradition dictates, would not be 
able to host their ancestral tablets regardless of her marital status. The only thing they 
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were adamant about was that they did not want to have a Christian funeral, which 
some Christian children organise in a final bid to “save their parents’ souls for 
Christ”.  
While ancestor worship is identified as a “Chinese” cultural practice, not all 
non-Christian hua ren participate in the practice. Convenience is the recurring reason 
cited by my non-Christian respondents’ for their non-participation in ancestor 
worship. Informant RS/F38/SP said her mother moved her late father and paternal 
grandparents’ tablets to the temple many years ago for convenience. RS explained 
that it was possibly because the maintenance of the tablets had become a burden for 
her mother, who was a single parent: 
My mother began to find it a hassle every time we have to bai303 
(especially on special occasions)…(so) she said just consolidate (the 
tablets and place them) at the temple. 
 
REASONING CULTURAL IDENTITY 
The cases discussed of hua ren with different religious inclinations and their practice 
or non-practice of ancestor worship highlights the possibility offered by the 
Sinoscape: there is no singular practice that defines one’s cultural identity. A practice 
is open to various meanings and symbolism, which is determined by the practitioner. 
There is a strong case of reasoning that underlies one’s cultural identity.  
In the case of my respondents, the younger generation of hua ren (those aged 
50 and under) generally did not regard the practice of ancestor worship as mandatory, 
as their parents or grandparents did. Their participation in ancestor worship activities 
appeared to be perfunctory. As mentioned earlier, many of them neither kept track of 
the dates of the occasions for ancestor worship nor did they take an active role in the 
                                                
303 拜, worship. 
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rites and rituals. Generally their participation was limited by the extent of immediate 
family obligation on the insistence of their participation. They cited parental pressure, 
family tradition and filial piety obligations as the reasons for their participation. Many 
under-30 respondents who used to visit family graves during Qing Ming as children 
usually stopped going once they reached their teenage years. Various reasons were 
given for this. As such visits often took place extremely early – usually at dawn to 
avoid crowds and traffic at the cemeteries – some respondents said they found it hard 
to wake up in time. Others also cited school and work as their reasons for not going 
on these visits.  
While older respondents (aged 50 and above) lamented the younger 
generation’s lack of interest in such events, responses from my under -30 respondents 
suggested a relatively laissez faire attitude on the part of the senior family members in 
“enforcing” their participation. The younger respondents also suggested that the 
senior family members did not insist on their presence, despite the significance of 
Qing Ming. Interestingly, some respondents who were parents revealed that they were 
not keen for young children (such as those under 10 years old) to go to cemeteries and 
columbaria. They believed that the young would be susceptible to threats from the 
spirits or the negative energy field of these sites. These responses revealed another 
facet of hua ren cultural outlook: while paying tribute to ancestors was important, it 
should not go against folk beliefs. In this case, ancestor worship should not be 
conducted at the expense of the well-being of young children. It was believed that 
children had to be protected so that they could safely grow into adulthood. Although 
there are no spoken “rules” about the appropriate age for children to go to cemeteries 
and columbaria, generally children under 10 years old are not encouraged to go to 
such places or participate in funerals of non-relatives, for example. This protection of 
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young children is perhaps linked to the continuation of the family name. Especially in 
the case of the boys, many hua ren families believe that it is important that they are 
able to grow into adults in order to perpetuate the family name through marriage and 
having children of their own.  
The above discussion demonstrates how reasoning has already overshadowed 
the traditional practice of ancestor worship, privileging the living over the dead in 
contrast to what has been regarded as customary. From another perspective, the 
underlying explanation for the paradigm shift is a result of the dominance of 
rationality. Reasoning has been evident in the responses from the younger generation 
of informant who said that they were generally ignorant about the tenets, symbolism 
and rationale for ancestral worship activities because “nobody explained” or taught 
them. Informant TWY/M22/SP, who accompanied his parents to the temples and 
columbarium, helps with the laying out of food and the burning of joss sticks and 
papers. But he was “not exactly sure what to do”; his participation was largely to 
please his grandmother. Even for informants who continued the practice of ancestor 
worship, many of them cited parental examples as the reason: “My parents did it, so I 
do it too”. This is an apt example of Bourdieu’s logic of practice. While younger 
generation informants generally expected some form of reason and explanation for 
actions, the older generation regarded explanations as unnecessary as “it has always 
been done this way”. Yet, when no reasoning is forthcoming, the younger generation 
falls back on two courses of action: they either eschew it altogether or they continue 
practicing according to the logic of practice.  
That the older generation does not specifically and actively explain the 
ancestral rites and rituals and their accompanying symbolism and significance to the 
younger generation is an oft-heard reason why the younger generation does not 
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continue with the practice of ancestor worship. There could be several reasons for 
such passivity on the part of the older generation in transmitting the knowledge. First, 
Chinese religion as we know it is a syncretic blend of Taoism, Buddhism and folk 
practices. Without canonised teachings, the practices are modified and changed to suit 
the context and environment in which they are carried out. With such a fuzzy 
foundation, it is hard to clarify the information when transmitting it to the younger 
generation. Second, and related to the first reason, the older generation may have had 
inherited such practices and beliefs in similar fashion from their family elders, hence 
the transmission of such knowledge and memories would just be as fuzzy. Thus when 
faced with questions of why particular rituals and practices are carried out, the 
response is almost always “it’s always been done this way”, “it’s tradition” and the 
like. This is the logic of “it is what it is”. 
The third reason for the lack of explanation is perhaps the older generation’s 
realisation that the younger generation is living in a world different from theirs, one 
that is not bound by traditions and customs and is characterised by individualisation 
and modernity, however defined.304 It is one in which the English language and 
western culture – literary and popular – dominates, and one that emphasises economic 
skills rather than the possession of traditional values. Because of this, the older 
generation adopts a form of self-censorship in the belief that the knowledge they pass 
on would not be continued anyway. Such attitudes are indicative of the changes in 
Singapore hua ren’s attitude towards the idea of perpetuating the continuity of the 
family. While family remains an important aspect of their lives, my hua ren 
respondents generally do not see the need to have children to carry on the family 
name, as the traditional Chinese family believes. Not only are single hua ren 
                                                
304 See also Chee Kiong Tong, Kong Chong Ho and Ting Kwong Lin, “Traditional Chinese customs in 
modern Singapore,” in Asian traditions and modernization: perspectives from Singapore, ed. Mun 
Cheong Yong, 67-88 (Singapore: Easterm Universities Press, 2004). 
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“substantially less positive” about the desirability of marriage, hua ren are also less 
likely to agree that having children is a top priority in their lives, compared to their 
Malay and Indian counterparts.305  
The basis of such reasoning critically assumes that there is a body of 
knowledge to be transmitted. It also assumes that there is an explanation to 
accompany every action, and that the explanation must be clarified. Yet, as the 
responses from my respondents indicate, this is not necessarily the case. While there 
is a general idea of “cultural value” and “what should be done”, there are variations 
between families and even between generations within the same family. This reflects 
a very different mode of knowledge that is, in large part, due to the general change as 
a result of education, and in part, a change in religious beliefs among Singapore hua 
ren. The Enlightenment mode of knowledge, one that privileges the scientific, the 
rational and explanation, is strongly evident in Singapore. Sociologist Tong Chee 
Kiong argued that there is a process of rationalisation and intellectualisation of 
religion in Singapore.306 He argued that over the past few decades, the hua ren in 
Singapore have undergone a process where  
individuals shift from an unthinking and passive acceptance of religion to 
one where there is a tendency to search for a religion that they regard as 
systematic, logical and relevant.307  
 
Tong’s study of religious change in Singapore found that younger and 
English-educated Singapore hua ren perceived Christianity to be a rational, modern 
religion with an organised structure (Sunday School, Bible Study, Cell Groups for 
instance). This perception is juxtaposed with the seemingly unorganised and 
                                                
305 David Chan, Attitudes on family: survey on social attitudes of Singaporeans (SAS) 2001 , Social 
survey, Ministry of Community Development and Sports (Singapore: Ministry of Community 
Development and Sports, 2002), p 13 and p 19.  
306 Chee Kiong Tong, Rationalizing religion: religious conversion, revivalism and competition in 
Singapore society (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 
307 Ibid., p 4. 
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unexplainable tenets and practices related to Chinese religion, which made 
Christianity a more attractive religious option. Tong argued that this process of 
rationalisation of religion - “clarification, specification and systemisation of the ideas 
which men have concerning their reason for being”308 – explains the religious shift 
among Singapore hua ren from traditional Chinese religion to Christianity and 
Buddhism. Citing Max Weber, Tong argued that this process of rationalisation and 
intellectualisation which was an important aspect of modern society, was taking place 
in Singapore. It was made easier by the socio-cultural milieu which  
Emphasises voluntarism in the decision-making processes regarding 
religious affiliation, exposure to a plurality of religious options, and an 
educational system that emphasises scientific and critical thinking.309  
 
This argument is most clearly illustrated by the responses of the younger 
generation of respondents, as well as those who are English-educated, and/or of the 
Christian and Catholic faith. Those who turned away from traditional Chinese religion 
attributed their decision to the apparent meaningless of the rituals. Although they still 
occasionally participated in some of these rituals, such as during Qing Ming, they did 
not attach much religious meaning to these rituals; their participation wass to please 
their parents.310 For these non-religionists, they considered such rituals as customs 
and part of tradition, not necessarily religious. Most of my non-religionist informants 
indicated the reason for their participation in ancestor worship rites and rituals as 
“respect for the ancestors” or feeling obligated to attend such events.  
In the following pages, I shall use the terms “reason” and “reasoning” in place 
of Tong’s “rationalisation”. Although Tong’s study did not claim Christianity as a 
                                                
308 Ibid., p 5. 
309 Ibid.  
310 Eddie C Y Kuo, Jon S T Quah Quah and Chee Kiong Tong, “Religion and religious revivalism in 
Singapore ,” Report prepared for the Ministry of Community Development (Singapore, 1988), p 21. 
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“rational” religion, using the term “rationalisaion” could potentially be misread as an 
assessment of the rationality of Christianity. Like Chinese religion, Christianity is 
also a religion based on faith, which by biblical definition is “being sure of what we 
hope for and certain of what we do not see”.311 Christians are told to “live by faith, 
not by sight”.312 In this regard, rationalisation on the part of the hua ren Christians is 
just a replacement of Chinese religion with Christianity. One of the reasons why 
Christianity is viewed as a more rational religion is possibly because of its association 
with the Western culture and the English language, both of which have been accorded 
privileged status in Asia. A second reason, as many of my hua ren Christian 
informants indicated is that the Bible is held up as proof of rationality – every 
commandment and principle Christians adhere to are written down. By this reasoning, 
Chinese religion is superstitious because it is not based on a text. This highlights the 
misplaced logic of privileging the word over the oral, where the written has more 
authority than the oral. This point shall be discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
RECULTURALISATION AND DECULTURALISATION: ROLE OF THE STATE 
The strong streak of rationalisation in Singapore could be the result of a highly 
rational system of education. The education system has, since the 1960s, emphasised 
at various points in time, technical skills, science and economics, all of which 
privilege rationality and explainable reason. In the 1960s, following independence in 
1965, the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) government sought to underscore the 
equality of the various ethnic groups by stressing multiracialism and multiculturalism 
as the basis of its cultural policy. To maintain a semblance of neutrality, the PAP 
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privileged the economic over the cultural.313 English was made the lingua franca of 
education, commerce and government since it was an international language, and one 
that could transcend the ethnic differences. The hua ren without formal education and 
the exclusively Mandarin-speaking who had been marginalised since the 1950s, 
continued to occupy the periphery.314 Chinese-stream education took a back seat to 
the English medium. Conceding the economic advantage of English education, many 
hua ren sent their children to English medium schools despite their belief that their 
children should receive their education in the Chinese medium and its values. The 
falling enrolment in Chinese-medium schools vis-à-vis rising enrolment in English 
schools attested to that trend.315 By 1987, all primary schools had to use English as the 
medium of instruction, marking the end of Chinese-medium schools, although a few 
Chinese-medium schools were able to retain the teaching of Mandarin at the first 
language level, together with English.316 For most other schools, Mandarin (and the 
other state-recognised Mother Tongues – Tamil and Malay) was taught as a second 
language. Even Nanyang University (Nantah), the first Chinese language university in 
Southeast Asia, had to replace Mandarin with English as the medium of instruction in 
1976.317  
The PAP government embarked on a re-culturalisation project in the late 
1970s in the face of fear of deculturation as a result of the rapid Westernisation. With 
                                                
313 Chua Beng Huat, Communitarian ideology and democracy in Singapore (London: Routledge, 
1995), p 59. 
314 See Kwok Kian Woon, “Chinese-Educated Intellectuals in Singapore: Marginality, Memory and 
Modernity” in Asian Journal of Social Science, 29, 3, 2001. 
315 See Beng Chaoo Ang, “The reform of Chinese language teaching in Singapore primary schools, 
1974-1984,” PhD Thesis, National University of Singapore (Singapore, 1991), p 35 and p 40; and 
Ministry of Education, “Report on the Ministry of Education 1978,” (1979). 
316 Ang, “The reform of Chinese language teaching”, pp 40-41.  
317 For a history of Nanyang University, see Eng-Leong Tan, “The establishment of Nanyang 
University 1953-1956,” Academic exercise, Department of History, University of Singapore 
(Singapore, 1973).  Teck Hui Ong, “Nanyang University, 1956-1968: the question of official 
recognition,” Academic exercise, Department of History, National University of Singapore (Singapore, 
1985) deals with the university’s efforts to defend its curriculum.  
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the lack of a true “Singaporean culture”, the government fell back on ethnic culture as 
a logical base on which to establish the cultural identities of Singaporeans. The 
Mandarin re-cultralisation project included the introduction of Mandarin to replace 
Chinese dialects as the lingua franca of Singapore hua ren, and the introduction of 
Confucian Studies to serve to buttress the cultural foundation of Singapore hua ren. 
But the re-culturalisation project was unsuccessful. The Western system of education 
and dominance of the English language was by then too entrenched in the social 
foundation of Singapore. With a new generation of Singapore-born hua ren exposed 
to the critical thinking based Western education, traditional customs and practices that 
without scientific explainations appeared to be too irrational and impractical to merit 
continuation. In addition, by replacing dialects with Mandarin as the lingua franca of 
hua ren, the government truncated the transmission of values and knowledge of 
practices within families. Perhaps the failure of the re-culturalisation project was also 
due to the “type” of culture that Singapore hua ren was suppose to identify with: 
instead of the folk culture as exemplified by dialects, Singapore hua ren were 
encouraged to identify with Chinese “high culture” as embodied in Mandarin, and 
“fine arts” such as cultural dances and calligraphy. This re-reculturalisation failed to 
take into account that most Singapore hua ren traced their ancestry to the peasantry in 
the south of China rather than to the court culture of northern China.  
Among Singapore hua ren, Mandarin was not necessarily a tool of instruction 
or of cultural transmission; many of the informants viewed Mandarin as just another 
subject to master in order to pass examinations or a more practical language. 
CFT/M22/SP said English was the only language his is comfortable with. Although 
his parents were not English educated and spoke dialect among themselves, they only 
communicated with their children in English.  
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They believed that English is the more profitable language, so they just 
focussed on that. Of course, they had to try Chinese once in a while, that’s 
why they got me tuition because they couldn’t do it themselves. 
 
For TWL/M22/SP, Mandarin was a struggle. Even though his parents nagged at him 
to brush up his Mandarin, he could not do it. “All my brothers also have difficulty 
with their Chinese,” he said.  
Something must have happened…although my mum, especially, always 
speaks Mandarin at home, we watch the news in Chinese, our 
newspapers (we read) are in Chinese, but it never really grew on us to 
read and write Chinese. 
 
TWL said he was relieved when he no longer had to do Mandarin as a school 
subject at university. He believes his parents’ pressure on him and his brothers to do 
well in the language was a matter of practicality: 
Honestly, I think it’s just for the exams…I don’t think that they want me 
to learn Chinese just because I am Chinese…there’s a bit of Chinese 
pride, but I think they are more practical than this. It’s all about the 
exams, so that’s why they have stopped nagging me about it (since TWL 
no longer needs to do Chinese in university). My brother who’s in JC 
now gets quite a lot of it. They kept saying that the Chinese exams are 
coming and he’s not prepared… 
 
In the 1980s, the government began its efforts to build a cultural foundation 
for hua ren by introducing Confucian Ethics to secondary school students, “with the 
explicit aim of strengthening family ties in a rapidly modernizing world”.318 
Confucian Ethics was selected as being “representative” of the “Chinese” culture and 
was thus included in the Religious Knowledge courses that were offered from 
1982.319 The government argued that Confucianism, not Buddhism, was what most 
                                                
318 Eddie C. Y. Kuo, “Confucianism and the Chinese family in Singapore: continuities and changes,” 
Working Paper No. 83, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore (Singapore, 1987), 
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319 The other courses offered were Buddhist Studies, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge and 
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parents wanted their children to study.320 It also wanted to bring Confucianism 
beyond the classroom, such that it should be “reinterpreted as a code of personal 
conduct for modern Singapore”.321 The politically motivated cultural imposition of 
Confucianism on the hua ren population failed. Enrolment numbers were too low to 
justify the amount of resources and efforts devoted to the promotion of Confucian 
Ethics. The Religious Knowledge curriculum was later rescinded. One reason cited 
for this was that the religious classes promoted the popularity of Christianity rather 
than Confucianism.322 Secondly, in addition to low enrolment numbers forthe 
Confucian Ethics classes, the government feared that the Religious Knowledge 
classes were intensifying religiosity.323 Finally, the third reason, if unarticulated, was 
the realisation that the cultural foundation of hua ren was Singapore was not as rooted 
in Confucian culture as the government argued.324  
Besides education, urban redevelopment and housing policies had a direct 
impact on the practice of ancestor worship. The relocation of families to Housing and 
Development Board (HDB) flats, for example, broke up communities and extended 
families into individual nuclear units. This undermined the traditional notion of 
lineage and ancestral worship on the lineage level as the members were scattered. In 
the past two decades, the Singapore government has actively promoted the cremation 
of the dead rather than the more traditional practice of land burials. Cemeteries such 
as the Pek San Theng and Bidadari, among others, have been demolished over the 
past decades to make way for redevelopment. Today Choa Chu Kang Cemetery is the 
                                                                                                                                      
incomplete revitalisation movement,” Working Papers No 113, Department of Sociology, National 
University of Singapore (Singapore, 1992), p 23, footnote 1.  
320 Ibid., p 23, footnote 7. 
321 Ibid., p 7. 
322 Joseph B Tamney, the struggle over Singapore's soul: western modernization and Asian culture 
(Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1996). 
323 Kuo, “Confucianism as political discourse”, pp 18 – 19. 
324 See Kuo, “Confucianism and the Chinese family”, which highlighted the changing nature of 
Singapore society, the Chinese family and the impact on Confucianism. 
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only cemetery in Singapore that is available for traditional soil burial. The new burial 
period, effective from 1998, is only 15 years. After that the remains will be exhumed 
and put into a columbarium (following cremation) or reburied. According to the 
National Environment Agency, which oversees the state-operated burial and 
cremation facilities, the new policy “will allow the cemetery land to last beyond 
2130”.325 In place of burial and cemetaries, cremation is now encouraged and and 
columbaria have been established to house the remains of the deceased. This reflects 
the weakening hold of traditional practices and beliefs on the population.326  
Traditionally a permanent resting place for the dead, the grave is now 
considered a luxury. Many hua ren are choosing to be cremated giving the temporary 
nature of the graves in Singapore. The home is also no longer where the ancestral 
tablets of the deceased are hosted. The small size of HDB flats, where most hua ren 
reside, limits the performance of traditional large-scale worship ceremonies. Of the 43 
non-Christian informants, 36 did not host any ancestral tablets at home. They cited 
reasons ranging from lack of space to it being a chore to maintain the tablets. One 19-
year old informant indicated that there was no space at home and that the tablets were 
“aesthetically unappealing”. Even though her father was the eldest child and son, the 
decision was made to host the tablets at a temple rather than at home, as tradition 
dictates. Several informants also indicated that the ancestral tablets of their ancestors 
– mostly parents and grandparents – were hosted in temples, their reason confirming 
the perception that the ancestors were “better taken care” of in the temples because 
the monks or the temple staff would pray and make offerings more regularly than the 
family members were likely to do.  
                                                
325 National Environment Agency, http://app2.nea.gov.sg/topics_burialsystem.aspx, accessed 12 
January 2012. 
326 Seong Chee Tham, Religion and modernization: a study of changing rituals among Singapore's 
Chinese, Malays and Indians (Singapore: Graham Brash (Pte) Ltd, 1985), p 63. 
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Some of the family elders even went to the extent of “booking” their own 
spots at the temple while they were still alive, in preparation for the eventuality that 
their own children will not continue with the practice of ancestor worship. In one 
example, YLC/F58/SP’s late mother-in-law booked two spots in a temple when her 
husband died in the 1970s; one was for him and the other one for herself. She had 
made the arrangement as a safety net to ensure that she and her husband would not be 
forgotten after their death, despite her having eight children, three of whom were 
sons. The informant said her mother-in-law was not confident that her children would 
continue with the practice as several had converted to Christianity and Catholicism, 
and her daughters are either married out – traditions dictated they could host the 
parents’ ancestral tablets – or unmarried. The “safest” way to ensure that they were 
taken care of in their afterlife was by “placing themselves” in the temples where the 
monks would make daily prayers and offerings.  
 
THE LOGIC OF CULTURAL PRACTICE 
From the discussion above, the logic of reason appears to be at odds with the 
“traditional” worldview of how things are, or the logic of practice. While conversion 
to Christianity was one of the major reasons for such reasoning, as discussed in the 
previous section, there remains a logic of practice, as Pierre Bourdieu theorised, that 
cannot be rationalised. When asked why they practice what they do, it is common to 
hear this response from my respondents of all age groups: “It’s always been done this 
way”. That is the reason and explanation for their practice. For some Christians, the 
Christian doctrine explains their outlook and non-practice of ancestor worship, for 
example. For those who continue to practice ancestor worship, they infuse the 
traditionally non-Christian act with their own personal meanings. For the non-
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Christians, the logic of practice – because it has always been done this way – is an 
adequate reason for continuing with the practice. There is no need for explicit 
explanation or justification.  
There is no written scripture outlining the details of the rites and rituals of 
ancestor worship. Many of my respondents said they learned about it through 
observation. “I always make it a point to look at how others do it,” said XJC/M81/SP 
who added that as a child, he always observed how the family and clan elders in 
Fujian, China, did things. “Whenever there are major festivals, we make offerings,” 
he explained. He said no one actively taught him how to do or what to do, and that he 
had learned about the practice through observations: “In the past, I just look and 
follow what others are doing. From there, I learned.” When asked if he taught his sons 
the rituals, he replied that they would do it on their own accord on any occasions that 
require the offering of joss sticks.  
They’d pick up the joss sticks and pray. You don’t have to tell them what 
to do, they’d do it automatically, following traditions. 
 
His sons, XJC said, had observed how he did things over the years and have picked 
up the habit as a matter of course. He himself had done likewise and, for him, it is 
natural that his sons do likewise. For him, “there is no need to teach” these acts.  
Another informant in her 60s said she did not actively teach her children the 
rites and procedures of ancestor worship. She said they had watched her and her 
husband do it since they were children and would follow accordingly. Even then, 
“they would not know what to do” after she passes on, she said. “Just offering joss 
sticks would do. It’s better than nothing,” she added.  
This rather laissez faire attitude is in line with the spirit of “Chinese” religious 
practice. Except for Buddhism and orthodox Taoism which has a scriptural basis, 
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most practices that are described as “Chinese” folk or religious practices do not have 
canonical texts. Instead, individual practitioners are able to adjust the rites and rituals 
according to their own situation. While the basic reason for ancestor worship – to 
honour the deceased as a matter of respect – is easily understood by all, the minutiae 
of the rites and rituals are harder to explain. Furthermore, because ancestor worship is 
so closely associated with Chinese religion, it is often perceived as a religious act. A 
common response among hua ren in Singapore, especially among the older 
generation, to their religious beliefs is that they are bai shen de 拜神的，which 
literally translates to mean “praying to gods”. “Bai shen” is a general term used to 
refer to Chinese religion (rather than Taoism or Buddhism), and a person who bai 
shen is likely to practice ancestor worship, which explains the inevitability of 
regarding ancestor worship as a religious act. Scholars have described such “Chinese 
religion” by various other names and description, including “Shenism”,327 “religion of 
the masses”,328 and an anonymous religion that is “an amorphous mass of beliefs and 
practices from various sources”.329 However described, Chinese religion is 
characterised as a syncretic religion, drawing from religions and philosophies such as 
Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism as well as from history, mythologies and legends 
as reflected in the expansive pantheon of deities, many of whom were characters from 
these narratives. 
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FROM MATERIAL TO EMOTIONAL DEPENDENCY 
While the older generation of my respondents perceive the cultural shift negatively as 
a form of cultural dilution, the younger informants generally view it more positively. 
For them, cultural change is a natural product of social change. The younger 
generation of respondents did not see memorialisation as necessarily connected to 
rites and rituals of ancestor worship. Instead, they believed it could take other forms, 
including the telling of family stories and collecting old photographs. While these 
memorialisation practices are nothing new, they have in the case of my respondents 
become vehicles for personalisation and individualisation as we shall see below. Even 
more formal forms of memorialisation such as the compiling of genealogy and family 
histories, and visiting the ancestral villages in China have also taken on more 
personalised tones in modern Singapore. Significantly, the form and rationale for the 
adoption of certain memorialisation practices underscores a trend of personalisation 
based on sentimental intimacy.  
The compilation and construction of the genealogy is a significant element in 
memorialisation of ancestors in traditional Chinese culture. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
genealogy is a significant document of the Chinese social network, but the formality 
and the rule-bound nature of classic genealogy has meant that it has not taken root in 
Singapore. First, the hua ren society in Singapore originated as a transient society 
rather than a permanent one in which ties to the land and place were emphasised. 
Furthermore, the hua ren society was comprised of migrants originating from 
different areas in China, which meant that there was rarely one lineage that lived 
together as might have been the case in China. Instead, the closest form of lineage in 
Singapore is the surname-based clan association open to persons sharing the same 
surname. Sharing the same surname is not the same as sharing the same bloodline; 
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considerations of area of origins, dialect groups and braches of the surname have to be 
considered. Most of the genealogies in the collection of Singapore clan associations 
were collected from lineages in China. Third, as discussed earlier, the nature and role 
of clan associations in Singapore differs vastly from those in China. The function that 
closely replicates that of the lineage in China is ritual calendrical ancestor worship. It 
did not take on the role of compiling and maintaining genealogies.  
The compilation of genealogy is neither a common nor popular activity in 
among my Singapore hua ren respondents not least because of the difficulty of the 
task. None of my respondents actively participated in this activity, including the older 
generation and clan members. A couple of respondents in their 20s indicated that they 
vaguely remembered seeing “some sort of family book” before, although they could 
not confirm if the family book was indeed the genealogy book, since it was not in the 
possession of their immediate family. Most of the respondents cited various reasons 
for not compiling family genealogy with the most common being the perception that 
the task was too difficult and that they did not know where to begin. While several 
respondents in their 20s recalled undertaking some form of such research for their 
school assignments, the effort and interest was not sustained beyond that. This was 
usually because of limited access to information and the lack of time to pursue it in 
depth. While several indicated it would be “interesting to know where (we) came 
from”, the interest did not materialise any further beyond the occasional discussion 
about the events and people in the family during social gatherings. For one respondent 
who was not keen on family history, there was little value in projecting the family 
memory beyond the immediate relations: 
I never thought about (doing family history)…maybe because I don’t 
know anyone past my grandparents, you see. And I don’t really expect 
my children to know my great grandmother, for example. 
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The transmission of cultural knowledge, in this case, was limited to the current 
generation and the existing relationships, rather than extended to include those 
beyond. 
In 2010, the Singapore Genealogy Society330 (SGS) was set up with the aim of 
popularising hua ren genealogies, specifically genealogies originating from 
Singapore. This is a departure from traditional hua ren genealogies which inevitably 
starts with the progenitor in China. The Society has the ambition of completing the 
Founding Genealogy of Singapore331, a grand genealogy compiled from the various 
individual family and clan genealogies, in time for the 50th anniversary of 
Singapore’s independence in 2015. Through the popularisation of genealogies and the 
project of constructing the founding genealogy, the Society wants to root the hua ren 
population in Singapore while at the same time acknowledging their cultural heritage. 
This move appears to be in response to the fear of cultural dilution commonly 
expressed by the older generation of hua ren. The Society takes the clear position that 
the hua ren in Singapore are no longer hua qiao: 
Qiao refers to temporary sojourn, temporary resident. There is no sense of 
belonging. Singapore is now an independent country. As citizens, Singapore is 
where we belong. As Singapore hua ren, ideologically, we must absolutely 
abide by our pledge, to be loyal to Singapore’s multicultural and religious 
freedom principles on which a harmonious society is built. We should do our 
duties as citizens. But we are still hua yi descendents; we inherited the hua 
blood, as well as the spiritual values and cultural traditions. Spiritually, we 
cannot give up this blood ties or deny the deep-rooted cultural legacy.332 
 
SGS Secretary Tan Ngap Yong333  believes that  Singapore hua ren have to 
come into their own, and their identity should not be one that is deculturalised from 
hua culture but that it has to be “de-China-fied” (“去中国化”). While Tan’s 
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332 Unpublished Singapore Genealogy Society paper. Translated from Mandarin.  
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argument suggests a consciousness about the separation of cultural and socio-political 
identifications, and the recognition of the need to localise hua ren identifications, the 
underlying motivation remains cultural. In promoting the construction of genealogy, 
the SGS emphasises the importance of leaving traces and records for the future 
generations. This is seen as important as it allows the future generation be able to 
trace their ancestry. A sense of urgency is pushing forward this project due to the 
perception that many of the young people today do not even know the names of their 
grandparents and where they came from. Genealogy, Tan believes, can create the 
necessary moral suasion, based on perceived kinship ties, to bind a social group and 
to link what was lost. Tan sees the Singapore-based genealogies as a way to integrate 
new immigrants from the People’s Republic of China and the Peranakans with the 
hua ren communities, as the genealogies would explain how the different groups 
might be linked.  
While most of the hua ren respondents I interviewed were not interested or 
equipped with the knowledge to construct or contribute to their genealogies, a group 
of hua ren Christian respondents were actively involved in tracing their ancestry. As 
mentioned in preceding discussion, non-Christians generally do not expect Christians 
to participate in any ancestral worship activities and by virtue of this, they eschew 
traditional values such as filial piety. But a small group of members of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, more commonly known as the Mormon Church,  
undertake the compilation of genealogies. While Christianity in general does not 
encourage its believers to continue with the ancestor worship, the Mormon Church 
encourages its members, regardless of ethnicity and cultural inclinations, to actively 
trace their ancestry as part of their religious obligations. The significance of 
genealogical records for the Mormons is highlighted by the practice of proxy baptism, 
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in which Church members can baptise their deceased family members who were not 
believers in their lifetime, after their death. Such practice is built on the foundation of 
the Church doctrine that marriage and families can continue beyond this life. But to 
be united for all eternity, they need to be “sealed” – bound by a ritual blessing – in 
one of the Church’s temples.334 Hence, genealogy features prominently in the 
Mormon faith, with the Church being one of the world’s most active proponents of 
genealogy and developer of genealogy technology.335  
HH/F68/SP joined the Church in 1970 and started work on her family 
genealogy in the late 1970s. Juggling work as a teacher and wife, HH only began 
work on her geneology “very diligently” after her retirement.  As of 2011, HH had 
traced five generations preceding her. She had interviewed a paternal aunt to learn 
about her family history and planned to visit her ancestral village to see if she could 
trace the genealogy any further. In contrast, HH’s husband has not been very 
successful in his efforts; he did not have any information about his family beyond his 
grandfather:  
I am stuck, unless there’s a breakthrough or any relative (who might) 
know…I still have some distant relatives in Malaysia, but I have not 
found the connection. I think I should try to do it.  
 
Although his personal project of tracing his ancestry has been thwarted by the 
lack of information, ACH believes in the importance of leaving a legacy for the 
younger generation:  
                                                
334 A building used for rituals – such as proxy baptism, marriages – rather than for regular worship, 
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http://www.lds.org/church/temples/gallery?lang=eng, accessed 17 February 2012.   
335 FamilySearch is considered the largest genealogy organisation in the world. It is the non-religious 
arm of the Mormon Church which collects, preserves and stores genealogical records from all over the 
world. The information is shared via the website - https://www.familysearch.org/ - and also through 
Family History Centres, located in various countries. The website provides a comprehensive overview 
and step-by-step guide to compiling genealogy and family history, although it is heavily focussed on 
the Western world. The Church also developed the Personal Ancestral File (PAF) which can produce 
pedigree charts, family group records, and family histories, which can then be printed.  
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The whole idea is to leave behind your belief and the reasons why you 





Although the younger Singapore hua ren respondents appear to be moving away from 
the ritualistic memorialisation activities, this by no means indicates that they do not 
participate in any memorialisation activities or that they find memorialisation 
unnecessary. My research suggests that memorialising activities have moved from the 
ritual to the personal: memorialisation activities are more motivated by personal 
sentiments. One such highly personal way of memorialisation is by telling of family 
stories. Studies have shown that family stories, albeit informal, have shaped 
individuals’ beliefs, outlooks, as well as intergenerational relationships.336 Family 
stories are also a legitimate form of memorialisation, although it remains informal.  
The telling of family stories is not a new practice. Story telling is an important 
method of transmitting knowledge and constructing cultural identities in many 
cultures and societies. Story telling is a perpetual practice that does not register in the 
public realm and has no fixed structure, thus allowing for meanings to be embedded 
and re-interpreted with every telling. It is also one that requires the least skills, unlike 
compiling genealogy or family history. It must also be noted that story telling is a 
process that lacks historical depth, for unlike traditional genealogy and lineage, story 
telling usually does not extend beyond three generations. But it is also one of the most 
easily accessible channels to acquire family and cultural memory. Nineteen of my 52 
                                                
336 See for example, Family stories and the life course: across time and generations, ed. Michael W. 
Pratt and Barbara H. Fiese (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004); Judith E. Smith, Visions of 
belonging: family stories, popular culture, and postwar democracy, 1940-1960 (New York : Columbia 
University Press, 2004). 
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respondents said they participated in the telling of family stories from time to time. 
These stories are often told  during family events when the extended family is around. 
Often the stories are triggered by a comment or an occasion which revolves around 
family members and places. AL/F19/SP said her family often traded stories about 
their old family house in Geylang: 
There is this house, where, it’s quite a huge house; a lot of my relatives, 
even from beyond the extended family would stay there. That means 
the extended, extended family, like my mum’s cousins. They would all 
live in one house. So they used to talk about that house because…it 
lasted (till about 15 years ago). 
 
 
The family’s extended stay in the house has become a rallying point for 
reminisces. A specific spatial and geographical location can provide the foundation of 
a collective memory specific to the family. “(T)alking about that house, like how nice 
it was at that point of time and stuff like that” provided fertile memories in which to 
locate the identifications of the family members.  
As with delving into the past, the telling of family stories generally takes place 
in families that are close-knit or have good relations with one another. VL/F22/SP’s 
maternal side of the family meets for breakfast every alternate Sunday, and VL would 
go along occasionally: 
 
The last time they were sitting together and they were talking about – 
because my grandmother wants to go to Taiwan but she has asthma, so 
my mother started talking about how she (grandmother) got asthma. 
She had my youngest uncle, which was her ninth child and she wanted 
to abort, then she kept taking a lot of medicines and all of that…but the 
baby didn’t die and she got asthma in the end. 
 
 
These stories about past exploits of family members would generally be 
insignificant to non-family members but they hold meaning for the teller and the 
listeners. The stories act as a bridge between the individuals, time and space and 
connect them in the collective experience of being part of the family. For the younger 
people who have not had experienced the event personally, the telling and retelling of 
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these stories allow the creation of prosthetic memories relating to their families and 
their own past which provides a foundation for their family connection. 
Sentimental value and intimacy are important elements in creating a bond with 
a specific identification, informed by relations or location. Many of my respondents 
who expressed disinterest in family history or did not participate in the telling of 
family stories indicated that their families were not tight-knit or that there were 
sensitive issues within the family. One respondent added that the reluctance to delve 
into the past was due to bad experiences. RS/F39/SP said 
I don’t think my mother is keen (to do family history or talk about 
it)….she was not given the education. My grandmother was a gambler, 
so she (mother) doesn’t like to talk about the family. 
 
It is the meaning the individual ascribes to the family stories that make them 
significant.  
Another personal and private memorialisation practice is the visiting of the 
ancestral village in China. Among the practices surveyed, visiting the ancestral village 
in China is the least common activity, with only five respondents indicating that they 
or their families had visited the ancestral villages. Two of the five respondents were in 
the 20 to 40 years old age group. RF/F31/SP described her one visit to Hainan Island 
in China as an interesting, albeit superficial, experience: 
 
I have been back once (my dad and aunt goes back to Hainan island on 
average once a year, sometimes with other distant relatives, sometimes 
on their own). In the late ‘80s or early ‘90s, our extended family 
chipped together money to build a house there which is now occupied 
by our long distance relatives (they act as “guardian” of our homes too). 
This effort was conducted with another extended family in Singapore 
(the grandpa who’s still alive in his 90s now is the second cousin of my 
paternal grandma). The houses are adjourning to each other. We are not 
wealthy but have at least some money to travel. It is less meaningful to 
me or my cousins as we do not speak the dialect well, and we also do 
not know the relatives there. So when we visit, it is rather superficial 
for us and more like an interesting visit where firecrackers and 
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fireworks can be let off in our own backyard. However, it is interesting 
to my dad since he has always been active in our local Hainanese clans 
and associations, and my aunts etc speak the dialect fluently and can 
communicate with those folks there. We also try to contribute to 
improve the wellbeing and standard of living for the relatives there, by 
building a bathroom and toilet (with flush) – a big thing in rural 
countryside! 
 
The superficiality of the respondent’s experience can be related to the lack of 
knowledge and experience with the village or the relations there, as the quote above 
shows. For older respondents who have direct connections with the villages – either 
having immediate family members or being born there – the significance is far deeper. 
Three respondents, aged between 60s and 80s, indicated that they go back to the 
ancestral village more regularly, sometimes annually. These respondents were either 
born in China or have close relatives there who provide some emotional pull. Such 
emotional pull may be strong enough to overcome the common perceptions that 
“China relatives” are only interested in the financial benefits of having “Singapore 
relatives”.  
But familial and kinship ties, especially those separated by time and space, 
may not be strong enough for the continued maintenance of ties in the current milieu. 
Some respondents recounted stories of gold-digging China relatives. A respondent in 
his 60s said he stopped sending money back to his home village after a brief visit in 
1979. At that time, China was still closed to the world and he had secretly and 
illegally returned to his village via Hong Kong. He had been sending money regularly 
and wanted to see the ancestral village his father came from. Once there, he 
discovered that despite the money he and his Singapore kin had sent at the requests of 
the China relatives, nothing was done to the old ancestral house, which was 
dilapidated. It was used as a barnyard for the animals. Instead new houses were built 
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next to the ancestral house. He said the villagers were all lazy and not doing anything, 
and that their lives were not as hard as they made it out to be in the letters.337 
In modern Singapore, respondents suggested that kinship ties, like any 
relationship, has to be built on a foundation of sentiment based on knowledge. This is 
a significant change from earlier thinking that Singapore hua ren feel that blood ties 
alone are enough to warrant help from one’s kin. Today, there needs to be a personal 
relationship for that to take place, blood ties notwithstanding. This is a common view 
especially among the younger generation. Older respondents reported having a hard 
time trying to interest their children and grandchildren in the ancestral village. One 
respondent who returns to his ancestral village annually told his son, who was to visit 
China for a business trip to meet with his cousin from China. The son was not 
convinced that he should since he did not know the cousin all. The respondent argued 
that they should meet simply because of the fact that they are related. Respondent 
KP/F33/SP said her ancestral village was in Poon Yu in the Guangdong province in 
China. Neither she nor her parents had any interest in going back.  
My parents are not interested in China. Even if we were to go back, it’s 
so commercialised, and we have no relatives.  
 
CT/F33/SP echoed the same sentiment:  
The nearest “ancestral village” the third generation (of the family) went 
to was my maternal grandparents’ town in Malaysia (not) all the way 
back to China… The thought of going all the way to the original 
ancestral village didn’t interest me. I doubt my mum even know where 
exactly is the village!  
 
 
The reluctance to return to the ancestral village was also tied up with the 
perceptions of China as being unhygenic and backward. An respondent in her 30s was 
                                                
337 Personal interview 30 September 2010.  
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interested in going back to her ancestral village (“somewhere in China”), but said it 
was difficult to persuade her mother, who is “a very fussy person” and “is not 
interested because it’s dirty and the food is too oily”.  
Anyway, she’s not close (to her husband’s side of the family). Her 
family also…all passed away already, so she’s not so keen. 
 
 
The respondent’s interest in returning to the ancestral village lay less in seeking out 
her roots than her interest in food. “There’s a lot of food which (have already) lost 
their original flavour here, only in China can we find (the original taste)” hence her 
interest in visiting the place.  
 
HUA REN IMAGINATION IN SINGAPORE 
For many hua ren respondents who are non-Christian, speak Mandarin and practice 
ancestor worship, their cultural identity as hua ren is obvious, and a given. This is 
reflected in how they punctuate explanations about rites, rituals, customs and 
practices with the phrase, “us hua ren”. For the younger generation and those who 
neither practice ancestor worship nor are fluent in Mandarin, their cultural 
identification is less straightforward. While most of my young respondents have no 
problem identifying themselves as hua ren in one way or another, they are able to 
separate their hua ren ethnic identity and their cultural identity, even if they cannot 
fully articulate the latter fully. One case in point was TWL/M22/SP who was very 
conscious of the multiple layers of his identity, which he labelled as “conflicting”. 
Born into a Christian family, TWL attended several schools that emphasised the 
“Chinese heritage: 
I come from a fiercely Hokkien Huay Kuan school (Ai Tong Primary 
  Jaime Koh 
 
 160 
Chinese language (Catholic High School), then I went to a very mixed 
environment (Anderson Junior College). 
 
The mixed exposure resulted in what TWL described as “a very weird mix like me”. 
TWL says that while his family continued with “Chinese” practices such as 
celebrating festivals, he was conscious of the incongruence between his religion and 
his ethnic/cultural identity as hua ren. The exposure to his Anglicised church friends 
and family who were aware of their “Chinese heritage” for TWL was an example of 
how the interactions between the different elements could lead to the emergence of 
the consciousness of cultural differences.  
The situation also arose during instances when my hua ren respondents came 
into contact with “other Chinese” such as those from PRC, Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
AL/F19/SP said she felt the difference when she meets the “other Chinese”, “maybe 
because of the way they speak…or perhaps because of the way they act.” JT/F29/SP 
felt likewise. On being asked how she identified herself as hua ren, JT recounted her 
difficulties when she travelled to China and Taiwan. In both instances she “felt very 
out of place”, primarily because of communication problems. She related her 
experience with her Taiwanese hosts: 
 
…I had huge problems communicating with them. They were trying to 
tell me about their culture and about their education system and all that 
(in Mandarin). I can understand but I had a hard time trying to answer, 
trying to sound intelligent. There are a lot of words I cannot (articulate) 
in Mandarin. It’s very difficult. Trying to order (food) was also 
difficult. I could only point… 
 
Despite finding China and Taiwan “still very, very Chinese”, JT had no 
problem seeing herself as “Chinese”, even though she’s Peranakan:  
I think if you ask most of my family, they will tell you that we see 
ourselves as Chinese… If anybody were to ask me what am I, I’d say 
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Chinese. I might say Chinese first before Peranakan (because) 
Peranakan is Chinese. 
 
In JT’s mind, there was no doubt that she is “Chinese”. JT related that 
her family still followed “Chinese festivals” and customs, such as holding the 
tea ceremony at weddings, and addressing family elders by the proper kinship 
terms in dialect. The only obstacle, according to JT was language: “Once they 
open their mouth, they cannot (pass off as Chinese). You’ll know instantly that 
they are trying to speak Hokkien. But they just look Chinese.”  
Like JT, many of my younger respondents had no trouble saying that 
they were “Chinese” because they followed certain “Chinese” practices, spoke 
the language, was interested in some aspects of the culture and history or 
simply because they have been identified as such. Many hastened to add a 
disclaimer that they are “Singaporean Chinese” 
 
AL/F19/SP:  
I wouldn’t say … I’m Chinese and I came from some village from 
China because my ancestors came from there. I don’t mean it in a 
derogatory sense, I just don’t see myself as that because, after all, I 
grew up here, that’s why I see myself as Singaporean Chinese. 
 
SZS/M22/SP:  
I feel…proud to be a Singaporean Chinese, (it’s) like we have our own 
identity…separate from the China Chinese. Sometimes, it’s different… 
 
DT/F21/SP: 
If I choose (to be identified as) Chinese, for example, people might 
think I am from China. Which is not … necessarily a bad thing, but, 
I’m from Singapore. I don’t know how to explain it, but you can tell a 
Singaporean Chinese from China Chinese right? I mean even when I 
speak in Chinese, some taxi uncle thinks I’m from China…I mean it 
sounds totally nationalistic, but disclaimer needed. 
 




If Singapore is a “Chinese” society, it is one by dint of its ethnic composition. Yet in 
practice, the hua ren in Singapore have developed cultural identities that are not with 
the same as their ethnic identities. As the cases of my Christian hua ren respondents 
demonstrate, ancestor worship is an act, a performance which can be accorded 
different meanings. For them, the participation or non-participation is not as important 
as what the action signifies for them.   
The material basis for Singapore hua ren’s ethnic identity is relative weak. 
English has replaced Mandarin and dialects as the lingua franca. While temples and 
clan associations still exist, they have evolved into community social networking 
places from places where ethnic identities were consolidated. The weak material basis 
of Singapore hua ren identity allows for a corresponding shift to a more emotional 
level of cultural identification – or symbolic ethnicity – which is then prominently 
displayed during festive occasions such as Chinese New Year and Qing Ming. Such 
symbolic ethnicity is sometimes perceived as an apparent cultural dilution because of 
the decreased participation in ritualistic memorialisation activities. On the other hand, 
such change is perceived by some in more positive light. These respondents argue that 
change is inevitable, and instead of it being cultural dilution, the direction in which 
memorialisation activities is headed reflects an increasing personalisation that is more 
meaningful than blind participation for the sake of “tradition”.  
This chapter has shown that memorialisation activities are not restricted 
merely to the ritualistic and the religious. Practices and meanings change in tandem 
with structural social and cultural changes. In contemporary Singapore, identification 
is no longer only bound to traditional ritualistic practices; it is also influenced by the 
social-cultural milieu. The changes in what it means to be hua ren point to a more 
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fundamental change – a shift in cultural identifications. Modernisation and 
urbanisation pit two competing sets of identifications against each other: the modern 
urban identity based on cultural flexibility and the traditional identity based on fixed 
rituals and values. The adoption of personalised forms of memorialisation or the 
injection of personal sentiment and significance to existing forms of memorialisation 
suggests that hua ren identifications are not necessarily dictated by their inherited 
ethnic heritage. This reflects a separation of culture and ethnicity.  
There are several indications of cultural changes that have taken place among 
hua ren in Singapore. The first and most obvious is cultural change as a result of 
religious conversion to Christianity, which marks a fundamental shift in one’s belief 
and value system. For these Christian respondents, ethnic markers such as the practice 
of ancestor worship and its corresponding beliefs are no longer a fundamental marker 
of their identity, which is now marked not by ethnicity or cultural heritage but by 
religion. But they may still regard themselves as hua ren by other markers, such as the 
celebration of “Chinese” festivals such as Chinese New Year, and the culinary 
heritage. Although individuals may impose their own meanings to ancestral practices, 
there is still a fundamental cultural shift. For those who practice ancestor worhip with 
a psychological and mental distance, it is just like any other cultural practice – such as 
going to church or celebrating Christmas. The practice no longer informs the 
fundamental cultural system, but is an act that can be modified, acquired or discarded. 
This is also the case among the non-Christians.  
A related cultural change that informs the trend is the use of language. Even 
though Mandarin is the mother tongue of hua ren, many of the younger respondents 
struggle with the language, especially as an examinable subject in school. Most of the 
younger generation respondents speak English at home, and they barely have a fluent 
  Jaime Koh 
 
 164 
command of dialect or Mandarin. In contrast, most of the older respondents do not 
speak English and/or Mandarin. The differing language abilities across the 
generations posse a significant barrier to the transmission of cultural memory and 
knowledge, which is even more significant given the oral-based tradition of hua ren 
cultural practices. The lack of knowledge and tools to acquire the knowledge weakens 
the cultural identifications of the young respondents. The widespread use of English 
as a medium of instruction and communication also undermines the acceptance of the 
Chinese value system, the foundation of Chinese traditions, which is at odds with 
western thought based on critical thinking and rationality.  
This chapter has shown that cultural identity as reflected through practices and 
ethnic identity are not necessarily coterminous. Some of my respondents, especially 
the older generation, have no problem identifying themselves as hua ren because of 
their hua ren practices, many of the younger respondents are more conscious of the 
disconnect between their practices and religions (cultural identity), and their ethnic 
identity. The research also suggests that respondents recognise that rituals are not only 
means of memorialisation and that these rituals are losing social currency in today’s 
urban Singapore. The next chapter discusses the case of Taiwan, another hua ren 
majority site with a different socio-cultural milieu.  
 
~ 




TAIWAN: LOCALISING CULTURAL IDENTITY 
 
Taiwan’s uncertain political status makes it a complex case study for issues of 
identity. Like Singapore, Taiwan has a hua ren majority population with significant 
historical connection to China. Yet, unlike Singapore, Taiwan is neither an 
independent country nor a colony of another state power, although the PRC claims the 
island of Taiwan as a renegade province. Taiwan, though an “overseas Chinese” 
community, was never included as a case study in the framework of the “Chinese 
diaspora” precisely because of its political and cultural association with mainland 
China. With some 95% of its 23 million population comprising “Han Chinese”338 – 
the remaining being indigenous aboriginal tribes – Taiwan is inevitably described as 
“Chinese”, although some scholars have argued that the various groups in Taiwan 
have developed a separate Taiwanese culture and identity, even if they had originated 
elsewhere.339  
This chapter will show that although modernisation and urbanisation has 
affected memorialisation practices and attitudes, the material basis for such practices 
is far more visible and stronger than in Singapore. This, and the political desire to 
establish Taiwan as an independent entity, motivates a strong sense of localisation, 
which comes across strongly in the Taiwanese imagination of its cultural identity. 
After a brief historical sketch of Taiwan, I discuss the impact of family and clan 
organisation on Taiwan hua ren’s memorialisation practices. I argue that although the  
younger generation of Taiwan hua ren is affected by the ideas of rationalisation, like 
my younger respondents in Singapore, their participation in memorialisation practices 
                                                
338 Government Information Office, “People and Language,” http://www.gio.gov.tw (accessed 
November 3, 2011).  
339 Keelung Hong and Stephen O. Murray, Looking through Taiwan: American anthropologists' 
colussion with ethnic domination (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005); 林美容, 台湾人的社
会与信仰 (台北: 自立晚报, 1983). (Lin Mei Rong, Taiwanese society and beliefs) 
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appears to be more grounded in practice. This is because the material environment in 
Taiwan is more evident than in Singapore.  
   
Map 2: Taiwan340 
TAIWAN: A CHINESE SOCIETY?  
Taiwan’s history and culture are closely tied to that of China and Japan, two countries 
that had colonised the island at different times. Although Taiwan now seeks to assert 
itself as a distinctive entity, it is impossible to discuss Taiwanese identity, culture and 
history without reference to China and Japan. This is due to the complexity of 
Taiwan’s status as a “(redoubled) colonial subject” of China and Japan.341 In order to 
assert itself, Taiwan alternately positioned itself  
                                                
340 http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/taiwan.html, accessed 27 September 2012. 
341 Carlos Rojas, “Introduction,” in Writing Taiwan: a new literary history, ed. David Der-Wei Wang 
and Carlos Rojas, 1-16 (Durjam: Duke University Press, 2007), p 1. 
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in opposition to China and Japan – with the result …that ‘Taiwan’ is in 
a supplemental, parasitic position with respect to its more hegemonic 
neighbours…342  
 
China – imperial, republican and communist – looms large in Taiwan’s history 
and cultural psyche. Imperial China claimed Taiwan as part of its territory, 
Republican China established its alternative power base on the island, and communist 
China sought to re-claim Taiwan as its own. In fighting against such overtures, 
Taiwan sought to establish its own identity through Japan and eventually, on its own 
merits. Still, Taiwan has not entirely shaken off the shadows of China. In the post-
1945 period, Taiwan has been variously regarded politically as “the other China” and 
“surrogate China”, subjectivities conceived during the Cold War in opposition to 
communist China on the mainland.343 Taiwan was thus what China “could have been” 
without Communism. This “two Chinas” paradigm, which persisted for decades, 
place Taiwan as the emblem of “traditional China” or “traditional Chinese culture”, 
an image the Kuomintang (KMT) government also cultivated.344 Anthropologists and 
ethnographers looked to Taiwan as an alternative site of fieldwork for their studies on 
“Chinese” societies and customs when Communist China was closed off to the world 
between the 1950s and the 1970s. These studies, which have since remained the 
foundation of Chinese Studies, took Taiwan as “part” of a “whole” that was China.345  
Taiwan developed its “Chinese-ness” as a result of its historical associations 
with the mainland. Records of Chinese settlers on Taiwan predate the arrival of the 
                                                
342 Ibid., p 2. 
343 Sung-sheng Yvonne Chang, “Representing Taiwan: shifting geopolitical frameworks,” in Writing 
Taiwan: a new literary history, 17-25 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), p 18. 
344 Keelung Hong and Stephen O. Murray, Looking through Taiwan: American anthropologists' 
colussion with ethnic domination (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p 4. 
345 See for example the works of Emily Ahern, Arthur P Wolf and William Skinner, among others.  
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Dutch in the 16th century.346 Fishermen and traders from the Fujian prefectures of 
Zhang Zhou347 and Chuan Zhou,348 plied their trade in the waters off Taiwan as did 
Chinese and Japanese traders and pirates.349 When the Dutch landed in today’s Tainan 
in 1620, they reported an existing network of Chinese village traders,350 whom the 
Dutch later enlisted as middlemen in enacting transactions with the aborigines. In the 
1630s, the Dutch recruited farmers from Fujian for their rice and sugarcane farms,351 
and left them to be governed by their own headmen.  
When Ming loyalist Zheng Cheng Gong, also known as Koxinga,352 
successfully captured Taiwan from the Dutch in 1661, it marked the beginning of the 
island’s formal sinicisation. Taiwan “had a Chinese ruler for the first time”.353 
Following Koxinga’s successful establishment of his stronghold on Taiwan came the 
first wave of migration from Fujian, consisting mainly of Koxinga’s followers and 
supporters.354 These migrants came “in vast numbers”, constituting what scholar Ng 
Chin Keong described as the “Fukienese colonisation of Taiwan”.355 More significant 
was the imposition of a “Chinese world order” which included the establishment of a 
                                                
346 For an overview of the state of Chinese influence and settlers in Taiwan before Koxinga, see Chien-
Chao Hung, “Taiwan under the Cheng family 1662-1683: Sinicization after Dutch rule,” PhD Thesis, 
Georgetown University (Washington, D. C, 1981), pp 22-82. The chapter covers the early history of 
Taiwan, as well as the period of Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch rule.   
347 漳州 
348 泉州 
349 Tonio Andrade, How Taiwan became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han colonization in the 
seventeenth century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp 22-27. 
350 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), p 83.  
351 Ibid., pp 85-86.  
352 郑成功. Koxinga is an appellation derived from the title Guo Xing Ye (国姓爷), Lord of the 
Imperial Surname, bestowed on him by Emperor Longwu of the Southern Ming dynasty.  
353 Jr Wills and John E., “The seventeenth-century transformation: Taiwan under the Dutch and the 
Cheng regime,” in Taiwan: a new history (expanded edition), ed. Murray Rubinstein, 84-105 (Armonk, 
New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), at p 95. Even though history books hailed Koxinga as the first  
“Chinese” ruler of Taiwan, Koxinga was actually born in Japan to a Japanese mother.  
354 John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy on the Taiwan frontier (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993), p 96. 
355 Chin-Keong Ng, Trade and society: the Amoy network on the China coast, 1683–1735. (Singapore: 
Singapore National University , 1983), p 39.  
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civil administration based on the Han Chinese model of the deposed Ming dynasty.356 
This included the imperial examination system, “the transplantation of the Chinese 
ideographic writing system, the Confucian classical teachings about family and social 
order”.357 
Koxinga’s attempt to establish Taiwan as an anti-Manchu base was short-lived. 
In 1684, his grandson surrendered to the Qing Court; Taiwan was brought under Qing 
administrative control and made a prefecture of Fujian province.358 For the first time, 
Taiwan had a formal state authority. The Qing dynasty consolidated the sinicisation 
process on Taiwan by maintaining the system of government and administration 
established by the Koxinga dynasty, bringing the island “ into the pale of Chinese 
civilization”.359 Although Qing immigration policy was inconsistent, fluctuating 
between legalising family migration to Taiwan and rescinding on the policies, 
immigrants began arriving on Taiwan.360 By the 19th century, immigrants from Fujian 
and Guangdong comprised the majority of the Han Chinese population on Taiwan.361  
When Qing China ceded Taiwan to the Japanese after the later defeated China 
in the 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War362 it marked the first sustained separation of 
Taiwan from China. Politically, the Japanese instituted a new administrative system 
and was credited for industralising Taiwan’s economy, building up the island’s 
                                                
356 Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy, p 469, footnote 32. 
357 Hung, “Taiwan under the Cheng family”, p 20. 
358 John R. Shepherd, “The island frontier of the Ch'ing, 1684-1780,” in Taiwan: a new history 
(expanded edition), ed. Murray Rubinstein, 107-132 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), at 
p109. 
359 Hung, “Taiwan under the Cheng family”, pp 292 - 293. 
360 Ibid., p124. See also Shepherd, Statecraft and political economy, pp 145. 
361 Hung, “Taiwan under the Cheng family”, p 11. 
362 Under the treaty, in addition to paying indemnity to Japan, China also had to 1) recognised the 
independence of Korea, its tribute state (which later paved way for Japanese annexation of Korea in 
1910), 2) cede Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu islands), the Liaotung Peninsula (in northeast China, 
bordering Korea) to Japan, 3) open the ports of Chungking, Soochow, Hanchow and Sha-shih to 
Japanese trade, 4) grant rights to Japanese to open factories and manufacturing in China. Emmanuel 
Hsu, The rise of modern China, 5th (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p 342. 
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infrastructure, introducing urbanisation, and improving the state of sanitation, 
healthcare and education on the island.363 Japan’s colonisation of Taiwan also severed 
the island’s cultural affiliations to China. Chinese-language newspapers were 
abolished, classical Chinese was removed from elementary school curriculum, and the 
speaking of Mandarin was discouraged. Many Taiwanese especially those living in 
urban areas were “fast becoming Japanned” – educated and modern – two facets more 
commonly associated with the Japanese than with the Chinese.364  
The extent of “Japanisation” of Taiwan was extensive; by 1943, more than 
80% of Taiwanese could understand and speak Japanese.365 The Japanese state 
religion of Shintoism was imposed as part of an effort to replace the existing folk 
religions. Japanese customs for weddings and funerals were introduced in an effort to 
replace Chinese ones, as were dressing and food. The Japanese authorities even 
sought to replace Chinese names with Japanese ones in a bid to detach the Han 
Taiwanese from their descent groups and links with China, although only about 1.7% 
of the population opted to do that.366 Politically, the Taiwanese population was 
encouraged to pledge their loyalty to the Japanese Emperor. By the late 1930s, 
assimilation intensified into imperialisation (kominka). This was an effort to cultivate 
the Taiwanese into Japanese subjects who would be committed to the Japanese war 
efforts.367 By the early 1940s, Taiwanese were recruited for the Japanese military.368  
                                                
363 Steven E Phillips, Between assimilation and independence: the Taiwanese encournter nationalist 
China, 1945-1950 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2003), p 18; 葉肅科, 日落臺北城: 
日治時代臺北都市發展與臺人日常生活, 1895-1945 (台北: 自立晚報社文化出版部, 1993), pp 20-
31, 31-42, 53-62; Gary Marvin Davison, A short history of Taiwan: the case for independence 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), pp 57-63. 
364 Harry J Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese rule, 1895-1945: the vicissitudes of colonialism,” in 
Taiwan: a new history (expanded edition), 201-260 (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), p 218.  
365 Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan: historical encounters with the East and the West 
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009)., p 154 
366 Ibid., pp 154 – 155. 
367 Lamley, “Taiwan under Japanese rule”, p 240. 
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In the midst of the government’s Japanisation efforts, a group of writers and 
intellectuals sought to define a distinct, local Taiwanese identity that was neither 
Japanese nor Chinese. The anti-feudal and anti-Confucian Taiwanese New Culture 
Movement emerged in the 1920s with the intention of encouraging the use of the 
vernacular Chinese language (bai hua wen 白话文) rather than the classic wen yan 
wen (文言文). The Taiwanese movement was influenced by the May Fourth 
Movement of 1919 in Republican China. Its the main objective was to focus on 
Taiwanese issues, Taiwanese consciousness and to examine the local (colonial) 
context, and what that meant for the Taiwanese, not Chinese.369 The movement was 
short-lived because it was largely limited to the intellectual circle, which restricted its 
reach and impact. Furthermore there was little cohesion: some in the group pursued 
equality with the Japanese, while others wanted autonomous home rule through 
representation.370 Some scholars have argued that the movement was an ideological 
retort against the restrictive Japanese colonial rule; that it was about self-
determination, and legal and social equality as colonial subjects rather than 
reunification with China.371 In contrast to the “heavy Japanese influence on Formosan 
political movements, the influence of China was negligible” because there few little 
deliberate actions on the part of China in motivating the movement.372 Regardless of 
its success or failure, the Taiwanese New Culture Movement was the beginning of the 
nativist movement (xiang tu yun dong 乡土运动) that was to gain greater traction in 
the 1970s and 1980s.  
                                                                                                                                      
368 Tsai, Maritime Taiwan, pp 164-167 
369 Gary Marvin Davison, A short history of Taiwan: the case for independence (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), pp 66-69. 
370 See Edward I-Te Chen, “Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-
1937,” The Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 3 (May 1972): 477-497. 
371 Ibid., p 495. See also Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming "Japanese": Colonial Taiwan and the politics of 
identity formation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
372 Chen, “Formosan Political Movements”, p 496. 




THE LINEAGE AND FAMILY  
The social institutions of the lineage and family appear to be far more entrenched in 
Taiwan than it is in Singapore largely because they have been established for longer 
in Taiwan than in Singapore. Furthermore, the conditions for the establishment of the 
lineage and the family were more conducive in Taiwan. Even though the family 
structure was largely an unstable throughout the Qing period (17th through to 19th 
century) because of the fluctuating immigration policies, by the 19th century, the 
family has become a key feature of Taiwan hua ren society. On another level, the 
lineage also has a strong presence in Taiwan, evident from the number of lineages 
formed in various parts of the islands.373 It must be noted that these lineages were not 
a direct duplication of that found in China. Taiwan “was neither a simple 
transplantation of traditional Chinese society nor a completely different society from 
that of the mainland,” wrote Chinese historian Chen Kongli.374 Because of how land 
was granted to settlers and the nature of landlord-tenant relationships, the early 
lineages formed in Taiwan were contractual lineages based on mutual socio-economic 
interests rather than purely on blood relations.375   
Taiwan lineages are categorised according to the orientation of ancestor 
worship. Those oriented around one of its ancestors in China are known as tang shan 
zu （唐山祖, literally meaning China ancestor). This type of lineage was formed by 
                                                
373 See 王念湘；沈认鹤；郭百超；李丽菁；蹒丰富, 《南瀛宗祠誌》 (台南: 台南县政府, 2009). 
The family temples of Nan Ying (Nan Ying is an ancient term for Taiwan). 
374 Quoted in Zhenman Zheng, Family lineage organization and social change in Ming and Qing 
Fujian, trans. Michael Szonyi (with the assistance of Kenneth Dean and David Wakefield) (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), p 57. 
375 Ibid., p 25 and p 243. For details of land grants and transfers, see  T. Fricke, J. S. Chang and L. S. 
Yang, “Historical and ethnographical perspectives on the Chinese family,” in Social change and the 
family in Taiwan, ed. Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, 22-48 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1994), p 23.   
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migrants who came from a specific area in China and established around the worship 
of an ancestor from China. The other type of lineage is known as the kai tai zu (开台
祖) commemorating the first ancestor who came to Taiwan. Both types of lineages are 
generally known as ji si gong ye (祭祀工业) in Taiwan, especially if the lineages own 
properties. Ji si gong ye is loosely translated to mean property-owning ancestral 
worship associations. This is a corporate entity, with assets and properties to its name, 
set up with the objective of memorialising the family ancestors. There is often an 
accompanying lineage shrine or temple376 hosting the tablets of the lineage ancestors. 
Any ancestral rites are financed through income from the assets and properties in the 
name of the clan – usually land and buildings. This is akin to a family trust fund. Only 
family members and direct descendents from the branch of the family can participate 
in the ancestral rites.377 These family shrines and the lineage organisations are still 
common in small towns and villages in Taiwan, especially in the southern part of the 
island, although the level of activity varies. The ownership and operation of these  
properties owned by the associations are now regulated by law.378  
Rapid industrialisation in the 1950s and 1970s put economic pressure on the 
sustainability of farm families. To cope, families began to encourage their children to 
attain higher education so that they could compete for better jobs in the cities. 
Industrialisation drew labour from the farms as cities attracted the rural young with 
education and employment opportunities. Family planning also contributed to smaller 
                                                
376 These temples are variously referred to as 家庙 jia miao， 祠堂 ci tang or 宗祠 zong ci, which 
means clan or lineage temple, and houses the ancestral tablets of deceased members.   
377 台灣祭祀公業協會, http://www.ceremony.com.tw/c/c2/c23/c231/c231_06_01.asp (accessed April 
17, 2012). 
378 See 端 林, “台灣祭祀公業的社會學分析,” 行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告 
(Taipei, 2000). (Lin Duan, A sociological analysis of Taiwan’s ji si gong ye) 
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family sizes, which affected farm families.379 Extended families gave way to nuclear 
families.380  
The significance and power of lineages were also perceived to be declining. 
An important reason for the reduction of lineages’ power was the consequences of the 
Land Reforms of 1949. The reforms changed the rural power structure by transferring 
authority from landlords and lineage organisations to individual farmers. In doing so, 
it demolished the landlord-as-patriarch paradigm and effectively removed one of the 
main raison d’état and power sources of lineages – corporate land ownership.381  
The accompanying social changes as a result of urbanisation and 
industrialisation led some to deduce a weakening of family links in Taiwan’s families. 
This is based on their findings that the significance of what were once considered key 
family values in Chinese families have gradually declined. Scholars have argued that 
filial piety in Taiwan has been transformed from being oriented to the collective 
(family, clan) to being individually oriented.382 Filial piety is no longer unquestioning 
loyalty to the “family”, but a sentiment that is dependent on the depth of relations 
between family members.383 Furthermore, the expression of filial piety can take on 
many forms instead of blind obedience to the wishes of the family elders.384 Some 
scholars point to the declining significance of what were once considered key family 
values, such as the continuation of the family name and line. The emphasis has shifted 
                                                
379 A. Hermalin, P. K. C. Liu and D. Freedman, “The social and economic transformation of Taiwan,” 
in Social change and the family in Taiwan, ed. Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, 49-87 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
380 An-Chi Tung, Chaonan Chen and Paul Ke-Chih Liu, “The emergence of the neo-extended family in 
contemporary Taiwan ,” Journal of Population Studies, June 2006: 123-152, p 131. 
381 A. Hermalin, P. K. C. Liu and D. Freedman, “The social and economic transformation of Taiwan,” 
in Social change and the family in Taiwan, ed. Arland Thornton and Hui-sheng Lin, 49-87 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p 63. 
382 Te-Hsiung Sun and Yin-Hsing Liu, “Changes in intergenerational relations in the Chinese family: 
Taiwan's experience,” in Tradition and change in the Asian family, ed. Lee-Jay Cho and Moto Yada, 
319-361 (Honolulu: East-West Center, 1994), p 320. 
383 国枢 杨, “现代社会的新孝道,” 中华文化复兴月刊 19, no. 1 (1986): 51-67, pp 59-62. 
384 国枢 杨, “现代社会的新孝道,” 中华文化复兴月刊 19, no. 1 (1986): 51-67, pp 62-63. 
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to immediate family ties rather than extended ones; continuing family line is no 
longer the main reason for having children, and finally, not many people expect to be 
remembered/cherished after death.385  
Despite this, the family and clan remain a source of for the cultural identities 
of Taiwan hua ren as evident from several features in Taiwan society. The most 
obvious change in family structure in Taiwan is the breaking down of the extended 
family into nuclear families. But besides that, changes to the family structure and 
function have not been drastic. Despite the nuclearisation process, family ties in 
Taiwan remain strong. Many families are likely to live in close proximity to their 
relatives, maintain frequent contact with extended family members and engage in 
informal social support exchanges.386 This has also been borne out in my research. 
Lineages remain part of Taiwan’s rural social landscape even though their 
significance has been reduced. Vibrant religious and traditional rituals are still being 
practiced in many cities and regions throughout the year, and are well documented.387 
Ancestor worship remains one of the most vibrant cultural practices, much of 
which is still carried out away from the public eye in the private sphere of the home. 
All 41 of my Taiwan informants said they regularly participated in at least one of the 
three practices that constituted ancestor worship: worshipping of ancestral tablets at 
home, visiting ancestor graves, and visiting ancestral tablets in columbaria, temples or 
niches. Twenty-three informants (56%) indicated that they or their family members 
(usually mothers) make daily offerings at the ancestral tablets at home, a far higher 
                                                
385 A. Thornton, L. S. Yang and T. Fricke, “Weakening the linkage between the ancestors, the living 
and future generations,” in Social change and the family in Taiwan, ed. Arland Thornton and Hui-
sheng Lin, 359-395 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
386 An-Chi Tung, Chaonan Chen and Paul Ke-Chih Liu, “The emergence of the neo-extended family in 
contemporary Taiwan ,” Journal of Population Studies, June 2006: 123-152 
387 See for example Mark Caltonhill, Private prayers and public parades - exploring the religious life 
of Taipei (Taipei: Department of Information, Taipei City Government, 2002) and 王乙芳, 台湾的祭
祀文化与节庆礼俗 (台北: 台湾书房出版有限公司, 2010). 
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number than in Singapore (19%). This typically involves the offering of joss sticks 
every morning and/or evening. 
Of the 23 informants who indicated that they or their family members 
participated in daily worshipping of ancestral tablets at home, only 6 have the tablets 
hosted in the house where they live. The rest said the tablets were hosted in their 
ancestral house, where their parents or grandparents lived, or at other relatives’ 
houses. The notion of the ancestral house is a common one in Taiwan and non-
existent in Singapore. The ancestral house generally refers to the house where the 
family in Taiwan began. It is usually in the rural areas and is often referred to as lao 
jia （老家), which literally means “old house” or zu wu (祖屋 ). It is customary for 
the ancestral tablet to be hosted in the ancestral home, which is the venue for all major 
ancestor worship rituals. Family members who live away from the ancestral home 
would usually return for these events, usually during Lunar New Year and Qing Ming. 
When the sons marry and move out of the ancestral home, they can set up their own 
set of ancestral tablets in their new home. This practice is known as fen xiang huo (分
香火) or ge xiang (割香) - the distributing of the joss fire. The new family will set up 
a new urn at the altar with some ashes taken from the urn of the “original” urn for 
ancestral worship. This symbolic act represents the continuation of the family lineage 
as the ancestors are not forgotten but continually honoured by subsequent generations 
of the family.  
 
CULTURAL IDENTITY AND THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 
While Taiwan still retains a large agricultural and rural sector, it also has a number of 
major cities where the impact of modernisation and urbanisation on ancestor worship 
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practices is pronounced. The urban environment invariably has bearings on how hua 
ren memorialise their ancestors.  
Similar to the situation in Singapore, one of the most visible impacts is seen in 
the gradual replacement of land burial with cremation and the placement of the 
remains of the dead in columbaria. According to 1997 figures, the cremation rate in 
Taipei was between 80 to 90% while the national figure was about 50%.388 Since the 
mid 1980s, burials have been increasingly regulated by the state. Instead of 
unregulated land burial, the Taipei city government runs several columbaria and one 
graveyard. At the graveyard, burial is for a stipulated time period after which the 
remains are exhumed and prepared for reburial or cremation. The vacated spot is re-
used for the next deceased.389 Old burial grounds are also gradually removed and the 
land converted to other functions. Burials that do not take up valuable land are also 
encouraged. These include tree burial, flower burial or sea burial.390 As a result of 
these social changes, the likelihood of those who passed away in the past 20 years 
having a grave is low. Informants who said they visited graves of their ancestors did 
so some time ago, and/or that the graves were in rural areas. It was also not unusual 
for their ancestors’ remains and/or ancestral tablets to be placed in a columbaria or 
temple, instead of being hosted in the family home.  
Like in the case of Singapore, memorialisation practices in Taiwan are 
situated between rationality and the logic of practice. Many of the younger Taiwan 
                                                
388 杨，国柱, 台灣當前的埋葬文化與改革方向, http://www.thinkerstar.com/newidea/fengshui/yang-
05.html (accessed April 20, 2012). 
389 Paul-François Tremlett, "Death-scapes in Taipei and Manila: a postmodern necrography," Taiwan in 
Comparative Perspective 1 (November 2007): 23-36., p 29. 
390 Paul-François Tremlett, "Death-scapes in Taipei and Manila: a postmodern necrography," Taiwan in 
Comparative Perspective 1 (November 2007): 23-36., p 30. See Taipei Mortuary Services Office 
website, 多元環保葬介紹 (Introduction to envrionmentally friendly burials), 
http://www.mso.taipei.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode=24329&mp=107011 (accessed April 25, 2012) for 
details of sea burial and flower-bed burial.  
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respondents take a more laissez faire approach to memorialisation practices. They are 
able to rationalise it according to their personal situations. The older generation 
continues to maintain their own logic of practice that may seem “illogical” to the 
younger generation, who nevertheless continue to participate in such practices out of 
respect for the family members. I illustrate the rationality-logic of practice balancing 
act with the following example of the H family.  
I interviewed three members of the H family on two separate occasions. I first 
met the eldest son AH/M52/TW at his workplace in Taipei, who then arranged for me 
to interview his mother HBLX/F78/TW. I interviewed the latter and her second son, 
ABH/M40s/TW, on another occasion at her Taipei residence. The mother was the 
main practitioner of domestic ancestor worship since the ancestral tablet was at her 
home. She had inherited the tablet, which honours the collective H family ancestors, 
and several individuals, when she married into the family more than 50 years ago. 
Although she was not the eldest daughter-in-law, she had to shoulder the 
responsibility of the household, which included ancestral worship duties, when her 
eldest sister-in-law moved overseas. It was then that she learned the rules and rites, 
which until then she had never performed.  
While age had slowed her down, HBLX continued to carry out the ancestral 
worship rites on designated days: first and 15th day of the lunar new year, second day 
of the lunar second month (Earth God’s birthday), Qing Ming, Dragon Boat Festival, 
Zhong Yuan Festival, Mid Autumn Festival, Chong Yang Festival391 and on the death 
anniversaries of her parents-in-law. The other ancestors were collectively honoured 
                                                
391 Chong Yang festival falls on the ninth day of the ninth lunar month, as such it is also known 
colloquially as the Double Ninth Festival. Traditionally, ancestor worship is carried out on Chong 
Yang festival, which is akin to Qing Ming. In Hong Kong for instance, many families still visit the 
graves on this day. Today in Taiwan, Chong Yang is dedicated as “Senior Citizens’ Day”.  
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on Chong Yang. She said these were the “stipulated” occasions on which to perform 
ancestor worship. HBLX felt obligated to honour her parents-in-law on their death 
anniversaries, “I cannot not do it”. This is because they are the closest in terms of 
seniority to her.  
On almost every occasion, HBLX would prepare feasts that included dishes of 
chicken, meat (pork), fish, various type of steamed cakes (糕点 gao dian, or kueh in 
Hokkien), vegetables such as radish and various types of fruits to be offered to the 
ancestors. Each dish has inscribed meanings. For instance, chicken was seen as an 
essential offering item, for the offering of chicken means a home will  be established 
(有鸡才会起家)392 because in Hokkien, the “chicken” and “house” sound alike. 
Radish is believed to represent good luck.393 
Her sons have told her to simplify the processes since she was getting old and 
they felt it was too much work for her. Her son AHB explained: 
If she knew more, if she were to do this for every generation of our 
ancestors that has passed on, no number of tables will be enough to hold 
the offerings.  
 
HBLX’s sons told her there was no need for such a spread at every offering. They had 
a practical explanation: there were not enough people to eat the offerings afterwards. 
Both brothers and their families would try to turn up at their mother’s home on major 
festive days when offerings are made in order to consume the food after they are 
offered to the ancestors.  
                                                
392 In Hokkien, the phrase is rendered as wu geh jia eh ki geh. 
393 In Mandarin, radish is known as 萝卜, in Hokkien, 菜头 which is sounds like 彩头， meaning good 
luck.  
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The brothers were able to separate the meaning from the act of making 
offerings. Although they usually followed their mother’s instructions regarding these 
practices, both did not ascribe the same level of importance to the practice. AHB, who 
would most likely inherit the ancestral tablet and ancestor worship, said he was 
carrying out his mother’s wishes now. But he also said that times have changed and 
so would the practices. He hinted that he would simplify the current ancestor worship 
practices even further should the responsibility be left to him. His brother, AH, felt 
likewise: 
For my mother, it is something she has to do. But my siblings, no one 
feel that they have to do these things. So we don’t know what we are 
going to do in the future. 
 
AH explained that his children did not really understand the rationale for these 
practices and were likely to “get rid of all these things” if they had the chance, 
although “they will still follow us to visit the graves (but) that’s about it.” 
This case also highlights the myth of universality in traditions. Although there 
are variations in the actual practice of the rites and rituals, many individuals assume 
that their own repertoire is the universally accepted one. In actuality, what individuals 
and families think is “universal” is actually specific to them. HBLX, for example, was 
surprised when told that different families have different practices. When AHB 
pointed out a plausible explanation for her particular practice of placing seven sets of 
cutlery (cups and bowls) when making offerings to the ancestors, she rejected his 
explanation. To AHB’s mind, the numbers represent the number of ancestors being 
memorialised, being one set for each individual, although it is unclear who the seven 
ancestors are. His mother, on the other hand, maintained that there was no specific 
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reason for the number as “this is how it’s done”. She latter admitted that some 
families used 5 or 10, the latter being a representation of the phrase 十全十美 shi 
quan shi mei, meaning perfection. It did not mean that the family was honouring 10 
ancestors. She said she had been using seven sets of cutlery since she married into the 
H family and took over the responsibility. She explained that she had been told by the 
family elders to use seven sets of cutlery when making offering to the ancestors. 
“That was how I was taught, it’s not about seven people.” 
AHB interjected to say that this was how she was taught but added a possible 
rationale for the practice. Examining the ancestral tablet on the altar (See Photo 1), he 
pointed to the names of seven individuals written in script on the tablet; 3 to the left 
and 3 to the right. A name was carved in freehand near the edge of the tablet. The 
entry was almost invisible and appeared to be a late addition. It was unclear who the 
inscribed name belonged to. When AHB’s father died, his name was not added to the 
front of the tablet but on a piece of paper that was stuck at the back of the tablet. AHB 
explained that her mother inherited the practice of using seven sets of cutlery; she did 
not question the rationale but accepted it as the norm.  
Interestingly, despite her insistence on keeping to traditions regarding how to 
make the offerings, HBLX said that there are no restrictions on what can be offered:  
Times have changed. The offerings made can be anything the living 
descendents (making the offerings) want to eat, or it can be the 
deceased’s favourite food. 
 




Photo 1: H family ancestral tablet 
 
ANCESTOR WORSHIP AND THE LINEAGE 
Unlike Singapore where traditional lineage organisations are few and far between, the 
lineage is still a presence in Taiwan especially in the rural areas. In the cities, there is 
another type of social organisation, the general surname clan (宗亲会 zong qin hui). 
This is similar to the clan associations in Singapore which is a social grouping of 
people sharing the same surname and who are not necessarily related by blood. Some 
of these clans may have assets, usually a building bought in the name of the clan to 
house the clan offices or clan temples. The funds are raised from clan members, either 
in the form of fees or donations. Generally, many of these city clans organised 
themselves as a group with the purpose of remembering and paying respect to their 
ancestors. While they attempt to replicate the objective of a lineage, the rules of 
membership to the clans are not as stringent as that of a lineage, which is only limited 
to direct descendents. For the clans, membership is not restricted by either regional or 
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dialect origins; anyone with the same surname is eligible to join the clan. Once the 
clan is established with enough members and funds, it would build an ancestral 
shrine, akin to a lineage family temple to honour the memory of their ancestors. One 
of the memorialisation activities commemorated by both the lineage temple and the 
surname clans is the Spring and Autumn Sacrificial Rites 春秋二祭, deemed one of 
the most significant ancestral worship dates. In addition, lineages and clans would 
also conduct ancestor worship rites during major festivities such as Qing Ming, 
Dragon Boat Festival (端午Duan Wu), Zhong Yuan (中元, lunar seventh month), 
Winter Solstice (冬至, dong zhi) and Chinese New Year eve (岁末 sui mo).  
Whether it is the clan or the lineage, there are indications that these traditions 
are disappearing along with its members. The majority of the members in lineages 
and clans are aged 50 years an above. Even though all family members born into a 
lineage are automatically members, only the older generation continues to be active 
participants in lineage activities. Informants attribute the lack of young members to 
several reasons: the younger generation have less time for such activities as most of 
them have to work or study. In addition, many of the young people have moved away 
to the bigger cities or other counties for work or study. There is also a general 
consensus that most of the young today have little tolerance for what they see as 
outdated traditions with little relevance for their lives.  
In response to the dwindling membership, some local clans have adopted new 
approaches to sustain the financial viability of their clan. The Taichung City Hsu Clan 
adopted a practice common among temples – the lu zhu 炉主 system.394 It allows for 
a person to bid for a statue of the progenitor, 许真人 Xu Zhen Ren, which he will host 
                                                
394 头家炉主 Local chiefs and incense heads, http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=1789 
(accessed April 30, 2012). 
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at his home or office for a year. This person, known as the lu zhu 炉主, is obligated to 
host a dinner for the clan members once a year, capped at NT$30,000. The deputy lu 
zhu will foot the bill for the drinks at the dinner and the tou jia 头家, literally meaning 
head of the house, but in this case the assistant to the lu zhu with the ancestral rites, 
will donate NT$1,000 towards the expense of the dinner. This is an important source 
of funds that  helps offset the expenditure of the clan. Such practice is akin to the 
system in Singapore during zhong yuan (or the Hungry Ghost Festival), where each 
temple has a lu zhu who bids to host the incense urn for a year. His bid is the donation 
to the temple which funds the temple’s activities or the following year’s seventh 
month dinner expenditure. In this case, the Taichung clan has taken on a practice 
modelled on the folk practices not only in utilising the practice but also in casting the 
statue of the progenitor as a deity to be worshipped.  
  
RELIGION AND THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 
Religious change is a factor that has affected cultural practices. Christians and 
Catholics make up about 2.5% of Taiwan’s 23 million population (579,640).395 This 
relatively small proportion is not reflected accurately in my fieldwork. Of my 41 
informants, seven are Christian. The disproportionate number of Christian informants 
is partially a result of the chain referral system, with Christian informants introducing 
me to their friends. 
The Christian informants, while generally agreeing that the practices of 
offering joss sticks and burning of joss papers conflict with their religious teachings, 
all participate in ancestor worship acts, in one form or another. This reflects the 
                                                
395 2010 figures. Ministry of Interior, “Population by age” and “General Conditions of Religions” in 
“Statistical Yearbook of the Interior,” http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/elist.htm (accessed April 23, 
2012). 
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dominance of the family and clan in cultural practice in Taiwan. Most of my Christian 
informants are the only Christians in their family, who may be Buddhist, Taoist or 
non-religious but still practice ancestor worship in the traditional sense. Hence, the 
informants rationalised their participation in ancestor worship as an act of respect for 
the family. CC/F42/TW converted to Christianity, more specifically Mormonism, 
about 20 years ago. She recounted that shortly after her conversion, she still felt 
pressured to participate in ancestral worship activities. On these occasions, she would 
“hold the joss sticks in my hand, (and) when praying, I pray to the Christian God. So 
(the family) didn’t know,” she explained. As time passed, although she would still 
help her family with the arrangements and logistics for ancestor worship, she no 
longer held the joss sticks, an act her family has come to accept. CC likened helping 
with the burning of the joss paper as just another thing one does – “it’s “just like 
putting paper in a bin” – without any religious significance. 
Other informants take a more active interpretation of their participation in 
ancestor worship. Some saw it as a testimony of their Christian faith; that they do not 
eschew respect for their ancestors simply because they are of a different religion. 
GZF/F20s/TW converted to Christianity when she was 7 years old. After her 
conversion, she initially did not participate in Qing Ming activities because she saw 
these practices as conflicting with her religious beliefs, especially the act of holding 
joss sticks and burning of joss papers. At the same time, she did not like being 
criticised for being disrespectful to the ancestors because of her refusal to hold joss 
sticks. At 13, GZF changed her attitude and began to join in her family’s Qing Ming 
observations. GZF represented her parents who had to work at the annual Qing Ming 
visits to the graves. While she did not hold joss sticks, she put her palm together and 
made a praying gesture instead. She explained the reason for her change in attitude:   
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I heard from people that actually Christians ought to attend such events 
even more, to let people know that Christians also have respect for 
ancestors. So I started going to Qing Ming at 13. 
 
GZF saw her participation in Qing Ming events as demonstration that 
Christians are not “unfillial” as non-Christians perceived them to be. GZF said her 
church was one of several churches in Taiwan that encouraged members to participate 
in memorialising ancestors. Instead of offering joss sticks, joss papers and food, 
members are encouraged to offer flowers. Alternatively, church members can also 
conduct a family worship session during Qing Ming to pray for the departed 
ancestors. To affirm her decision, GZF related an incident at the most recent Qing 
Ming visit to the ancestral grave. She observed a Christian grave next to her family 
grave. The area around the grave was tiled, which meant there was no overgrown 
grass and weeds to clear, thus eliminating one of the most laborious tasks at Qing 
Ming (see Photo 2). The Christian grave was clean and there were fresh flowers placed 
at an urn in front of the grave. GZF said her relatives expressed envy at the simplicity 
and convenience of the memorialisation effort, a direct contrast to the laborious hua 
ren tradition of preparing of food, joss offerings and the like. GZF said that on seeing 
the flowers at the graves, her relatives expressed surprise that Christians also “bai 
bai”. “I told them we do. It’s just that we do it with flowers,” she said.  




Photo 2: A Taiwanese family clearing the area around the family grave on Qing Ming. 
 
GZF is an example of how hua ren Christians reason their participation in 
ancestor worship; that they can still practice hua ren memorialisation acts without 
regard for the original religious meanings. Cultural traditions can be and have been, 
adapted and blended into another form of practice. I illustrate this point with the 
following observation taken at a Catholic cemetery I visited in Tainan during Qing 
Ming in 2010.  
The Catholic cemetery was located in a cemetery district about half an hour’s 
drive out of Tainan city. It was a small walled off section, separate from the main 
“Chinese” cemetery that had been cut into two by a highway. The Catholic cemetery 
housed both graves and niches. An interesting feature of the cemetery was the 
presence of urns at the graves (see Photo 3 and Photo 4). The urns were built into the 
grave, not temporary structures, and were similar to those used for holding incense 
sticks found on many Chinese altars in front of statues of deities and ancestral tablets. 
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Two smaller urns were built into the sides for the holding of fresh flowers. Many of 
the urns contained joss sticks and cigarettes recently lit for the deceased. The rows of 
niches had no urns. Instead there were holes in front of each urn specifically bored in  
for the purpose of holding the joss sticks. Individuals offered joss sticks at the graves 
of the people they knew (see Photo 5). A Catholic priest made his round of the 
cemetery, praying for the deceased and sprinkling holy water over the graves and the 
niches. Members from the same diocese were at the cemetery to pay their respects to 
their deceased friends and family, several of them holding joss sticks.  
 
Photo 3: Graves at the Catholic cemetery. Note the joss sticks in the urns. 
 




Photo 4: A close-up of a tombstone at the Catholic cemetery. The names of the couple were 
Abraham and Maria. Note the urn and joss sticks. 
 
 
Photo 5: Two church members offering joss sticks. 
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OF SENTIMENTS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Many informants argued that ancestor worship was not a religious rite but one 
that was symbolic of the living’s sentiments for the deceased and for the family in 
general. They regarded ancestor worship as a form of remembrance for their deceased 
family members rather than an act of religious belief. But there was a tighter circle of 
who is regarded as family worth remembering. Many informants said they did not see 
the necessity of making offerings to ancestors whom they had not seen or interacted 
with. This was because, even though they were related by blood, these people were 
like strangers to them. What they felt was important was for them is to make offering 
to people that they knew, i.e. had a personal relationship with. These family members 
usually included their parents and grandparents. As AH/M52/TW explained:  
If the ancestors are your parents or someone you’ve seen before, I believe 
(the younger generations) will continue the tradition (of memorialising 
them). My daughter is now 20 years old. If you tell her, let’s go see ah 
gong, clear his grave, she’d follow, although she doesn’t know why but 
she knows where she came from. 
He added: 
In the past, traditions dictate that you go to the graves/tablets during 
specific periods of time. But now, for convenience, like us, I sometimes 
go and visit my father during father’s day. I go when I miss him. 
Sometimes I even go during holidays or Chinese new year. It’s not fixed. 
I think these can be flexible…(but) the action has to be meaningful.  
 
This comment suggests that relationship between the deceased and the living 
is just as critical a basis for memorialisation as blood ties are. This point is also 
reflected in uxorilocal marriages where males marry into the female family. In some 
instances, the males are known to take the wife’s surname, although more commonly, 
the first-born son will take the mother’s surname as a means of continuing the descent 
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line. The adoption of sons, within and beyond the family and clan were also common.  
In cases like these, the memorialisation of ancestors, especially on the family level, 
was a case of filial obligation. Several informants related their own histories of having 
been adopted by another family or have older siblings adopted into the family. In all 
the cases, the ancestors honoured were of the family that brought them up not their 
“original” ancestors. MF/M50s/TW said his family made offerings to several 
ancestors of different surnames. Although he did not know who they were or how 
they were related, he continued with the ancestor worship because a relationship 
between the families must have had been established to account for the practice. In 
this case, he said there was an obligation to be honoured.  
For many of my informants (41%), the expression of sentiments was not just 
limited to ritualistic practice. Many believed that telling and exchanging family 
stories was also a legitimate way of memorialising their ancestors. It was also more 
meaningful because of the private and personal nature of the form: the stories were 
told by family members about people and events that had personal meaning to them. 
In articulating these stories, the tellers and the listeners become incorporated into a 
sentimental and emotional network of relationships localised in the geography of the 
family. Except for one informant – a literature student – who indicated that she was 
actively writing down her family history, the others relied on the oral tradition of 
story telling. Many informants indicated that writing or searching of family history 
was a daunting task that was time consuming and laborious. They said it was difficult 
for them to proceed even if they had wanted to because they had no resources as the 
older family members had the information had already passed away. They also felt 
that there was “nothing spectacular” about their family history that warranted for it to 
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be written down. They felt they were neither prominent personalities nor academics 
whose stories would be interesting to the public.  
 
THE PLACE IN CULTURAL IDENTITY 
Besides religion, place also plays a part in determining and influencing attitudes 
towards cultural practices and their involvement. To locate one’s identity and history 
in Taiwan is an important aspect for cultural imagination among my informants 
because it individualises the memorialised rather than treats the ancestor as part of a 
nebulous collective. This is, for my informants, more personally meaningful. One 
example was AH/M52/TW. Inspired by classical Mandarin eulogies, AH wrote 
elegiac prose for his late father and aunt. In each of these pieces, AH personalised the 
memories by writing about his personal experiences with the deceased individuals 
rather than composing a generic eulogy. In the piece about his father, titled Food and 
Bicycle, AH included not just the biographical sketch of his father’s life – how others 
saw him, but detailed their relationship through a narrative of father and son traipsing 
the streets of Taipei city on bicycle in search of good food. The piece thus located AH 
and his father’s memories and experiences in the local geography and the personal. 
AH explained his rationale for writing the piece: 
The stories gives meaning to my relationship with my father…it was a 
way of remembering (my father who loves to eat), where we ate when 
and what. Many of my father’s friends came to me (after the funeral) and 
said I missed out some places and food he liked. It’s something you 
know, not something that has no meaning for you.  
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The stories localised the relationship in local geography, history and personal acts 
(going for meals together). They give a greater sense of being rooted in a particular 
time and space, which in turn create a deeper sense of belonging. 
During my time in Taiwan, people would tell me to visit the south (南部, nan 
bu) on learning my research topic. Generally, they did not direct me to visit a 
particular city, but purported that the south – the area south of Taichung – was a 
stronghold of tradition. They said the north, represented by Taipei, was too modern 
and urban. Informants would highlight the presence of numerous temples, shrines and 
vibrant religious activities in the south. That was where I would find answers to my 
questions, informants told me. This was because the south was (seen as) the 
embodiment of tradition.  
WCJ/M20/TW was born in the southern Taiwanese city of Kaohsiung. He 
explained that his family practiced traditional folk religion, and that ancestor worship 
was also part and parcel of his family life.  
In an environment where (such practices) is the norm, it will appear 
strange if one does not do it…There are many temples in the area where I 
was born, so it becomes part of my life, unconsciously. In that sense, my 
parents did not have to specially bring me into the religious and ritual 
environment.  
 
Although most of my informants had ancestors that originated from mainland 
China, for many of them, the China origins are “too long ago to matter now”. Of the 
41 Taiwanese informants, four indicated that they had visited their ancestral villages. 
Of the four, three referred to the village in Taiwan where their ancestors originated 
while only one referred to the one in China where his forebears came from. When 
asked about their family history, many informants said their families have been in 
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Taiwan for “several hundred years” or “many generations”, and that it has been too 
long to be verified. They saw themselves as authentic local Taiwanese.  
MW/F41/TW’ s case was an interesting one. She was one of two informants 
who indicated that their parents were 外省人 wai sheng ren. The term literally 
translates to mean people from an outside province. Wai sheng ren refers to 
Mainlanders who came over to Taiwan with the retreating KMT in the 1940s. The 
label was also used on the offspring of the first generation Mainlanders, who were 
identified by their political affiliation (mostly pro-KMT), their use of Mandarin (even 
if it was not necessarily their first language) and their cultural affinity to China. MW’s 
father was born in China and came to Taiwan with his father during the 1940s. MW’s 
mother was born in Taiwan to Mainland Chinese parents. MW said she was 
considered a wai sheng ren when she was a schoolgirl in the 1970s because her 
parents were wai sheng ren. She disputed this categorization “because we were born 
in Taiwan”.  
How can you say I am wai sheng ren when I am born in Taiwan and does 
not relate to China? 
 
She went on to buttress her identification in the local by saying that it was 
hard to differentiate between the so-called wai sheng ren and ben sheng ren because 
of ethnic integration and intermarriage. To consolidate her argument, she pointed to 
her mother and siblings being born in Taiwan, adding that her two sisters married 
Taiwanese, “really true blue Taiwanese…from southern Taiwan”. 
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SL/F34/TW, whose father came from Mainland China during the 1950s, said 
that while her father would consider their family as wai sheng ren, she saw herself as 
Taiwanese: 
I used to think I was Chinese, as in zhong guo ren (person from China) 
because of all the indoctrination in school…but as I grew up, I begin to 
think of myself as Taiwan ren. 
 
The change in attitude came about as a result of a change in the political climate in 
Taiwan, and as a result of personal experience:  
The key for me was after I went to Mainland China, I begin to see myself 
as Taiwan ren…I feel we are so different…every time I went, it 
reinforces that feeling of difference. It’s not just the accent, but the way 
of thinking. 
 
Growing up in 1970s and 1980s Taiwan, the informant’s experience was divorced 
from the reality of the previous generation:  
(We) no longer care where the ancestral village (老家， lao jia) is … for 
me, my identification is with the land in which I was born. Now, I feel I 
am Taiwanese. My ancestor may come from mainland China or from 
Taiwan, it doesn’t make much difference to me now. 
 
The strong sense of localisation among the Taiwanese was further illustrated 
by conversations with two informants who were active in lineage work. Both were 
from different parts of Taiwan, belonging to different lineages. HWH/M70s/TW 
belonged to a clan based in Taipei while MF/M50s/TW was a lineage member in 
Xinpu town in Hsinchu county. The discussions centered on the issue of genealogy 
and lineage. As discussed in Chapter 2, genealogy gives legitimacy to the clan and 
lineage. But the significance of genealogy has been gradually eroded over time as it 
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loses relevance in an urban and industrialised society, and as questions of its 
authenticity arose. While clans and lineages take the genealogy as an important proof 
of their origins and reputation, some members attributed a more symbolic rather than 
absolute significance to the genealogy. Both informants said that their members did 
not deny the significance of genealogy but some were sceptical of the plausibility of 
an unbroken line of descent. They cited factors such as literary rates during the early 
periods and socio-political conditions – such as war and migration – that affected the 
accuracy of the records.  
HWH/M70s/TW related his experience of seeing a genealogy that was traced 
back to the progenitor of the surname dated to the ancient Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 
BC):  
There is not one generation missing. They trace it all the way to Wen 
Shu Gong 文叔公 （the progenitor of the clan). I am suspicious of this. 
How can this sort of genealogy exist? …I feel that they may have pieced 
the genealogy together, but from what sources, I do not know. 
 
He expressed scepticism because of the unbroken line of descent dating several 
thousand years. Implied in his scepticism was the possibility that the genealogy was 
constructed artificially to boost the reputation of the village, which was the ancestral 
village of the grandfather of the former Philippines president, Corazon Aquino. 
Following Aquino’s visit to the village in 1988, it was revitalised with extra funds and 
investment. The informant explained that because of the village’s association with 
Aquino, many people asked for the genealogy. It was for this reason that the village 
began constructing the genealogy, he said. In this way, the genealogy becomes a 
symbol and “proof” of the “celebrity” status of the lineage. 
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HWH pointed out that there were in fact disputes over which ancestor should 
be revered as the progenitor. He said that the Taipei clan claimed Wen Shu Gong 文
叔公 as the founding ancestor of the surname, while the Taichung branch of the clan 
claimed another candidate, Xu Zhen Ren 许真人 . HWH said that Xu Zhen Ren was 
consecrated as the representative figure as a result of “politics”: he was given a title 
by a Sung dynasty emperor because of his good works as a medical doctor. He 
implied that the title made it sensible for Xu Zhen Ren to be honoured since he was 
bestowed with an imperial title, which subsequently led to the legend that the Xu and 
some 40 members of his family, including the pigs and the dogs, ascended to heaven. 
HWX dismissed this legend as preposterous and impossible. HWH argued that that 
chronologically, Xu Zhen Ren was a descendent of Wen Shu Gong, who was 
bestowed the kingdom of Xu. Wen, therefore, was the rightful candidate. When I 
asked the Taichung clan member, on another occasion, about the differences, he 
brushed it aside, likening it to differences in denomination in Christianity.  
The issue of authenticity of the line of descent has an impact on the current 
generation. MF/M50s/TW spoke of the difficulty in ascertaining the accuracy of 
information of the clan’s ancestors. He said that their branch of the family could only 
trace back five generations of their descent with certainty. While they knew who the 
ancestor who first came to Taiwan from China was, there was little or no information 
of the subsequent five generations:  
We were researching the individuals who had tablets in our lineage 
temple. (Of the 600 or so tablets), we found out about 60 had come from 
China to Taiwan during different periods. We went through all the 
genealogies we can get, but can only find 20 or so of them (mentioned in 
the genealogies). Of the 20, only 3 are accurate (that is, correctly 
recorded in the genealogies and tablets)!  
The informant said the possibility of honouring the wrong ancestor was high,  
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but surely we can’t tell them (the descendents) that, can we?...We don’t 
know for sure if the mistake is generated because of different accents, 
pronunciation or faulty memory. So we’ve stopped the research, we 
don’t dare go any further.  
 
This break in the transmission of information has motivated some to take up the 
practice of compiling the genealogy from all available information so that the future 
generations can know the history of the clan. But what is clear is that such cultural 
truncation has aided in localising the lineage in Taiwan:  
Many of the genealogies we have in Taiwan were started with the 
ancestor who first came over from China. There are some who 
back-trace to China, but most of us took Taiwan as the starting 
point because, at the end of the day, we are all born here, it’s more 
real (to us) and it is more accurate. 
 
The strong sense of localisation or Taiwanisation of the Taiwanese’ cultural 
identity is also evident in the government’s policy of registering historical family 
shrines and lineage halls as national monuments.396 Some have even gone as far as to 
enlist medical science to its course, arguing that the majority of Taiwanese have local 
aboriginal blood and that the so-called “Chinese” blood is not that of the authentic 
Han Chinese.397 Among the many forces that shape the narratives of, identifications 
and identities of groups and communities, is religion. Not only does religion shape 
identities and roles, belonging to a particular religion and/or participating in such 
religious events provides a sense of belonging to a social group and affects one’s 
outlook. Besides the pantheon of deities in the Taoist and folk religion matrix, as well 
as the other mainstream religions, there are two cults of deities that have emerged 
                                                
396 See for example the list of family shrines in the Hsinchu area that have been listed as national 
monuments, available from the website of the Cultural Affairs of Hsinchu County Government, 
http://www.hchcc.gov.tw/, accessed 26 November 2010. 
397 妈利 林, 我们流着不同的血液 (Taipei: Avanguard Publishing House, 2010). 
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from the realm of ancestors. These two cults – of Koxinga and Yi Min Ye 义民爷 － 
are particular to Taiwan. Both began as ancestors of their respective clans but have 
since become “national” deities that transcend the familial boundaries. The 
development of a cultural industry around these cult figures is considered to be 
uniquely Taiwan and reflects an attempt to create a Taiwan culture and identity rooted 
in the history and development of the island.  
In Taiwan, especially in the south, Koxinga is hailed as national hero who 
fought off the invading Qing dynasty and founded modern Taiwan. Although of 
Japanese and Han heritage and born in Japan, the Taiwanese have claimed him as a 
local. The keeper of the Zheng Family Shrine in Tainan City proclaimed: Zheng was 
the first person in Taiwan to be consecrated and deified. The other deities, such as 
Mazu and Bao Sheng Da Di were all “imported” from mainland China. The family 
shrine, first built by Koxinga’s son Zheng Jing in 1663, is today a national public 
monument. It is a museum dedicated to the life and deeds of Koxinga as well as a 
functioning family shrine that hosts the tablets of Koxinga and a few of his other 
family members.398 The clan, although small, still conducts the Spring and Autumn 
Sacrificial rites annually, and on Qing Ming, visits the tombs of two of Koxinga’s 
sons, the only two left in Taiwan.399  
Besides being revered as an illustrious ancestor of the Zheng clan, Koxinga 
has been deified. His statue takes centre stage in the Zheng family shrine and Koxinga 
is memorialised and worshiped as a deity (one among the pantheon of folk figures) in 
several other state-erected temples dedicated to the figure. These include the Anping 
                                                
398 Their remains have been moved back to mainland China when the Qing government conquered 
Taiwan in the 17th century.  
399 According to this blogger, http://blog.xuite.net/tropicofcancer/2327/1492483, accessed 3 April 
2011, the tombs are located at a site near the old Tainan airport.  
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Mazu Temple,400 where Koxinga is one of the several deities worshipped. At the 
Guoxingye's Shrine (延平郡王祠 Yanping Junwang Temple) built in 1662, his life 
and works are honoured.401 The reverence for Koxinga lies in the Taiwanese view that 
he was the founder of Taiwan, and thus Taiwan’s original first ancestor. Hence 
Koxinga is also known as the “Sage King who founded Taiwan” 开台圣王 （or 开基
始祖 the ancestor who opened the land). 
The other cult particular to Taiwan is that of the Yi Min Ye. The Yi Min 
culture is a belief system unique to Taiwan. It does not exist in Mainland China. 
Specifically, it is unique to Hsinchu although its influence has spread across the 
Hakka groups in Taiwan, possibly due to the increasing indigenization of the Hakka 
culture. It reflects the movement of returning to one’s Hakka roots. The focus of the 
Yi Min (义民 righteous citizen) culture is the Yi Min Ye 义民爷, loosely translated to 
mean Lord Yi Min or Lord of the Righteous Citizen. But this deity was not an 
individual but rather a group of people who were members of the Yi Min troops that 
rallied to help the Qing Court suppress a local rebellion (in Taiwan) in 1788. In place 
of a statue of the deity, as is common in many temples, is an ancestral tablet to 
represent the troops who died during the rebellion. The Yi Min were considered 
martyrs and have since been elevated into deities. The Yi Min temple in Hsinchu was 
built from donations from two main families in the area, and has since become a 
rallying point for the neighbouring villages in the area. The proponents and believers 
of the Yi Min culture are the Hakka people. The Yi Min culture has evolved into a 
                                                
400 安平开台天后宫 
401 傅朝卿 和 詹伯望, 《图说郑成功与台湾文化：国姓爷，延平郡王，开台圣王》 (台南: 台湾建
筑与文化资产出版社, 2006). 
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local feature of the Hsinchu county and has been written into the greater Taiwan 
Hakka culture.402  
TAIWAN REN OR HUA REN?  
Unlike in Singapore where hua ren appear more ready to accept the cultural 
identification imposed by the state, the Taiwanese are less compliant. For them, the 
hua culture is an imposed one. Although the term hua ren is widely used in Southeast 
Asia to refer to people of “Chinese” ethnicity, the term is not as commonly used in 
Taiwan. While many of my informants said they understood the term, they did not use 
it to refer to themselves. When asked to identify themselves, most of them indicated 
that they were Taiwan ren, the people of Taiwan. They said that while they had 
“Chinese” ethnicity, they did not refer to themselves as “Chinese” or zhong guo ren 
because they were not the citizens of China. Han, another common term usedto refer 
to Chinese ethnicity, was seen as an arcane term that no longer had currency, except 
in some academic publications. My informants were very clear in their identification 
– they were Taiwan ren, a reflection of the current political-cultural sentiments.  
The cultural imagination of the Taiwanese has to be considered within the 
framework of political imagination in Taiwan. Between 1945 and the 1990s, the 
political and cultural chasm in Taiwan society was largely between the Mainlander 
wai sheng ren (literally meaning people from another province) and the ben sheng ren 
(本省人, people of Taiwan, excluding the aborigines). As the wai sheng ren were 
identified by their connections to China, the ben sheng Taiwanese were identified by 
their connections with their local community, their anti-China, pro-independence 
stance, and their use of the Hokla (or Hokkien) and Hakka languages. By the 1970s, 
                                                
402 新竹县政府交通旅游处, http://travel.hsinchu.gov.tw/page.aspx?wtp=2&wnd=107&id=4 (accessed 
April 20, 2012). 
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as part of the political and cultural opposition to the Mandarinisation efforts, ethnic 
distinctions began to emerge. By the 1990s, there was a revival of the ethnic heritage 
of the Hoklo （ fu lao, 福佬) and Hakka（ke jia， 客家）, which were used to 
construct the Taiwan ren identity.   
When the Kuomintang (KMT) retreated from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, 
it was felt that the Taiwanese, especially the hua ren, had been “enslaved” and 
“contaminated” by Japanese culture; it was a situation that needed to be rectified.403  
The KMT sought to imprint its mark on the Taiwanese people through what Allen 
Chuan called “cultural reunification”.404  
The KMT turned to Chinese culture as a resource for nation building: Taiwan 
was to be marked as a nation built on the traditional ideals of Confucianism, albeit 
one that was antithetical to the “modern” Chinese nation that the new cultural 
movement sought to establish, and one that the Republic of China was to be. The 
KMT approach was based on the New Life Movement it launched on Mainland China 
in 1934. The New Life Movement was  “designed as a massive, all-encompassing 
movement to restore Confucianism as the basis for Chinese civilisation”. It was a 
social movement that drew on the Confucian ideas of filial piety, morality and ethics 
to transform the people of China and build the latter into a modern nation.405 
The period between the 1960s and 1970s was one in which Taiwan was 
constructed as being “more Chinese” than China. The KMT positioned Taiwan as the 
fortress for reviving the Chinese nation (min zu fu xing bao lei 民族复兴堡垒). The 
                                                
403王甫昌， 《当代台湾社会的族群想像》， 台北：群学出版有限公司， 2003,  p74. 
404 Allen Chun, From nationalism to nationalizing: cultural imagination and state formation in postwar 
Taiwan, Vol. 1, in The politics of modern Taiwan, ed. Dafydd Fell, 104125 (London: Routledge, 
2008), p109. 
405 Jennifer Lee Oldstone-Moore, “The new life movement of nationalist China: Confucianism, state 
authority and moral formation,” PhD Thesis, Faulty of the Divinity School, University of Chicago 
(Chicago, 2000). 
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KMT government saw itself as the defender of “authentic” Chinese culture. In 1966, 
it launched the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement (中华文化复兴运动) in 
Taiwan as the CCP on the mainland launched the iconoclastic Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution. The aims were to “show the world community that the Chinese 
culture was well preserved in Taiwan” and to “restore (the Taiwanese) people’s 
confidence in the superiority of their cultural inheritance”.406 Standard Mandarin was 
implemented as the official language and medium of every day communication in 
place of the dialects.407 The content of school subjects such as history, geography and 
literature were heavily geared towards China. Artefacts of high culture, including 
classical texts, were upheld as national treasures (none of the indigenous cultural 
practices and material artefacts were included). The KMT also sought recourse to 
Confucianism as part of its attempt to create a “Chinese” national character.408 The 
attempt to “invoke, resuscitate and reinvent tradition” was part of the KMT’s attempt 
to re-imagine and redefine a national identity for Taiwan.409  The reaching back to 
“traditional values” was a way to cultivate a “national” solidarity that was absent.  
By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, there was a strong movement to 
indigenise the Taiwanese identity. Politically, the pro-independence movement gained 
traction, seeking greater local representation in politics. By then, the KMT was also 
seeking to localise itself by recruiting more Taiwanese to join its rank and file in a 
move to shed its image as a foreign exile political force. The most significant 
development was the rise of Lee Teng Hui, a native Taiwanese, to political leadership 
of Taiwan. Lee has been credited for the acceleration of the indignenisation 
                                                
406 Fu-chang Wang, “Why bother about school textbooks? An analysis of the origin of the disputes over 
the renshi Taiwan textbooks in 1997” in John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau (eds), Cultural Ethnic And 
Political Nationalism In Contemporary Taiwan, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp55 – 99 at p 
61.  
407 Ibid.  
408 Chun, “From nationalism to Nationalising”, pp 112-119. 
409 Ibid., p 106. 
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programme, moving Taiwan from the narrative periphery to the centre, and 
encouraging the articulation of a Taiwanese consciousness based on a community of 
shared fate.410 During Lee’s presidency, a Community Construction Movement was 
launched as a mechanism to build Taiwanese consciousness and a Taiwan-centred 
identity, through the promotion of studying the local.411 Lee promoted the idea of 
Taiwan as a “living community” and the cultivation of communal sentiments where 
every Taiwanese would identify with and feel rooted to Taiwan.412 
At the same time, there was a corresponding cultural movement towards de-
sinicisation by anchoring the Taiwanese identity in the local. Education, which had 
hitherto been China-focussed, was revised to place greater emphasis on Taiwanese 
issues.413 Students were encouraged to go into the grassroots to experience and 
unearth the “real Taiwan”.414 A localisation movement, or ben tu hua (本土化) took 
root in the literary, music and film realms, leading to the emergence of xiang tu wen 
xue (乡土文学, nativist literature), Taiwan min yao (台湾民谣, Taiwanese folk song 
movement) and the so-called New Wave cinema. The portrayal of Taiwanese 
perspectives, use of the Taiwanese languages (Hokkien, Hakka) and the recognition 
of the aboriginal influences and origins took centre stage. By the 1980s, the 
Taiwanisation movement had gained enough momentum for the government under 
President Chiang Ching-kuo, who succeeded his father Chiang Kai-Shek, to portray 
                                                
410 Bi-yu Chang, "From Taiwanisation to de-sinification: culture construction in Taiwan since the 
1990s," China perpectives [Online] 56 (November-December 2004). 
411 Ibid.  
412 Hsin-yi Lu, The politics of locality: making a nation of communities in Taiwan (New York: 
Routledge, 2002)., p 41. See pp 33-58 for an overview of the programmes and developments of the 
localisation programme.  
413 A new series of history, geography and social studies textbooks, under the theme of Ren shi Taiwan 
(认识台湾, Getting to know Taiwan) to be added to the curriculum of first year junior high school was 
introduced in 1989. See Fu-chang Wang, “Why bother about school textbooks?”, p 61. See J. Bruce 
Jacobs, Democratizing Taiwan (Leiden: Brill, 2012). pp 219-226 for a summary of the contents of 
several ministry-approved history textbooks for tenth graders. 
414 Lu, The politics of locality, p 5. 
  Jaime Koh 
205 
 
“Taiwan as a nation of successive waves of immigrants consisting of people with 
various cultural inheritances, one of which is Chinese” rather than to regard Han 
Chineseness as “the core element in Taiwanese cultural identity”.415  
The localisation of Taiwan’s cultural identity intensified in the 1990s, when 
the DPP constructed another discourse of ethnicity which has come to be part of the 
cultural imagination – that of the four ethnicities (si da zu qun 四大族群)416 – the 
Aborigines417 （yuan zu min 原住民）, the Hakkas, the Hoklos and the 
Mainlanders.418 In this framework of cultural imagination, the ben sheng population 
was categorised according to their dialect origins, and the categorisation of the 
population into the four ethnicities overshadowed the ben sheng ren – wai sheng ren 
dichotomy. The newly articulated classification pushed the cultural element, rather 
than the political, to the forefront. This grouping was part of a more complex web of 
distinctions: the Aborigines vis-à-vis the Han Chinese (Hakka, Hoklo and 
Mainlander), the Hakkas and Hoklos vis-à-vis the Mainlanders, and the Hakkas vis-à-
vis the Hoklos. These ethnic distinctions, which began to take root in the 1970s as 
part of the emergence of political and cultural opposition to the KMT government, 
had by now become part of the social ontology of contemporary Taiwanese society 
and culture.419 The once important representation of “authentic Chinese” culture 
gradually giving way to representations of local Taiwanese culture, as represented by 
the “multicultural” nature of Taiwanese society and of the distinct Hoklo, Hakka and 
Aboriginal identities. These “are all part of Taiwan culture, whether they are local 
                                                
415 Wang, “Why bother about school textbooks?”, 56. 
416 王甫昌， 当代台湾社会的族群想像， pp 54-100. 
417 The Aborigines population is categorised into 14 officially recognised groups, with the three largest 
being the Amis 阿美, the Paiwan 排灣 and the Atayal 泰雅. The three groups account for about 70% 
of the Aborigines population, which stood at about half a million in 2010, or about 2% of Taiwan’s 
population. Government Information Office, The Republic of China Yearbook 2011 (Taipei, 2011).  
418 A-chin Hsiau, Contemporary Taiwanese cultural nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000), p 105. 
419 王甫昌， 当代台湾社会的族群想像， pp 54-100. 
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cultures, mass cultures or high cultures”, Chen Shui-bian declared in his presidential 
inauguration speech in 2000.420 He admitted that “the people across the Taiwan Strait 
share the same ancestral, cultural, and historical background”, but the different 
historical trajectories have led to the development of “vastly different political 
systems and lifestyles”. 421 Chen called for the creation of an environment in which 
“our diverse ethnic groups and different regional cultures communicate with each 
other, and so that Taiwan's local cultures connect with the cultures of Chinese-
speaking communities and other world cultures, and create a new milieu of "a cultural 
Taiwan in a modern century."422 In so doing, he called for the identification with a 
Taiwan culture. 
The Taiwan culture in question was not a unitary one. Rather it was a culture 
that celebrated plurality. Instead of being a culture such as the “Chinese” culture in 
Singapore which is superimposed on different dialect groups, the Taiwan culture that 
is being promoted was one that celebrated the diverse ethnicities such as the Hokkien 
and the Hakka. In contrast to the suppression of non-Mandarin cultures during the 
1950s and 1960s, there was a revival of Hokkien and Hakka cultures in the 1990s. In 
1993, Taiwan implemented the teaching of Hokkien in schools, reversing the 
historical trend where Hokkien was considered uncouth, vulgar and backward and not 
on the same level as Mandarin, the national language (guo yu 国语).423 In 2001, 
Hokkien was made one of the compulsory local Taiwanese languages to be learned in 
schools. The language was also used widely in government agencies. The once 
languishing Hokkien entertainment industry flourished from the 1990s and has since 
become a significant cultural hub. The marginalised Hakka language was also 
                                                
420 Shui-bian Chen, Dawn of a rising era, May 21, 2000, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/editorials/archives/2000/05/21/36938 (accessed April 9, 2012). 
421 Ibid.  
422 Ibid.  
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elevated to one of the “heritage languages” to be taught in schools.424 A Hakka 
Affairs Council was established as a cabinet-level unit in 2001 to promote Hakka 
culture, including language and traditions.425 As a symbolic gesture to highlight the 
importance of Taiwanisation, Chen had Aboriginal and Hokkien songs sung at the 
morning ceremony and Taiwanese food served at the evening banquet at the 
presidential inauguration in May 2001. Pop singer Chang Huei-mei, who is of 
aboriginal descent, was invited to sing the island's anthem at the inauguration.426  
This trend of localisation plays an important role in constructing the cultural 
identity of Taiwan hua ren. The issues of cultural identity and national identity in 
Taiwan are politically charged as highlighted. In anchoring their memorialisation 
practices to local practices, traditions and evolution, Taiwan hua ren are seeking to 
construct a hua ren identity that is Taiwanese, not Chinese. Most of the informants do 
not deny they are culturally hua, but emphasised that it is a hua identity formed in the 
particular locale and network of Taiwan. While the highly ritualised memorialisation 
practices reflect the cultural heritage of Taiwan hua ren, the personalisation of some 
of these practices and the increasing practice of personalised memorialisation 
practices, such as the writing of family history or in the forms of memorial essays for 
deceased family members, point to the significance of localisation in Taiwan hua ren 
cultural identity.  
    
                                                
424 T. M Fok, "Hakka language rises from the ashes," The China Post (Septem 11, 2011). 
425 Hakka Affairs Council, http://www.hakka.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=11 (accessed April 9, 2012). 
426 Following her appearance at the Taiwan president inauguration, A-mei, as the singer is popularly 
known, was banned from performing in China. Her songs, advertisements and programmes were all 
canned. Beijing interpreted her performance as political support for the pro-independence DPP. For 
China, it was “a political issue. She went too far on such a big occasion”. China bans Taiwan's 
Madonna, May 24, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/761908.stm (accessed April 9, 2012). 




In many ways, certain parts of Taiwan remain “traditional” in that the older ways of 
doing things, especially the ritualistic practices of ancestor worship, remain. But in 
many ways, Taiwan has not escaped the effects of modernisation and urbanisation. 
The trend of personalisation and simplification of cultural practices is a feature of 
contemporary society. The high mobility of the Taiwanese youth is a factor that 
accounts for this development. With many studying and working outside the counties 
and towns they were born in, these Taiwanese are unable to continue with the 
traditions they may have been brought up with. An alternative way of honouring the 
memory of their ancestors is to personalise the ways of doing it. Many of the rites and 
processes have been simplified by hua ren living in the city areas, due to restrictions 
of space and limited knowledge among the young. Many of the young Taiwanese 
today have limited knowledge of these rites and rituals. Yet, unlike Singapore, the 
material basis for hua ren cultural identification is stronger. Family and clans, though 
said to be in decline, still exert considerable influence on the cultural practices of the 
individuals. Through rationality may influence some of the younger generation in 
their attitudes towards the cultural practices, to a large extent, the logic of practice is 
still dominant.  
As discussed in the chapter, there is a strong political and cultural contest over 
the nature of hua ren culture and cultural identity in Taiwan. The debate is inevitably 
tied to politics. In seeking to define a national identity to counter the PRC, the KMT 
reached back, ironically, to the pre-modern “traditional values”. In defying the 
KMT’s Mandarinisation of Taiwan, the opposition sought to construct local narratives 
of Taiwan’s cultural identities, most notably through language and literature. 
Significantly, they did not disavow the cultural practices of its people. In Taiwan, the 
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cultural identity is constructed and rooted in the local. Regional differences are also 
cultural differences as people tend to distinguish their practices and their traditions by 
their ethnic origins, such as Hakka and Hokkien. More significantly, the research 
suggests that the identification with the local traditional and cultural frameworks is 
stronger than with a general idea of “being Chinese”, no doubt influenced by politics.  
~ 
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CHAPTER 6 
HUA REN IDENTITY AS A SYMBOLIC CULTURAL SPACE 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis was to establish a practice-based framework in 
which to understand and analyse the cultural identities of hua ren. I argued that hua 
ren identity has moved beyond the “Chinese Diaspora” narrative, and that there is a 
need to delink ethnic and cultural identities. In doing so, I challenged the notion of a 
singular supranational “Chinese” cultural identity through the examination of 
memorialisation practices among hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan. The previous two 
chapters on Singapore and Taiwan have demonstrated the impact of historical and 
social changes on the cultural imaginations of the hua ren at these two sites. How hua 
ren at each site remember their ancestors is a complex process of negotiation and 
navigation, reflecting the different socio-cultural environments in which the society 
and community developed. I contend that one’s cultural identity should be viewed as 
a multidirectional entity that is constantly changing and shaped by one’s local context. 
This chapter reviews the main research findings in the Singapore and Taiwan 
case studies and synthesises these findings with the conceptual frameworks laid out in 
Chapters 1 and 2. In Chapter 1, I proposed an alternative discursive framework known 
as the Sinoscape which is a practice-based cultural space in which hua ren identity is 
not regarded as an essentialised given. I also explored how different cultural 
memories have resulted in different hua ren identities. In the second part of the 
chapter, I explored why hua ren cultural identities in Taiwan and Singapore were 
forms of symbolic ethnicity. I argued that such a conception of ethnicity and cultural 
identity is valid and relevant in contemporary society. I also contended that while hua 
ren identities in Singapore and Taiwan share similar cultural roots, they differ due to 
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different socio-political environments. These identities are the products of the specific 
locale, network and cultural memories in the respective sites. While recognising these 
differences, I proposed that the cultural identities of hua ren in contemporary 
Singapore and Taiwan are similar in the sense that they can be regarded as forms of 
symbolic ethnicity which allows identity to be viewed as a multidirectional concept 
rather than a singular, universal one.   
 
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Many hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan are still, to borrow a phrase from Francis 
Hsu, living under the shadow of the ancestors. 427 Despite studies and surveys that 
point to its decline, ancestor worship remains a visible and essential practice through 
which hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan memorialise their ancestors. While the 
domestic cult of ancestor worship shows sign of decline (only a handful of older 
respondents continue to practice the domestic cult), many of the respondents still 
periodically participate in occasions of ancestor worship, such as visiting grave and 
niches at columbaria and temples during Qing Ming and/or death anniversaries. 
Except at clan associations where ancestral worship rites and rituals are more 
formalised, the rites and rituals at the family and individual levels are more informal, 
with variations made over the years to suit existing conditions. Very often, these 
practices are passed down from the previous generations with no clear instructions on 
the whys and the hows. The meanings and the rationales of these practices are thus 
often open to interpretation.  
                                                
427 Francis Hsu, Under the ancestors' shadow: Chinese culture and personality (London: Routledge & 
Keagan Paul, 1949). 
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At both sites, the domestic cult of ancestor worship is considerably less 
common. In Singapore, fewer of my hua ren respondents participated in the daily 
offering of joss sticks at the altar compared to my Taiwanese respondents. Generally, 
it was the older respondents who are involved in this practice than the younger 
respondents. The latter said that their involvement was usually limited to special 
occasions such as Qing Ming or Chinese New Year when the family elders insisted 
they make an offering at the altar. Many respondents at both sites said they did not 
host the ancestral tablet at home for various reasons. For most respondents in Taiwan, 
the tablets are still hosted at the ancestral home, that is, the family’s original home 
belonging to either their grandparents or parents. These are usually located in the rural 
areas. There were also many respondents who indicated that the tablets were either 
hosted at a temple or a columbarium. As such the domestic cult of worship cannot 
take place in such situations.   
Among the memorialistion practices surveyed, visiting ancestral graves was 
the most commonly cited ancestor worship practice among my Singapore and Taiwan 
respondents. This was usually undertaken once a year during the Qing Ming festival. 
Most respondents of the younger generation saw their participation as part of their 
familial obligations with little or no religious implications. And as Qing Ming has 
been traditionally observed as an annual day to remember one’s ancestors, Christian 
hua ren tended to more readily participate in ancestor memorialisation on this day 
rather than in the daily rituals of the domestic cult of ancestor worship. Many of my 
Christian respondents in both Singapore and Taiwan indicated that they would visit 
the graves of their ancestors during Qing Ming. But in place of the traditional joss 
sticks and food offerings non-Christians bring, the Christians would bring flowers to 
be placed at the graves. Some Christians would neither hold joss sticks nor participate 
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in the burning of joss papers, they believed that they were paying respects to the dead 
most notably by their presence or by saying a prayer for the deceased. 
But there were some Christian respondents who were able to cast a 
psychological distance between the rites and activities, and their religious beliefs such 
that both could co-exist without conflict. These were the ones who said they 
continued to offer joss sticks to the dead and helped with the burning of joss papers. 
For this group of Christian hua ren, the perceived tension between ancestor worship 
as a cultural practice and religious belief was resolved by them positioning ancestor 
worship as a memorialisation practice that was part of their individual cultural 
ecology rather than a religious practice of a specific religious ecology. The Mormons 
are a case in point. Although the Mormon Church views ancestors and genealogies 
differently from the non-believers, in both cases, the underlying principle is similar: 
that the family is an important institution to be preserved. In light of this doctrine, 
Mormon hua ren feel they can participate in ancestor worship activities as a way to 
respect the family and preserve its unity. At the same time, several other Christian 
respondents said they eschewed any participation in ancestral worship activities. They 
saw ancestral worship activities within a religious narrative, and believed that that 
narrative contradicted their own religious beliefs.  
Ritualised forms of ancestor worship rituals are not the only memorialisation 
practices carried out among my respondents. The younger respondents at both sites 
appearred to be more involved in informal forms of memorialisation such as the 
telling of family stories than in ritualistic activities. Many have also personalised how 
they remembered their deceased family members beyond the ritualistic. For instance, 
those who were interested in literature and history were more inclined to attempt 
constructing their family histories or writing essays to commemorate the deceased 
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family members at their funerals or anniversaries. This trend suggests that younger 
respondents no longer located their cultural identities in the ritualistic, instead 
memorialisation is located in acts that are more culturally natural to them. Their 
participation in the “traditional” forms of ancestor memorialization can be said to be 
symbolic of their ethnic identity. 
 
HUA REN: A SYMBOLIC ETHNICITY? 
My research suggests that there are differences in terms of cultural identities in hua 
ren communities in Singapore and Taiwan largely as a result of historical 
developments and local conditions. These examples support other studies of “overseas 
Chinese” communities that found variations in identifications and practices in 
different hua ren communities.428 Despite the differences, my research of these hua 
ren communities has highlighted a common feature of the contemporary hua ren 
cultural identities, that is, contemporary hua ren cultural identity is a form of 
“symbolic ethnicity”. As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, symbolic ethnicity is a term 
coined by American sociologist Herbert Gans to refer to an identification that is  
characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant 
generation, or that of the old country; a love and pride in a tradition that 
can be felt without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour.429 
 
In Gans’ conceptualisation, symbolic ethnicity is individualistic and has no real social 
cost for the individual, since the identifications are neither intense nor frequent. 
                                                
428 The Encyclopaedia of the Overseas Chinese edited by Lynn Pan presents a comprehensive overview 
of the various communities of hua ren in different countries. The encyclopedia of Overseas Chinese, 
ed. Lynn Pan (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2006).  
429 Herbert J. Gans, “Symbolic ethnicity: the future of ethnic groups and cultures in America,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies 2, no. 1 (January 1979): 1-20 at p 9. 
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Symbolic ethnicity is rooted in family traditions, usually taking the form of leisure 
time activities and festive celebrations. In the case of symbolic ethnicity, the symbols 
are visible, clear in meaning and easily expressed and felt “without requiring undue 
interference in other aspects of life”.430 In the case of hua ren, one prime example of 
symbolic ethnicity is demonstrated during Qing Ming, with the visitations to the 
graves. The graves, offering of joss sticks and paper offerings, are clear symbols of 
ethnicity. There is no ambiguity to the meaning of Qing Ming: to honour one’s 
ancestors and deceased family members. As indicated earlier, in symbolic ethnicity, 
the adherence to traditions is voluntary and, at times, superficial. It is often dictated 
by existing social conditions and the outlook and lifestyle of the younger generation. 
With symbolic ethnicity, identity is no longer about an essence of being or orthopraxy 
but one that is underpinned by sentiment.  
Gans argued that symbolic ethnicity is a feature of t third or fourth generation 
Americans who, unlike their immigrant forebears, are not as anchored to 
preconceived groups and roles. For this generation, ethnic identity is a matter of 
choice and is no longer taken for granted. In the case of hua ren in Singapore and 
Taiwan, the case of symbolic ethnicity is also obvious. In examining the practice of 
ancestor worship, this thesis has found that contemporary hua ren ancestral practices 
are largely symbolic. As illustrated in previous chapters, the hua ren family ideal and 
its associated values of obedience, filial piety and the like, are no longer the only 
factors that shape the outlook of hua ren in an urban and industrial society. In 
addition involvement in ancestral practices among younger hua ren tends to be 
irregular and limited. In my interviews, a common response from both Singapore and 
Taiwan respondents was that they only participated in ancestor worship when asked 
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to, usually by senior members of their family. They were usually not the ones who 
initiate or lead the rites, but were followers. Very often, the acts of memorialisation 
were also not incorporated into their daily lives. Younger respondents also tended to 
participate in memorialisation activities only during particular points in the year such 
as Qing Ming or death anniversaries. These respondents cited the reason for their 
continued practice as simply adherence to family traditions; they did not have any 
intellectual or spiritual understanding of the rites and rituals. It was simply something 
that they “did”. Furthermore, their participation in such practices was easily curtailed 
when other aspects of their lives intervened, such as study or work commitments.  
There are perhaps two main reasons for this. The first relates to changes in the 
nature of the society and the economy. As we have discussed in the chapters on 
Singapore and Taiwan, contemporary studies indicate that family structures and 
values have changed as a result of societal changes. Urbanisation, modernisation and 
industrialisation are the three key processes that have impacted the structure and 
nature of the family. In an industrial and urban economy, the family is no longer the 
core social organisation needed for production as in an agricultural society. This 
reduces the need for the family to stay together on a piece of land. Especially in the 
case of Taiwan, urbanisation and industralisation have greatly increased the mobility 
of family members, many of whom have moved away from the family home for study 
or work. This engineered a splitting of the family unit, however temporal, and opened 
individuals and their families to competing influences that could shape their 
perspectives in life.  
The second reason for the development of the symbolic ethnic identities can 
be attributed to the state who plays a major role as an institution involved in the social 
construction and articulation of identities – cultural and national – of its citizens. This 
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is done mainly through policies related to citizenship, education and religion. In both 
Singapore and Taiwan, the state has been a key player in the shaping the cultural 
imaginations of its people.  The two case studies highlight that hua ren cultural 
identities and identifications in both locations are open to political and cultural 
manipulation and positioning by the various state authorities during various times in 
their history. How the state views its “Chinese” population, what it considers to 
constitute its “Chinese” population and how they are allowed to articulate their 
“Chinese” identity influences the formulation and implementation of policies. This is 
most notable in the fields of education, housing, and land use among others, which 
affect the cultural identity and the practices of its population.  
Hua ren in both sites have changed and modified their cultural practices in 
response to changes in their environments. In Singapore, the state has removed the 
material basis of much hua ren cultural organisation by taking over the social and 
material functions of the clans and even the extended family by providing housing, 
jobs and social services. These roles were traditionally undertaken by the clan 
associations, which are family writ large. When these major functions are removed 
from the clans, they no longer have much moral and social authority over its members, 
who now do not need to rely on the clans for their social needs. The clans’ functions 
have been largely relegated to being a venue for social networking and cultural 
education. With the dominance of English and Western education, as discussed below, 
the cultural identity of Singapore hua ren is no longer one that is anchored in 
belonging to a social “Chinese” community, as it was  during the colonial period. 
The material basis of hua ren cultural identity in Singapore is further mediated 
by religious conversions and linguistic limitations. In contemporary Singapore, 
religion and religious activities are no longer important markers of identity. Hua ren 
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experienced a bigger shift in religious affiliations than other ethnic groups in 
Singapore. The 2010 census revealed that the percentage of hua ren who identified 
themselves as Buddhist or Taoist had decreased from 64% in 2000 to 57% in 2010. 
During the same period, there was a corresponding increase in the proportion of 
Christians from 17% to 20% and persons with no religion from 19% to 22%.431 This 
is drastically different from early 20th century Singapore where 98% of hua ren 
claimed to practice Chinese religion.432 The growth of Christianity has had a major 
impact on hua ren cultural identity. Sociologist Tong Chee Kiong’s studies of religion 
in Singapore has shown that it is common for the younger generation of Christian 
believers and converts to view traditional “Chinese” practices as “irrational” and 
“superstitious”. In addition, a growing number of Singapore hua ren, even those 
without religious affiliations shared similar perceptions of ancestor worship.433  
One of the reasons for this trend can be attributed to Singapore’s English-
language and scientific system of education which renders the inexplicable and the 
non-text-based practices as “irrational” and “superstitious”.434 As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the education system in Singapore is based largely on the Enlightenment 
influenced scientific school where phenomenon has to be explicable to be believable. 
Visible and tangible evidence is touted as proof of existence. The exposure to the 
English language as the primary learning and working language encourages the 
understanding and acceptance of the Western way of thinking. Yet the evidence-based 
mode of learning stands in contradiction to any religion including Christianity. Yet 
Christians perceive their religion as a more “rational” and less “superstitious” religion 
                                                
431 Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2010 Statistical Release 1: demographic 
characteristics, education, language and religion (Singapore: Department of Statistics, 2011.). 
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(Springer, 2010), p 64.  
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compared to the Chinese religion, even though both are based on faith — belief in 
things unseen. Associated with Western culture, Christianity is accordingly viewed as 
part of a “superior” culture possibly because of the success of European colonialism 
and capitalism. Christians also argue that their religion is superior as it has a written 
text and trained clergymen, unlike Chinese religions.  
Language, one of the major material bases of hua ren cultural identity, has 
also been eroded. Up until the 1970s, the Anglo-influenced and Communist-fearing 
Singapore government were suspicious of Mandarin-speaking hua ren because of 
their perceived affinity with China. As a result, there was discrimination against 
Mandarin-speakers. From the late 1970s, the government did an about turn. To foster 
a sense of hua ren ethnic identity, the Singapore government decided to make 
Mandarin the “mother tongue” of all hua ren regardless of their dialect groups. All 
hua ren children had to learn Mandarin as a compulsory subject in schools. By the 
1990s, the ability to speak Mandarin and understand “Chinese” culture were seen as 
invaluable tools for doing business with mainland China, the world’s largest 
economy. But this was to be considered within the frameworks of bilingualism and 
biculturalism. Singapore hua ren were expected to be fluent in both English and 
Mandarin, so as to easily traverse between spheres of Western and Chinese cultures. 
Singaporean hua ren were now urged to speak Mandarin simply because they were 
hua ren and because their ancestors came from China. In 1980, 81.4% of the hua ren 
population spoke dialect while only 10.2% spoke Mandarin at home.435 By 2010, 
47.7% of hua ren spoke Mandarin at home, compared to 19.2% who spoke dialect.436 
                                                
435 Seen Kong Chiew, “Chinese Singaporeans: three decades of progress and changes,” in Ethnic 
Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia: a dialogue between tradition and modernity, ed. Leo Suryadinata, 
11-44 (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002), at p 24. 
436 Department of Statistics, Census of Population 2010 Statistical Release 1: demographic 
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Still, with English being used widely at school, work and home, the cultural identities 
of young Singapore hua ren are not based on language. The 2010 figures showed that 
English was the home language of 52% of hua ren aged 5 to14 years.437  
Compared to Singapore, Taiwan has a stronger material basis for hua ren 
cultural identity. The cultural markers such as lineages, temples and festivals are far 
more visible and ingrained in the everyday lives of the Taiwanese including the 
young, compared to Singapore. Unlike Singapore, Christians and Catholics make up 
only a very small proportion of Taiwan’s population. The overall cultural ecology is 
still one that is based heavily on Buddhism, Taoism and Chinese folk religion which 
place strong emphasis on the practice of ancestor worship. Like most young people in 
contemporary urban societies, many young Taiwanese respondents are not as well 
versed in cultural traditions as the older generation. Yet, the cultural dislocation in 
Taiwan is not as strong as it is in Singapore because of the KMT’s government 
policies over the years that have ensured the visibility of “Chinese” culture. The 
localisation movement in Taiwan has also played an instrumental role in defining the 
Taiwanese cultural identity by emphasising the local elements native to the island, 
such as regional developments and characteristics. This allows Taiwan hua ren to 
acknowledge the cultural elements of being Taiwanese hua ren without subscribing to 
the political position of identifying with China, the political entity.  
 Like in Singapore, Mandarin was an imposed language on the hua ren 
population. The KMT instituted Mandarin as the lingua franca when they governed 
the island between the 1950s and 1990s.  Mandarin was used as a language of 
instruction and business in place of Hokkien and Hakka – the languages of the 
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locals.438 But unlike in Singapore where the language and education policies were 
driven by economic considerations, the language and education policies in Taiwan 
were largely motivated by politics. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the KMT’s language 
policies were part of its deliberate efforts to set KMT-ruled Taiwan as being “more 
Chinese” than communist-ruled Mainland China and as the “authentic” vestige of 
Chinese culture. By so doing, the KMT wanted to cement its position as the sole, 
legitimate government of China and guardian of Chinese culture. For many 
Taiwanese born in the 1970s and after, Mandarin became their first language used in 
school and at work, although some were still able to speak dialects with their older 
family members. Although the Taiwan government has, since the 1990s, began to 
place emphasis on English fluency of its population, English has not reached the same 
level of prevalence in the everyday life of Taiwan hua ren. These policies nurtured a 
generation of hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan that were linguistically dislocated 
from their “native” cultural identities. In Singapore, it was more common to find 
young respondents more fluent in English than Mandarin or hua ren dialects, while in 
Taiwan, most young respondents were more comfortable in Mandarin than in 
Hokkien or Hakka. While some of the young respondents expressed embarrassment at 
their lack of fluency in dialect, many of them are aware that they are the products of 
their times. Their ability to speak Mandarin/English and inability to speak the family 
dialect was not something that they consciously worked at. 
The eroded material basis for the cultural identity of the younger hua ren 
respondents meant that much of the cultural knowledge they have could possibly be 
prosthetic rather than deeply embedded in their daily life. Take for instance ancestor 
worship. Although in both Singapore and Taiwan, ancestor worship is still practiced 
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among the hua ren, many young respondents do not ascribe much meaning to these 
practices. It was just something they did because their families did it. For these young 
people, their cultural identities are maintained through the logic of practice. This is 
especially the case in Singapore where the hua ren material environment  – physical 
manifestations of culture such as temples, architecture and practices – is weaker than 
in Taiwan. As such, hua ren cultural identity for the older group of respondents 
generally resides on a more emotional plane. Their hua ren identity is asserted by an 
affinity to the amorphous “Chinese” culture and history, or even just the ability to 
speak Mandarin or hua ren dialects. In such cases, the rites and rituals associated with 
ancestor worship are ascribed an even greater significance as a marker of hua ren 
identity in what the older respondents consider to be a “westernised” society.  
My fieldwork suggests a cultural gap between the older and younger 
generation of hua ren, a gap that is present in both Singapore and Taiwan. Although 
the younger respondents appear to be more mindful of the cultural practices related to 
ancestor worship than their counterparts in Singapore, they are also exhibiting a trend 
of increasingly personalising various memorialisation practices. Even though the 
material environment for ethnic and cultural identity is far stronger in Taiwan than in 
Singapore, the older generation of respondents – like their counterparts in Singapore – 
perceive the younger generation to be more culturally diluted as a result of growing 
influence of non-hua ren culture. As such, I argue that hua ren identification in 
Singapore and Taiwan, especially among the younger respondents (those aged 40 and 
below) qualifies as symbolic ethnicity. While they continue to practice certain cultural 
acts, such as ancestor worship, the act does not emanate from the essence of “being 
Chinese”, but is rather a symbolic one; they continue to do so as part of the family 
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tradition and obligation as a member of the family, and not so much as a result of 
deep-seated belief.  
In addition, my fieldwork also suggests that the cultural knowledge of hua ren 
respondents in Singapore and Taiwan tends towards the pedestrian and pragmatic, 
that they are in direct relation to family life rather than lofty cultural values. Although 
most of the younger respondents understand the concept of filial piety and its cultural 
significance, they do not associate it with filial piety or the lack of it.439 As mentioned 
earlier, ancestral worship is seen as just a family activity among the young. Older 
practitioners may lament the declining interest of the young in such traditional 
practices, but they are also able to reason the situation – times have changed, so will 
customs and traditions. While my hua ren respondents did not claim understanding of 
the finer details and meanings of the ancestral rites, they fully understood the 
significance of the act: to remember and pay respect to their ancestors. This has 
allowed them to locate their cultural identity in the performance of the 
memorialisation practice. In this way, it did not matter if the form of practice has 
changed from the past. What was important was that the continuance of the practice at 
different times and places allowed them to continue to mark themselves as hua ren. 
My research suggests that the memorialisation of ancestors has become 
increasingly individualised and built on an established personal relationship between 
the living and the dead. This is unlike the more traditional relationship between 
ancestors and their descendents built almost solely on the foundation of blood ties 
instead of personal relationships. The relationship has moved from a collective 
approach to an individualised one. My respondents highlighted to me individual 
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memorialisation practices, such as writing essays about one’s departed relatives or 
visiting their graves whenever one wishes, which were modifications of traditional 
practices. They made such modifications based on an intimate knowledge of the dead 
and the relationship with them. The nostalgia for the family’s past in some cases 
further motivates a need to individualise the ancestors and events in order to make 
them personally meaningful to the individual rather than see the family as a collective 
whole. Such an approach places individuals within the larger contexts of society and 
family and acknowledges their individual contributions. Unlike ancestral worship 
rites and rituals, these activities do not visibly or particularly mark the individuals 
who perform these practices as hua ren. It is precisely the lack of an ethnic marker 
such as religious rites that make these cultural identities symbolic as Gans’ 
conceptualised.   
For some individuals, one’s cultural origins continues to influence the “where 
we are at now” or “who we are now”. But the degree to which it influences 
individuals depends on the individual’s experiences and the social context in which he 
or she lives. My research indicates that ancestors and place of origins are not 
necessarily an important part of hua ren identity. As one Taiwan respondent 
explained: 
If insisting I have to trace my origins, (I’d say) my ancestors were zhang 
zhou ren (people from Zhangzhou ), but I have no concept or 
understanding of zhang zhou people. When talking about ancestor, I will 
first think of my paternal grandfather in Yunlin,440 at least it’s a place I’ve 
been before. Possibly because of the break in Taiwan history, it’s very 
difficult and complicated to seek identification from ancestors.” 
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For this respondent, personal knowledge and the existence of a relationship with 
people and places are necessary requirements for her to connect with her ancestors 
and community. The identification comes from frequent interaction and hence the 
intimate knowledge and experience built up over time. Identification with a more 
remote generation and place is only symbolic.  
As has been argued in much of the literature on globalisation, cultural 
boundaries have become more porous than before, making it harder to maintain the 
authenticity of one’s cultural practices, if authenticity can ever be ascertained. 
Retaining the symbolism of the cultural practices and individualising that symbolic 
meaning to fit in with one’s lifestyle and perspective is a way in which hua ren, in 
societies that are open to multi-cultural and social influences, are able to negotiate the 
various demands of identifications. 
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF CULTURAL IDENTITY 
My research suggests that for some, the ancestor worship is a marker of their ethnic 
and cultural identity as hua ren: they are hua ren, therefore they practice the acts that 
mark them as such. This group generally consists of the older respondents and hua 
ren Christians who continue to practice ancestor worship. For others, the practice of 
certain acts is not necessarily culturally meaningful other than it being a symbolic act 
of obligation. This is obvious in the case of the younger respondents who display 
symbolic ethnicity, which I argue, has increased in part due to ancestral 
memorialisation activities being inherently a “performance” of culture. Performance 
studies scholar Diana Taylor aptly pointed out that “not everyone comes to ‘culture’ 
or modernity through writing”, and thus it was “imperative to keep re-examining the 
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relationships between embodied performance and the production of knowledge”.441 
Indeed, most of the ancestral worship activities in the cultural repertoire of hua ren 
are acts of imagination not based on canonical texts. Like performance-based 
activities that include gestures, orality, movement, dance and singing, 
memorialisation practices such as ancestor worship, telling family stories and visiting 
the ancestral villages are ephemeral, non-producible knowledge.442 These practices 
are rarely written down or recorded. Furthermore the performance of the practice may 
vary from the previous time. As Peggy Phelan noted: 
Performance cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise 
participate in the circulation of representation of representations… 
Performance’s being…becomes itself through disappearance.443 
 
This means that the performance exists only in the present – its lifespan extends only 
for the time of the performance. Once the performance is completed, it disappears and 
“becomes something other than performance”.444 In the case of memorialisation 
activities, the performance of a specific act of memorialisation – offering joss sticks, 
visiting an ancestral village, or telling of a family stories – is only for the present. The 
experience cannot be exactly reproduced at another site or another time. Such 
reproduction is not the performance, but a representation of that performance. Viewed 
from another perspective, every act of memorialisation in different times and places 
can be considered as separate and individual performances. Edward Bruner holds that  
                                                
441 Diana Taylor, The archive and the repertoire: performing cultural memory in the Americas 
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cultures…are better compared through their rituals, theatres, tales, 
ballads, epics, and operas than through their habits. For the former are 
the ways in which they try to articulate the meaning.445  
 
The rituals and performances cited by Bruner are symbolic acts that reflect human 
behaviour and identities of the performers and audience, and the meanings marked in 
circumscribed contexts. But mingled with social performance – day-to-day 
interactions with people and social life – the meanings of each cultural performance 
changes. As explored in the case studies, hua ren in Singapore and Taiwan, while 
sharing the same cultural roots, have not kept up with the idealised version of 
practices. Each location has its own developmental trajectory – politics, local 
development, urbanisation and industrialisation – which has affected and shaped the 
cultural identities and identifications of its hua ren population. Furthermore each 
generation of hua ren has rationalised the meaning and form of its cultural practices 
in the Sinoscape in order to make sense of its continuity – or in some cases, 
discontinuity – in their lives. 
One major influence on the performance of the respondents’ cultural identity 
is the state’s management of ethnic and cultural identities. Sociologist Bauman 
Zygmunt coined the term “liquid modernity” to refer to the state of the contemporary 
society in which social forms and institutions no longer have enough time to solidify 
before they are modified, undermining their functions as frames of reference for 
human actions. Our modernity, Zygmunt argued, is an individualised and privatised 
one.446 Given this fluid nature of contemporary society in which the constant changes 
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446 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000). 
  Jaime Koh 
 228 
and splicing of cultures and practices are perceived as threats to many cultures, 
Singapore and Taiwan have adopted different approaches.  
I argued in Chapter 4, that Singapore’s management of hua ren culture and 
identity has to be considered in the context of its population policies, notably within 
the framework of multiculturalism and multiracialism. Ethnicity is highly 
institutionalised in Singapore, manifested in what is generally known as the CMIO 
framework – Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others – determined by the major census 
categories.447 Within this framework, the heterogeneous character of each group is de-
emphasised and simplified to a few essential characteristics. Being “Chinese” in 
Singapore means that one has a “Chinese” surname, speaks the language and writes 
the script. Because of the increased marginalisation of “Chinese” culture, the older 
generation of hua ren fear that there has been cultural erosion among the younger 
generation. This fear stems from the anxiety in times of fluid modernity, and one in 
which English – and other non-“Chinese” influences – dominate.  
In Taiwan, the anxiety regarding cultural identity is not as great as in 
Singapore. Among my respondents, there appeared to be no question about them being 
hua ren enough. Instead, the question was how Taiwanese were they? In Singapore, 
hua ren appear to shape their cultural imagination and identification to prove and 
maintain their cultural links to China, albeit for economic reasons than cultural. In 
Taiwan, the opposite seems to be true. The Taiwanese anxiety over their cultural 
identity relates to them wanting to carve out an identity that is separate from political 
and cultural China - a Taiwanese culture. In the initial years that KMT established 
itself on Taiwan, it made a political decision to distance itself from China culturally. 
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But as we discussed in Chapter 5, in wanting to distance itself and Taiwan from China, 
the KMT reached back to the pre-modern Chinese “traditional values”, advocating 
Confucianism and the use of Mandarin. In defying the KMT’s Mandarinisation of 
Taiwan, the opposition sought to construct local narratives of Taiwan’s cultural 
identities, most notably through language and literature. In doing so, they called for a 
return to the local and an emphasis on the regional.  
Defined as a legal and political entity with a distinct territorial boundary, the 
state has the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens within its 
demarcated territory.448 Traditionally, the state is seen as prone to reification and 
essentialism in order to maintain the status quo. Given its power over its citizens, the 
state has often been viewed as an inconvenient and unwelcomed player that is 
restrictive, oppressive, and diametrically opposed to the notions of multiplicity and 
flexibility associated within a globalised and cosmopolitan world.449  Unwelcome and 
inconvenient as it may be, the state remains a dominant political, social and 
organisational structure through which identities are generated and articulated. The 
state provides “an undeniable point of reference for thinking about belonging”.450 
This is especially true in the globalised and cosmopolitan environment where 
increased migration and the ease of crossing national boundaries – physical and 
otherwise – have brought issues of “us” and “them”, “insiders” and “outsiders” into 
sharp contrast. Populations have turned to the state to respond to these issues, not just 
rhetorically, but also in terms of policy decisions.451 The two case studies in this 
                                                
448 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and states: an enquiry into the origins of nations and the politics of 
nationalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p 1. 
449 Gavin Kendall, Ian Woodward and Zlatko Skrbis, The sociology of cosmopolitanism: globalisation, 
identity, culture and government (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).  
450 Ibid., p 41.  
451 One of the most prominent issues in the recent 2011 general elections in Singapore is the large 
number of foreign workers who are perceived to have taken up jobs, pushed up local housing prices, 
and linked to a host of other social issues, such as congested public transport. The issue fuelled the 
  Jaime Koh 
 230 
dissertation highlighted the inevitability of the state in articulating the identities of its 
peoples. At times, these identities may be at odds with the cultural identities and the 
memories these groups hold.  
 
LOGIC OF PRACTICE VS RATIONALISATION  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Pierre Bourdieu argued that practices may “have no other 
raison d’être than that they exist or are socially recognised as worthy of existing”.452 
According to Bourdieu’s argument, “rites are practices that are ends in themselves” 
which need no other interpretation. Making a similar argument, many of my 
respondents in Singapore and Taiwan – both old and young – remarked that they did 
not understand the rationale or reason for the ancestral rites and rituals they practiced. 
Despite the lack of understanding, the respondents carried out the practices anyway 
because “that’s how things have been done” and because doing it was “a sign of 
respect” for both the living and the dead. Others assigned their own meanings to the 
rituals to make it more personally relevant for them.   
In both Singapore and Taiwan, the younger hua ren respondents were able to 
give reasons for their symbolic hua ren cultural identity and token participation in 
ancestral practices, while older respondents tended to locate their cultural identity in 
the logic of practice. The heart of the gap between these two conditions is not so 
much the question of modernity versus traditions, but rather it is a juxtaposition of 
different modes of knowledge production and acquisition. In Western thought, 
“writing has become the guarantor of existence itself” which makes it difficult to 
                                                                                                                                      
opposition and the public’s call for the government to put Singaporeans first, with the ruling PAP 
assuring that Singaporeans are not sacrificed for economic gains. In the aftermath of the elections, 
immigration policies have been tightened to stem the numbers of foreigners who may qualify for 
working permit and permanent residency in Singapore.  
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accept and understand embodied practices, such as ancestor worship.453 The hua ren 
cultural repertoire accepts the “how” of the practices as they are, without the need for 
explanation or knowledge of its significance and meaning. Its raison d’état is not 
based on scriptural texts; it is what it is because it is how it is done. In contrast to the 
written culture, a practice-based culture is less controllable because “the actions of the 
repertoire do not remain the same”.454 Unlike writing whose authority stems from its 
apparent stable and unchanging nature, repertoire is more fluid. It  
requires presence: people participate in the production and reproduction 
of knowledge by ‘being there’ being part of the transmission….The 
repertoire both keeps and transforms choreographies of meaning…455 
 
Such is the case with traditional “Chinese” religious ritual practices, which are 
transmitted through observation and imitation rather than through texts or formal 
instruction. Where ancestor worship is concerned, there is a high degree of flexibility 
and malleability. Many of the rites and rituals have been simplified and adapted to 
make them more applicable to modern life. This malleability and flexibility of 
practice is in part due to the nature of ancestor worship – it is not a text-based practice 
but one that is passed down orally. In the process of transmission, personal 
preferences may be consciously or otherwise included. Furthermore, “the traditional 
Chinese religion is one that is highly pragmatic, problem-oriented and this-worldly 
rather than philosophical,” which allows a high degree of adaptation by the 
practitioner. 456 
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This is in opposition to the text-based mode of knowledge production and 
acquisition that is derived from the scientific and systematic form of learning. This 
mode challenges ideas grounded in tradition and faith, seeking to anchor the world in 
empiricism, scientific rigour, reductionism, and the questioning of religious and 
cultural orthodoxy. Viewed from this perspective, cultural traditions such as ancestor 
worship appear to be irrational and illogical because they are not based on written 
texts, which are taken as evidence of being grounded in the intellectual tradition of 
critical thinking. 
Rationalisation is a central theme in German sociologist Max Weber’s 
analysis of modernity. Weber saw rationalisation as a process of disenchantment in 
which the “intrinsic meanings of values or actions are subordinated increasingly to a 
‘rational’ quest for efficiency and control.”457 Instead of being bound to a religious 
narrative, rationalisation places cultural values within the narrative of secularisation 
and the enlightenment concept of infinite progress. The process of rationalisation 
underlies the shift from a traditional world ordered by religious values to one that is 
ordered on rationality and efficiency.458 Based on Weber’s idea of rationalisation, 
Singapore sociologist Tong Chee Kiong argued that rationalisation was what caused  
individuals (to) shift from an unthinking and passive acceptance of 
religion to one where there is a tendency to search for a religion that they 
regard as systematic, logical and relevant.459  
 
While the process of rationalisation as Weber conceptualised can be applied to 
the case of those who have moved away from religion – such as hua ren who profess 
no religious affiliations, it is problematic when applying the term “rationalisation” to 
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hua ren who converted from Chinese religions to Christianity. This is because it is a 
case of replacing one religion with another, and not a case of replacing a religious 
narrative with a secular one, as Weber conceived. While Tong did not argue that 
Christianity was a more rational religion than Chinese religion, the use of the term 
rationalisation in the case of hua ren Christians’ explanation for their conversion may 
be confusing. It could be mistakenly understood that Christianity is a more rational 
religion than Chinese religions because, as mentioned in Chapter 4, Tong took 
rationalisation to mean a “clarification, specification and systemisation of the ideas 
which men have concerning their reason for being”.460 As I also argued in Chapter 4, 
Christianity, like most religions, is based on faith, despite the fact that its adherents 
believe that their faith is more rational than other faiths.  
But if we were to take rationalisation to mean the interpretation of the written 
word (the Bible) to bring one’s religious beliefs in line with one’s thinking, then 
rationalisation may be used to describe Christian hua ren’s justifications of their 
participation or non-participation in ancestor worship activities. In this sense, 
rationalisation is a way for individuals to negotiate between traditional beliefs and a 
modern lifestyle. By rationalising and explaining their actions in ways that can fit into 
their cultural and religious outlooks, respondents are better able to make sense of the 
practice and integrate it into their everyday lives. Through rationalisation, respondents 
are able to select cultural elements to include in their practical repertoire. In the case 
of ancestor worship, rationalisation is a way of convincing practitioners that the 
constant simplification and adaption of practices is a logical and reasonable response 
to a changing environment (such as burial and cremation, for example) and not a form 
of disrespect to the dead and its traditions. What mattered was not the details but the 
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symbolic meaning of the rituals. Changes could be made to practices as long as the 
practice was informed by the same principle: that the dead are still respected and 
remembered as part of the family. Rationalisation also helps explain how some hua 
ren are able to reconcile traditional practices with modern lifestyles. 
 
REIMAGINATIONS OF BEING HUA REN  
In this thesis, I have used the framework of the Sinoscape to analyse cultural 
identity. The Sinoscape comprises of cultural practices, memory and the various 
ways in which hua ren imagine themselves, their communities, and their worlds.  
It is shaped by the imagination of generations of hua ren in different locations 
under different social circumstances, and subjected to the forces of localisation 
and modification. As a framework, the Sinoscape is spacious enough to 
accommodate the various cultural imaginations, creating possibilities.  
Cultural imagination is important because it is “no longer mere fantasy…no 
longer simple escape…no longer elite pastime…and no longer mere 
contemplation”.461  Instead  
the imagination has become an organised field of social practices, a form 
of work…and a form of negotiation between sites of agency…and 
globally defined fields of possibility… The imagination is now central to 
all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of 
the new global order.462  
 
The thesis has demonstrated that the Sinoscape is expansive enough to accommodate 
the cultural imaginations of generations and different groups of hua ren. The 
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symbolic nature of hua ren cultural identity has provided the cultural space that 
engenders the cultural reproduction of its practices. Examining components of the 
Sinoscape such as cultural memory reveals the differences between hua ren 
experiences and reflects the localisation and indiginisation of hua ren. Taiwanese 
author and filmmaker Wu Nien-Jen succinctly made this point while reflecting on his 
inspiration for his directorial debut, A Borrowed Life: 
In Taiwan, there is an entire generation of people who are orphans of 
history. They were born during the Japanese occupation and received a 
Japanese education; then, virtually overnight, they had to transform 
themselves into Chinese. But it isn’t easy to completely change your entire 
value system just like that. Just like Lee Teng-hui…so many people curse 
him as a Japan lover and tell him to pack up and head back to Japan. I 
think these people really need to re-read the history of Taiwan…What 
happened to this whole generation born under the Japanese occupation is 
so very tragic. It is not they who did not want to embrace China, Taiwan 
was ceded to Japan and they received a Japanese education – that is all that 
they knew…Why can’t people understand this problem?463  
 
Although the traditional imagined world of hua ren – replete with historical 
and cultural values, norms and expectations – forms a part of the cultural identity, it is 
not the only component of hua ren identity. As Wu’s quotation above highlighted, the 
“traditional” imagined world is not the only world in which hua ren inhabit. There are 
alternative, imagined worlds that compete for and are imposed on hua ren. Although 
the traditional imagined world of hua ren has provided some form of stability and a 
common narrative thread for hua ren cultural memory, the reproduction of this world 
is not immune to changes. Trans-generational stability of knowledge464 can no longer 
be assumed to be constant, unwavering and secure. In many cases, as we have seen 
modifications to the content and form of knowledge have been made. In other cases, 
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there is a complete break of the reproduction process when there is a break in the 
transmission. Traditional practices such as ancestor worship are no longer a steady 
point of cultural reference for hua ren in light of values, outlook, and lifestyles being 
recalibrated according to a different set of conventions and standards. New 
experiences have influenced that repertoire of cultural knowledge and practices. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, memory becomes knowledge as it is transmitted. In 
transmission, the knowledge can be mediated by an individual’s external 
environment. This mediated knowledge, in turn, is transmitted as memory, which can 
often be categorised as vicarious memory or prosthetic memory, as the individual 
takes on these knowledge as his or her own memory even though he or she has never 
personally experienced the event. Through these prosthetic cultural memories, the 
individuals may embrace identities and identifications that are more symbolic. 
The substance of hua ren cultural memory, and hence identity, is not just 
knowledge about Confucian ethics or fluency in the complicated religious rites and 
rituals. In fact, more often than not, memories passed down in and through the family 
are more mundane and pedestrian matters that relate specifically to the family, rather 
than to the “Chinese” civilization and culture as a whole. Among the most active 
agents of generating and transmission of memory and experiences are family 
members. In performing the rites and rituals of memory, however modified, the 
participants actualise the abstract concepts of respect, kinship and blood ties. The 
latter are also actualised in the day-to-day family interactions. The cultural knowledge 
and memory is neither transmitted in its entirety nor actively. It is common for elderly 
family members to “censure” or modify practices they were taught or have learnt, 
before (and if) they pass it on to their children. These elders had already reasoned that 
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the rites and rituals, being complicated and developed in a distant time, might not be 
totally relevant to the modern society in which their descendents live in.  
Ultimately, the case of cultural identity is a case of positioning and 
representation. In examining the notion of “Chinese” identity for Chinese American 
university students, Andrea Louie465 argues that  
the political changes that have occurred in China, especially since 1949, 
have politicised the concept of ‘Chineseness’ so that Chinese identity is no 
longer only a question of the inheritance of the preservation of tradition 
but also of political ideology and self-definition.466 
 
Most Chinese studies place China at the centre of “being Chinese” and/or 
“Chineseness”. But the Chineseness of China is not necessarily congruent with the 
Chineseness of hua ren elsewhere.467 As Caroline Hau argues, “in practice, no single 
political entity/regime embodies or exercises ultimate authority on “China”, 
“Chinese” and “Chineseness”.468 Although the mainland’s importance in economic 
and political terms have increased significantly in the past 30 years, it is not the 
preeminent cultural arbiter of “Chineseness”, whatever it may entail.469 Unlike the 
United States or Japan, China’s soft power on the world and on communities of hua 
ren around the world is relatively weak. Furthermore, what soft power it has is 
challenged by rival centres of hua ren cultural influence – Hong Kong and Taiwan 
during much of the post Second World War years. The various communities of 
“ethnic Chinese” in Southeast Asia have also successfully claimed their versions of 
                                                
465 Andrea Louie, “Chineseness across borders: renegotiating Chinese Identities in China and the 
United States”, Durham: Duke University Press, 2004. 
466 Ibid., pp 52-53. 
467 Wang Gungwu, “The Chineseness of China: Selected Essays”, Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1991, p7. 
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“Chineseness”.470 The product “would be distinctively and recognisably Chinese and 
that may be all the matters”.471 
In a notion of symbolic ethnicity, cultural identity has to be viewed as a 
multidirectional concept. While practice reflects identity, identity itself is informed 
largely by memory which has been shown to be multifaceted. In his study of the 
relationship between memory of the Holocaust and decolonisation, Rothberg argued 
for a rethink of the nature and presentation of memory. The current framework 
addressing the relationship between memory and identity is flawed, he argued. Instead 
of seeing memory as competitive and privative, it should be regarded as open to 
influences and productive. Memory should not be a zero-sum game in which one 
group’s memory or one memory gains ascendency at the expense of another. 
Rothberg writes: 
The concept of multidirectional memory…is meant to draw attention to 
the dynamic transfers that take place between diverse places and times 
during the act of remembrance….The model of multidirectional memory 
posits collective memory as partially disengaged from exclusive versions 
of cultural identity and acknowledges how remembrance both cuts across 
and binds together diverse spatial, temporal and cultural sites.472 
 
The concept of multidirectional memory takes into account the 
multilayered nature of collective memory, which is highly mediated through 
how it is remembered, presented and articulated. Even though Rothberg was 
addressing the case of the Holocaust specifically, his concept of multidirectional 
memory is an important framework in the study of the relationship between 
memory and identity. This productive and intercultural dynamic that Rothberg 
                                                
470 Ibid.  
471 Wang, “The Chineseness of China”, p 7. 
472 Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional memory: remembering the Holocaust in the age of 
decolonization (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p 1. 
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called multidirectional memory provides an interesting framework for the case 
of hua ren cultural identity in Singapore and Taiwan.  
The two case studies in this thesis highlighted the multidirectional nature 
of cultural identity. The identity is a multilayered in that it comprises “Chinese” 
traditions and customs and “Chinese” history – both of which transcend national 
boundaries. It also comprises the “national” collective – the Singapore Story, 
and the narratives of Taiwan’s history – in addition to the local, regional history. 
Finally, the cultural identity of the hua ren is also moulded and shaped by their 
individual families’ and personal experiences. While similar in certain aspects, 
the cultural identity of hua ren in both sites differs in other areas as a result of 
the different socio-historical developments. Although both sites underwent a 
phase of rapid industrialisation and urbanisation in the 60 years since the end of 
the Second World War, and both have become economically successful and 
technologically advanced, Singapore and Taiwan’s societies are molded by 
different experiences. Japanese, Nationalist and American influences feature 
strongly in Taiwan society, while British and American cultural influences have 
an impact on Singapore’s society.  
The Sinoscape, as this study has demonstrated, is a space in which 
various possibilities of cultural permutations can take place. It neither 
essentialises nor is it so extensive and shapeless as to render any analysis of hua 
ren cultural identity ambiguous. This study has taken cultural practices as an 
index of cultural identity. While an important index, practices are by no means 
the only indicator of cultural identity. As the research has shown, the Sinoscape 
is a realm of possibility. Taken together with other analytical frameworks, such 
as Shih Shu Mei’s Sinophone and Chua Beng Huat’s “Pop culture China”, 
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which were discussed in Chapter 1, the Sinoscape demonstrates the range of 
possibilities where hua ren cultural identities are concerned. While practices 
may mark one’s cultural identity, and state authorities may impose ethnic labels 




This study is an attempt to concretise the abstract notion of hua ren identity by 
examining the changing cultural identities of two hua ren communities through 
material cultural practices relating to ancestor memorialisation, possibly one of the 
most  “distinctively and recognisably Chinese” set of cultural practices.  
Chapter 1 argued for the importance of distinguishing between ethnicity as 
race and ethnicity as culture. While race has been debunked as a basis of social 
categorisation, culture, however articulated and expressed, remains a potent element 
by which one is indentified. While it is expected that a hua ren (or any individual) to 
be well-versed in his culture, which should come “naturally”, it is not necessarily the 
case. At the most fundamental level, we are born into our ethnicity; it is almost 
inescapable. On another level, individuals acquire culture. Biographically, people are 
multicultural selves, adding to and subtracting from the cultural equation of their 
multilayered identities (including elements related to nationality, gender, ethnic and 
the like) as they develop throughout their lives. A person does not necessarily identify 
with the culture of his or her own ethnicity. This is especially true in the 
contemporary social context of globalisation and cosmopolitanism given the ease of 
travel and movement across territories, and the proliferation of education, mass media 
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and other cultural products. This makes it all the more obvious that ethnic labels are a 
function of the politics of identity. The same can be said of hua ren communities or 
any other ethnic and cultural communities. “Being”, “becoming” or “unbecoming” an 
identity is a result of acculturation, and at times, of political positioning and labelling. 
An important source capital in the formation of one’s identity is cultural memory 
constructed through stories heard and personal experiences, and passed on from one 
generation to another. In the process the cultural memory is remodelled and 
reinterpreted according to the temporal, spatial and personal contexts.  
This study is a first attempt at trying to anchor the large and complicated issue 
of cultural change in hua ren communities within a broader theoretical field. Given 
the ambition of the task, the study does have several limitations. This research was 
not meant to generate a comprehensive statistical map of the research sites. Instead, it 
intended to establish an indicative map of the current social situation. While the data 
may not be generalisable for the whole research sites, which is too diverse and the 
variables too many, it provides a preliminary overview of the contemporary cultural 
configuration of the hua ren at both sites. Significantly, the research would benefit 
from a larger scale and more systematic implementation of Daniel Bertaux’s family 
case history methodology as initially proposed. 
Several potential areas of study for future work could include a study of the 
similarities and differences between family memorialisation practices and national 
commemorations of an ethnic and cultural group, and what sort of cultural identity the 
practices may reveal. The study could also be extended to other ethnic and cultural 
groups, such as a comparative study between the ancestor memorialisation practices 
between two different groups in order to study what that reveals about the culture and 
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character of the respective groups. A larger question may be, what is the role of the 
ancestor in shaping the cultural identities of these groups.  
This research has a practical significance in the ways in which hua ren in this 
region are perceived, academically and popularly. Especially in the face of a 
politically, economically and culturally resurgent China, will these hua ren be 
overshadowed and their identities co-opted (once again) into the larger all-
encapsulating ethnic identity of “Chinese” and their other identities (nationalities) 
eclipsed? These “rival claims” of Chineseness that may yet one day converge “into a 
new mainstream that all will acknowledge as unmistakably Chinese”, as scholar 
Wang Gungwu hopes.473 Conceptually, it also raises the question of whether there is a 
need for an ethnic/cultural reference in this day and age of globalisation and 
transationalism?  
The research also highlighted the importance of recognising the different 
modes of knowledge in operation, and the dominance of the rational mode of 
knowledge. With this in mind, we may have to reconsider some of the intellectual 
paradigms in use. These are pertinent issues that could provide a springboard for 
further research and analysis.  
 
~ 
                                                
473 Wang, “The Chineseness of China”, p 7. 
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Survey on how Singapore Chinese remember their ancestors  
 
I am a PhD student in the Cultural Studies in Asia Programme at the National University of 
Singapore researching on how people remember their ancestors.  
 
As part of my research, I am carrying out a survey to find out about how Singapore’s Chinese 
relate to their ancestors, family and Chinese culture. I would appreciate if you can spare about 
15 minutes to help complete this questionnaire.  
 
This is not a test on how much you know. There is no right or wrong answer. Instead I am 
interested in your personal opinions and experiences.  
 
The findings from this survey will form the basis of my PhD thesis. Your responses and the 
information you provide will be confidential. It will only be used for the purpose of this 
research and may be included in the thesis and/or related publications in academic journals 
and conference papers.  
 
If you have any queries about this survey, please feel free to contact me at  
(+65) 98782511 or jaime.koh@nus.edu.sg.  
 
Thank you for your help.  
 
Jaime Koh 
PhD Candidate, Cultural Studies in Asia Programme  

















电话号码： ＋65 98782511 
电邮地址： jaime.koh@nus.edu.sg 
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I. Activities on remembering your ancestors 
纪念祖先的活动  
 
1. Please circle the activities that your family participate in. Please fill in the corresponding 






 活动  
 
Occasions these activities are 
carried out 
 些活动在什么时候进行？  
 
 
Do you participate? Why or 
why not? 
你有参与吗？   
原因？  
 
Worship of ancestral 










Visiting ancestral tablets 








(tracing family tree or 
adding details to your 






Compiling family history 
(e.g. writing down or 
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Telling stories about 















2. In addition to those activities listed above, do you think there are other ways with which 


















4. Do you think it is important to remember your ancestors? Please give your reason(s) 
below.  










5. Do you feel that remembering one’s ancestors is a central feature of Chinese culture? 
Please explain your answer briefly.  
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II. Religion and identity 
   宗教与身份认同  
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3. Do you feel that your ancestors and/or place of origins are important aspect of your 












III. Biographical data 
      个人资料  
 
 


























What is the main 






What languages do 
you use at home? 
(Please list in order of 
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Who in your family is 
the first generation to 






Who in your family 








Thank you for taking part in this survey. Your help is very much appreciated.  
谢谢您的参与！ 
 
If you are willing to further share your experiences with me in an interview, kindly 
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